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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the April 13, 1998, announcement of a mega-merger
between BankAmerica and NationsBank, creating the first ever coast to
coast banking organization, it is essential to examine how these merger and
acquisition deals will affect bank customers. San Diego, almost Bank-
America's hometown, is a stark illustration of this national trend. This deal
alone will affect over twenty-nine million bank customers in twenty-two
states;2 merger mania has the potential to affect over 140 million depositors
and customers nationally.
Since the financial regulatory changes of the 1980s, especially deregu-
lation and interstate banking, financial institutions have used mergers and
acquisitions as their primary method of growth. While the amalgamation
option has been tremendously successful for banking organizations, it has
been perilous for bank customers. The national and super-regional financial
institutions, no longer in a position where they have to please all the deposi-
tors all the time, have reduced services to the individual customer, instituted
higher fees for services offered, reduced support to the communities in
which they do business, and there are less opportunities for small business
credit. Since the merger frenzy began, the sheer number of financial institu-
tions a depositor has vying for their business has been significantly reduced.
The disappearance of banking organizations in San Diego was a preview of
what was to happen nationally.
In 1985, there were 14,417 insured commercial banks and 3,626 insured
savings institutions doing business in the United States? At the industry's
largest point there were 30,000 commercial banks in the United States.4 Of
the insured savings institutions, 219 were located in California.5 By 1996,
9,530 insured commercial banks and 1,924 insured savings institutions re-
mained, and only sixty-six of those insured savings institutions continued to
do business in California.6 'Troubles for California banking gained national
prominence when Security Pacific's position continually weakened in its
'equal merger' with BankAmerica. This merger with its shifting equilibrium
also foreshadowed the changing fortunes of [northern and southern Califor-
1. BankAmerica is actually headquartered in San Francisco. Under the terms of the
BankAmerica/NationsBank deal, the merged bank will be headquartered in North Carolina,
which will have significant and immediate ramifications on the San Diego and California
economies.
2. See Bank Merger OK'd-BankAnerica, NationsBank Approved by Federal Reserve,
THE DALLAS MORNINGNEws, Aug. 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13095820.
3. See DIv. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FDIC, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES BANKING INDUSTRY 1934-1996 A-i, B-2 (1997) [hereinafter STATISTICS ON
BANIUNG].
4. See REFORMING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 86
(Gerard Caprio Jr. & Dimitri Vittas eds., 1997) [hereinafter REFORMING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS].
5, See STATISTICS ON BANKING, supra note 3, at B-7.
6. See icL at A-i, A-2, B-2, B-3, B-7.
[Vol. 35
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nia]."7
When 1987 came to a close, there were thirty-seven banking organiza-
tions in the San Diego financial market.8 Sixteen of tho e organizations were
considered major players
More than any other single factor, amalgamation has been responsible
for this result. From the beginning of San Diego's first merger activity in
1981 by Great American Bank, to the August 1997 merger between Great
Western and Washington Mutual, leaving Washington Mutual with com-
bined assets of $94 billion,"0 and the latest development to affect San Diego,
the BankAmerica/NationsBank merger that will create a $600 billion bank,
the growth of financial institutions in Southern California, San Diego par-
ticularly, has been achieved through amalgamation. The amalgamation of
banking has had a huge impact on the San Diego bank customer, the well-
being of the community, local unemployment, and the city's economic
growth.
Historically, banking was limited geographically. Today, primarily be-
cause of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994," and the heightened competition
amalgamation has brought, the public perceives banking to be fragmented,
overly saturated, and even inefficient. The public fear of large banks having
too much power is still very prevalent in society. So much power in the
hands of so few is against the public interest This is the kind of fear that led
to today's restrictive banking environment. For example, constraints remain
an integral part of the new interstate legislation, such as the limit on the per-
cent of deposits that a single bank can control in any one state or nationally
under Riegle-Neal."2
By 1992, mergers and acquisitions had left San Diego with ten major
banking organizations. Today the San Diego market is serviced by only three
large commercial banks 3 and five small, mainly local institutions which of-
7. Arnold G. Danielson, Banking on California: And Then There Were Two-BofA and
Wells, 15 No.10 BANKING POL'Y REP. 6 (May 20, 1996).
8. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies and Top Area Savings and Loan Institutions,
SANDIEGo Bus. J. BOOKOFLISTS, Dec. 1987, at 29, 79.
9. The commercial banks were Bank of America, Security Pacific National Bank, Cali-
fornia First Bank, Union Bank of California, and to a lesser degree, Crocker National Bank
and Bank of Commerce. Wells Fargo Bank was not yet a factor in the Southern California
market. Commercial contenders of significantly smaller asset size consisted of First National
Bank, Peninsula Bank, First Interstate Bank, Grossmont Bank, and Bank of San Diego. The
dominant savings institutions included Ahmanson & Company's subsidiary Home Savings of
America, San Diego Trust and Savings Bank, Home Federal Savings and Loan, Imperial
Savings Association, and Great American First Savings Bank. See id.
10. See Letter from Michael L. Amato, Senior Vice President of Great Western Bank, to
Great Western Customers (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author).
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831(u), 1842(d) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
12. See Charlotte L. Tart, Expansion of the Banking Industry Under the Riegle-Neal In-
terstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Is the Banking Industry Headed in the
Right Direction?, 30 WAK FOREsT L. REV. 915, 916 (1995).
13. Those banks are Union Bank, Wells Fargo Bank, and BankAmerica, and one regional
savings institution with a minor presence, Home Savings. Great Western Bank, now Wash-
3
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fer some savings products but mainly promote themselves as commercial or-
ganizations, emphasizing their commercial products.14 If not for the local
credit unions, the institutional savings market would be extinct
All of this is contrary to the public interest. What remains available to-
day for San Diego depositors are banking organizations that are huge con-
glomerates or tiny establishments. The continuing trend with super-regional
and national banking organizations not only compromises competition but
threatens to eliminate it. Whether service to customers and the communities
into which these financial institutions venture remains any part of the busi-
ness of banking is, as a consequence, a growing concern. It is not necessary
for financial institutions to sacrifice customer service, community involve-
ment, and limit credit opportunities to maximize profits.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
"The first public announcement of the organization of a savings bank in
the United States appears in the Christian Disciple of Boston in 1816. The
Society for the Prevention of Pauperism had conducted an inquiry into phil-
anthropic methods of encouraging and protecting the savings of the poor."'5
The result of the inquiry was a small donation of capital and the bank was
open for business.'6 Inspired by the clergy, banking was created for the peo-
ple.
These savings institutions 7 were originally established for charitable
purposes and not necessarily to make a profit. The original task of banking
was to encourage people to deposit money in savings accounts, facilitate
home ownership, and supply credit to groups of workers or farmers who
could not obtain adequate credit at existing banking facilities."3 "Commercial
banks were... criticized for neglecting the financial needs of farmers, arti-
sans, and small traders, as well as low- and middle-income people, espe-
cially with regard to their needs for mortgage loans to finance the acquisi-
tions of houses. Specialized thrift deposit institutions, ranging from various
ington Mutual, was the last remaining major regional savings institution.
14. Grossmont Bank, Bank of Commerce, Peninsula Bank, Scripps Bank, and First Na-
tional Bank complete the San Diego market of financial institutions.
15. MoRRis L. ERNsT, Too BIG 97 (1940).
16. See id.
17. For purposes of discussion in this paper, the term "savings institutions" encompasses
savings banks, thrifts, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and is defined as a
savings organization established to make loans for the purchase of real estate or a home to
those persons who hold accounts at the organization and the public in general from the de-
posits of such account holders. Such institutions are either chartered by the state in which an
organization does business or the federal government, and is insured by the Federal Savings
and Loan Association or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. If chartered by the fed-
eral government, a savings institution is designated as a federal savings and loan association
(S&L), and is regulated by various financial regulatory agencies, including but not limited to
the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
18. See REFORMINGFINANCIAL SYSTEms, supra note 4, at 142, 144, 149.
[Vol. 35
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types of savings banks and credit cooperatives to credit unions and housing
finance institutions, were created or emerged spontaneously to fill these gaps
in the financial system throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries.
,'9
"Savings banks originally invested all their funds in government
bonds,"' so it was only natural they would become regulated by the gov-
ernment. "By 1875 the investment choice for savings banks had been en-
larged to include bonds of railroad and utility companies, and first mortgages
up to about half of the value of [the pledged] real estate .... With billions
invested in real estate, these banks became vital instruments" in the growth
and development of cities." Certainly this was true in the case of San Diego.
Two of the city's most predominant savings institutions, Great American
Bank beginning in 1885 and Home Federal Savings and Loan beginning in
1934, were undeniably instrumental in building the city of San Diego.
During World War II the Roosevelt Administration introduced a plan to
coordinate national housing policies. Central to this approach was stimulat-
ing a sense of cooperation between all federal agencies overseeing both
banks and savings institutions. Commercial banks' had traditionally been
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and were
regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB or "Board") and the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Savings institutions received federally subsidized
loans, were under the regulatory control of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB or "Bank Board"), and secured insurance protection from
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
"As a result of the Great Depression, Congress created a federal insur-
ance-of-accounts system to restore public confidence in the security of thrift
institutions and to ensure a sound and economical means of home financing.
The FSLIC fund reimburses a thrift depositor for savings lost through the
failure of a savings and loan association. It [was] however, the statutory duty
of the [Federal Reserve] Board to administer the FSLIC fund" under the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the National Housing Act of
1934.24 "FSLIC insurance, in the case of state-chartered associations, is vol-
untary and becomes effective only if such institutions apply for it and are ac-
cepted. As a condition for eligibility under the program, state-chartered
19. Id. at 13.
20. Ernst, supra note 15, at 99.
21. ME
22. See Top 25 Area Public Companies, SAN DIEcO Bus. J. BOOK OFLISTS, Dec. 1987, at
53.
23. For purposes of discussion in this paper, a "commercial bank' is a corporation which
receives money on deposit makes loans, issues promissory notes, cashes checks or drafts and
discounts commercial paper, is either a state chartered organization or a federally chartered
national bank, and is regulated by various financial regulatory agencies, including but not
limited to the Comptroller of the Currency.
24. Lincoln Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 670 F. Supp. 449,
449-50 (D.D.C. 1987).
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thrifts agree to inspection and regulation by the Board. The Board... pos-
sesses the ultimate authority to terminate an association's insurance if it
finds that institution engaging in unsafe and unsound practices." The ma-
jority of state-chartered California savings institutions did in fact apply for
FSLIC insurance when they converted from federal or mutual savings or-
ganizations to stock organizations incorporated in the state of California.
"By 1940, [there were] about six hundred [mutual savings] organiza-
tions [across the country], controlling about ten billion dollars of the nation's
savings, collected from about twelve million separate accounts. 2 6 "[Total
deposits in ordinary commercial banks [on the other hand], amount[ed] to
more than forty billion dollars."' Just as it is today, "a depositor who [did]
not like the way 'his' bank was run had but one [ultimate] remedy-with-
drawal of his moneys from deposit"28
In 1942, Congress created the National Housing Agency and placed un-
der its jurisdiction the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; in 1955 the Bank
Board became the premier independent federal savings institutions regula-
tory agency.
Over the next twenty years savings institutions marketed and provided
only one major product, home mortgage loans. The task of commercial
banks by contrast, was to satisfy the short-term credit needs of consumers
and businesses. The remaining banking services (stock market and bond
sales) became the domain of investment banks that were regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Since the beginning of World War II, banking has been extremely lu-
crative in Southern California. From the 1930s to the early 1960s, savings
institutions primarily, and banks to a lesser degree, were the actuators of the
American dream of home ownership. Savings institutions profited by mak-
ing more interest on the home mortgages they offered than they paid on
savings accounts. Commercial banks and savings institutions continued to
focus on offering different services and different accommodations to cus-
tomers. The two rarely competed for deposits from the same customers.
"The National Bank Act,29 as well as state banking laws, limited banks to
three types of 'business of banking' powers in order to protect the safety and
soundness of the banking system: deposit taking, credit granting, and credit
exchange."3
"The Banking Act of 1933 prohibited the payment of interest on check-
ing accounts, and the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Q placed a ceiling
on the interest rates banks and thrifts could pay on time and savings ac-
25. Id. at 454.
26. ERNST, supra note 15, at 97.
27. Id.
28. Id at 98.
29. 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
30. Tart, supra note 12, at 925.
[Vol. 35
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counts."'" Regulation Q,3" which had long been considered a banker's tool
because it discouraged competition, now caused difficulties for banking or-
ganizations. This regulation, which previously restricted only commercial
banks, was imposed on savings institutions in 1966. Regulation Q had pro-
vided savings institutions with the ability to pay one-quarter to one-half of a
percentage point more than commercial banks on deposits.3 This advantage
was perceived as compensating S&L customers for the limitation on banking
products that savings institutions could offer. Now, for the first time com-
mercial banks and savings institutions were on equal footing in attracting
depositors, although Congress did empower S&Ls to continue offering a
slightly higher fraction of a percentage point on deposits than commercial
banks. It was in this way that the savings institutions' deposit business stabi-
lized.
"In the years of generally stable rates, home loans had been a low risk
investment. Repayment was all but assured. Even when strapped, borrowers
kept up with mortgage payments. But home loans presented a high risk in-
deed when rates were unstable. A [S&L] could not make money if it had to
pay depositors ten cents on the dollar while earning only six cents in long
term mortgages booked years earlier."' "In response to this squeeze, Con-
gress in 1964 allowed [savings institutions] to venture out of real estate into
college and other education loans. Eight years later, in a step that put [sav-
ings institutions] in head-to-head competition with commercial banks,
Massachusetts thrifts used a loophole in the banking laws to introduce an
interest-bearing checking account called a negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW) account in an effort to attract short term funds. Although customers
were restricted to a few withdrawals a month from the account, the service
proved so popular that Congress approved the accounts nationwide in
198 0 .
"
"3 By 1988 savings institutions not only regularly offered NOW ac-
counts, but also made consumer loans and commercial loans.
These developments, much more than others, warned savings institu-
tions that they must in the years ahead compete with commercial and even
investment institutions for depositors. Products, priceability, interest rate
return, and services in general would be key to the future success of both
banks and savings institutions. Around 1980, S&Ls began to lobby Congress
heavily for new regulations that would allow them to offer a greater array of
products yielding more profitable short-term investments. 6 In 1986, under
31. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAv AND REGULATION 30
(2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter MACEY & MILLER].
32. Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132
(DIDMCA). See generally 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3509 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
33. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
34. KATHLEEN DAY, SAVINGS & LOAN HELL: THE PEOPLE AND THE PoLrnIcs BEHIND THE
$1 TRILLION SAVINGS & LOAN SCANDAL 57 (1993).
35. Id at 57-58.
36. See id
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both savings association laws and the regulations of the FHLBB governing
federal associations, savings institutions were permitted to invest up to 40%
of their assets in nonresidential real estate loans. After which came the slew
of federal laws concerning deregulation, which led directly to a surge of
merger and acquisition activity.
Although amalgamation has been the basis of growth for American
banking throughout modem history, deregulation in the 1980s was the cata-
lyst for catastrophic changes in Southern California banking. Emergence and
growth of the major commercial banks and the local savings institutions in
the San Diego market occurred almost exclusively through mergers with
smaller banks and multiple branch acquisitions. For example, during 1981
and 1982, San Diego-based Great American Bank completed the merger and
acquisition of eight small regional savings and loan associations. It increased
the S&L's net worth by $46.1 million, which was the "combined net worth
of these eight associations at their respective dates of merger."37 Those initial
eight mergers set the stage for Great American's phenomenal growth to an
asset size of $13 billion in 1986,"8 gained in large part through mergers and
acquisitions.
III. TiE IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATORY CONTROLS AND CALIFORNIA STATE
REGULATIONS ON SAN DIEGO AMALGAMATION ACTIVITY
Both federal and state law provided an environment conducive to bank
merger activity in San Diego's financial industry. Typically, states today
limit mergers by reviewing "the need for banking... facilities in the pro-
posed community; the ability of the community to support the proposed
bank...; the previous banking history of the community; opportunities for
profitable use of bank funds as indicated by the average demand for credit;
the number of potential depositors; the volume of bank transactions; the sta-
bility, diversity, and size of the businesses and industries of the commu-
nity.. .;" and the character, reputation, business experience, motives, finan-
cial standing and responsibility of the organizers, incorporators, proposed
officers, stockholders and directors. 9 Certainly this is criteria the California
State Banking Department uses. However, the federal and California finan-
cial regulatory agency perspective was to deregulate, so all of the above cri-
teria was evaluated from a pro-deregulatory point of view. During the mid-
1980s when deregulation in a number of industries became America's eco-
nomic decree, the banking industry was no exception. But by 1990 deregu-
37. GREAT AMERICANFIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 10-KREPORT 2 (1987).
38. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAvINGS BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1987). See
also GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, OFFERING CIRCULAR = 15,000,000,000 5.0%
COLLATERIZED EUROYEN NOTES Dua 1992, Mar. 25, 1987, at 17 [hereinafter GREAT
AMERICAN OFFERING CIRCULAR].
39. M. Brenot, Regulatory Agency Action: Business, Transportation and Housing
Agency, 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 102 (1995).
[Vol. 35
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lation had helped create the S&L failures and subsequent bailout that was
expected to cost at least $200 billion."
Unlike the deregulation that occurred in the transportation industry, the
focus for savings institutions and banks was not on balancing the interests of
communities and banking customers for the purpose of economic efficiency.
Instead, the objective was to create a minimally supervised banking envi-
ronment, and to increase profitability. It was through deregulation that the
federal government granted financial institutions a multitude of new invest-
ment powers as part of the Direct Investment Rule.
4
'
Federal and California law during the 1980s permitted the development
of new financial instruments, which were used to aggrandize bank assets and
liabilities. Often banking institutions and their officers had no previous ex-
pertise with these instruments. In addition, federal law had no regulatory
standards meant to deal specifically with the impervious procedures to be
implemented in connection with these new and risky financial tools. Also,
on the federal level, "net worth requirements were effectively eliminated,
allowing weak S&Ls to grow rapidly using insured deposits."42 Then in
1989, the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA)Y3 enabled Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF)u insured
"thrift institutions to change their charter to become commercial banks.
45
FIRREA wreaked havoc because it totally changed the administration of
savings institutions. These new charters did nothing to change the adminis-
trative problems that had occurred under FSLIC's guidance.
As a result of favorable state regulation, California was one of the re-
gions where the largest losses occurred. California law was more favorable
for savings institutions than for commercial banks, so there was far less to
give incentive for national commercial banks to be incorporated in Califor-
nia. Accordingly, Wells Fargo Bank, like many other California banking or-
ganizations, changed the company's state of incorporation from California to
Delaware in February 1987.4
"The typical [S&L] failure was a stockholder-owned, state-chartered in-
stitution in Texas or California where regulation and supervision were most
lax (although major failures also occurred at federally chartered S&Ls, at
mutuals, and in many other states). The failed institution typically had expe-
rienced a change of control and was tightly held, dominated by an individual
40. See Paulette Thomas, Regan Defends Decision Not to Expand S&L Supervisory Staff
During the 1980's, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1990, at A28.
41. See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 1725(a) (West 1989 & Supp.1997) (repealed).
42. NAT'L COMM'N ON FIN. INST. REFORM RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS &
CAUSES OFTHE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (1993) [hereinafter ORIGINS & CAUSES].
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
44. MaL § 1821(a)(6).
45. STATISTICS oNBANKING, supra note 3, at A-1.
46. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1987).
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with substantial conflicts of interest.., one who used the institution's capi-
tal to support personal business ventures. The typical [commercial bank fail-
ure was a large bank which] had grown at an extremely rapid rate, achieving
high concentrations of assets in risky ventures such as acquisition, develop-
ment, and construction (ADC) loans and/or direct investments of various
kinds."'
The California legislature played a huge role in liberalizing the state
regulatory environment in favor of S&Ls. For instance, Assembly Bill 3539,
passed by the California legislature in 1982, completely removed restrictions
on California-chartered savings institutions to invest their assets in real es-
tate and other non-conventional investments. These investments were of
course made with federally insured deposits. Eventually, however, many of
the California-chartered savings institutions returned to federal charters. As a
result, the California Department of Savings and Loan suffered large as-
sessment fee losses and many of the large S&Ls, like Great American and
Home Federal who had active Political Action Committees and had heavily
contributed to the campaigns of candidates seeking state office, decreased
their support. S&L failures in San Diego, at least in the case of Great Ameri-
can and Home Federal, typically occurred because of these issues.
By 1980 the savings industry was corpse-like.
The first liquidation and payout of a thrift in ten years occurred in 1981.
During that ten year period failed S&Ls had been merged into stronger
S&Ls and accounts transferred, but now depositors of the failed savings
institutions lined up around the block to get whatever part of their money
they could. In that same year the deposit insurance fund had resources of$8.5 billion to back savings institutions which had deposits of $600 to
$700 billion. The numbers used to describe the size of the problem were
staggering. It was clear FSLIC had to stem the drain or risk big budget
outlays.46
The Reagan Administration, in its desperation to keep savings institutions
open, directed FSLIC to use FSLIC notes, forbearance, or anything that did
not swell the deficit to avoid dealing with insolvencies by closing these
S&Ls and paying depositors.49 There would be no direct bailout, at least not
yet.5
0
Federal law mandated the closing of insolvent savings institutions, but
there was a loophole. FSLIC had authority to assist troubled institutions or to
sell or merge them if doing so was cheaper than closing them and paying off
depositors. Paying depositors was usually costlier than a merger in the short
run, but it often proved least costly once a S&L's assets were sold to help
offset the government's initial cash outlay to depositors.5' FSLIC sold strug-
47. See ORIGINS & CAUSES, supra note 42, at 3-4.
48. DAY, supra note 34, at 92.
49. See id at 93.
50. See id at 94.
51. See id
[Vol. 35
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 35 [1998], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol35/iss1/3
1998] THE AMALGAMATION OF THE SO. CAL. BANKING INDUSTRY 51
gling institutions to almost all who expressed interest: healthy buyers, other
S&Ls, commercial banks, and nonbanking companies.
"Federal law generally prohibits nonbanking businesses from owning
commercial banks... the rationale being that general commerce should be
separated from banking in order to prevent conflicts of interest,"5 but these
same businesses can own a S&L. "[Traditionally the Bank Board imposed
regulations that mimicked the policy applying to commercial banks, thus
barring retailers from owning S&Ls. [However in 1981] the Bank Board
waived these regulations, as it was empowered to, without congressional ap-
proval. '
53
Initially, federal regulations precluded commercial banks, but not sav-
ings institutions, from interacting in the investment banking market. Later,
savings institutions were also prohibited from such activities by both state
and federal regulations, although federal regulators again had the power to
withdraw such regulations without congressional consent. Federal law also
prohibited commercial banks from crossing state lines without permission
from the state they were entering. To limit competition, over the years local
bankers made sure their state legislators barred outsiders. Originally, this law
did not apply to savings institutions but S&L regulators traditionally had
elected to impose similar geographic limits.
FHLBB had the power to remove all federal law restrictions for pur-
chasers of troubled S&Ls, and it did so often. The Bank Board eliminated
still other ailing thrifts through mergers that clumped together several sick
institutions in the hope that a single, healthier institution would emerge.
Though such a strategy threatened to make one larger problem out of several
smaller ones, the Bank Board thought the gamble worth taking. Mergers
avoided depositor payouts and slowed the rate at which dollars were being
sucked from the FSLIC's dwindling reserves. During a two year period,
1,000 savings institutions disappeared in this way. "Many were. .. bought
privately without government aid. But a large chunk, nearly half, were trans-
ferred to new owners with the assistance of the Bank Board."' These were
the type of activities which San Diego based Great American First Savings
Bank and Home Federal Savings & Loan participated in to win the Bank
Board's approval of their own merger activity. One of the eight initial merg-
ers Great American completed and several of its subsequent acquisitions and
mergers were effected with the assistance of FHLBB and FSLIC. In these
various ways, amalgamation emerged as the tool to avoid depositor payouts,
slow the demise of FSLIC, and to restore the savings industry.
52. Id at 95.
53. Id at 96.
54. Id
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A. Federal Law and Regulation
There are five justifications for regulating financial firms:
1. The Preservation of Solvency: The primary function of financial
regulation is to protect [depositors] ... on the grounds that well-advised
members of the public would want such protestations .... The most
common regulatory tools used to preserve solvency are minimum capital
requirements, portfolio restrictions and diversification requirements, [im-
posing] generfal standards of conduct on finns and their employees, andperiodic reporting requirements supplemented with on-site examina-ions .... Additional tools include regulatory review.., to establish new
financial finns or acquire controlling interests in existing fin.... In
evaluating such applications, regulatory authorities typically consider theintegrity and expenence of management, their business plans for the en-
tity, and.., competitive conditions in the markets they propose to enter.
2. Prevent Systemic Economic Disruptions: A distinct goal of financial
regulation is to prevent bank failures that could spread costs through the
economic system by sparking financial panics, disrupting the paymentssystem or interfering with the crdit underwriting process .... Certain
government programs, such as central bank liquidity authority and regula-
tion of the payment systems, are designed to insulate an economy from the
negative externalties associated with financial-institution failure.
3. Prevent Uncompetitive Practices: A separate reason to regulate finan-
cial enterprises is to safeguard competition in credit and capital mar-
kets. hese justifications proceed from an assumption that without
special supplemental regulation, financial finns would gain sufficientmarket power to extract excess profit, or to deny credit to, disfavoured
borrowers .... T]he premise is that financial finms could enjoy special
public subsidies that, without legal constraints, might be shared with af-
filiated or otherwise favoured borrowers. Concern over anti-competitivepractices of this sort partially explain why financial intermediaries are of-
ten prohibited from making direct investment to other business enterprises
and are also strictly regulated in providing credit to, or engaging in trans-
actions with affiliated entities.
4. Redistributive Norms: Financial firms are also often regulated to ad-
vance redistributive norms. For example, mos st goems of insurance regu-
lation prohibit finns from charging different rates on the basis of certain
classification, such as race or wealth, even if those distinctions would beactuarially f s .... Common mechanisms for advancing redistributive
norns are mandatory terms for dealing with borrowers and creditors or re-
quirements regarding the allocation of assets.
5. Political Economy: Finally, some legal systems use financial regula-
tion to realize political goals. These include rules limiting foreign owner-
ship of domestic finns or restrictions on the geographic expansion of ur-ban banks into rural commtunities. n
55. HOWELL EDMUthS JACKSON, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICs AND THE LAW 232, 233 (Peter Newman ed.,
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Every one of the major federal regulations passed from 1985 to 1997
was created because of, or contain some elements of, each of these five justi-
fications. These elements, along with certain regulatory changes, created op-
portunities for bank holding companies, commercial banks, and savings in-
stitutions, but also increased competition among them.
Various restrictions have been imposed both nationally and by the state
of California, which affect the remaining three major San Diego commercial
banking organizations, BankAmerica, Wells Fargo Bank, and Union Bank.
The traditional tools to expand, such as lending limits, the type and amount
of investments, opening branch offices, acquiring other banks and savings
institutions, and engaging in the underwriting of certain securities are all
subject to regulation and examination by the Comptroller of the Currency,
the FDIC, OTS, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
Major regulatory changes affecting these three San Diego commercial
banks have been implemented in the past few years and continue to incite
changes in financial institutions as the industry progresses. Primarily, it has
been deregulation that encouraged the expansion of banking services and the
powers of savings institutions to engage in broader commercial and con-
sumer bank services. Deregulation also permitted the sale of investment
products by banking organizations and even eliminated interest rate controls
on deposits, while generally refraining the distinctions between commercial
banking organizations and savings institutions. Geographic restrictions on
commercial banks and savings institutions will also continue to disappear as
a result of the Riegle Neal Act.5"
Let's explore these regulatory changes and their effect one by one.
1. The Banking Act of 1933 Which Includes the Glass-Steagall Act and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act
a. The Glass-Steagall Act
The underlying weaknesses, mainly the diseconomies of scale and lack
of asset diversification of small banks in the banking industry between 1929
and 1933, caused the stock market crash of 1929, the ensuing depression,
and the resulting bank failures of the early 1930s, essentially the complete
collapse of the banking system. The response of Congress was to pass the
Banking Act of 1933, also called the Glass-Steagall Act,58 which is a funda-
mental piece of legislation that remains the centerpiece of American Bank-
ing policy.59
1998).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(u) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
57. See Raymond Natter, Glass-Steagall Act Reform: The Next Banking Issue on the
CongressionalAgenda, 35 FED. BAR NEWs & J. 185, 185-86 (May 1988).
58. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 335, 377, 378, 347(d), 412(1994 & Supp. 1996).
59. See MACEY& MILLER, supra note 31, at 22.
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Glass-Steagall had five provisions:
1. In response to the political charges that the Depression had been caused
by bank speculation in securities, the Act separated commercial banking
from investment banking.
2. The Act prohibited the payment of interest on checking accounts and
permitted regulation of interest paid on time and savings deposits. This
was an attempt to reduce the cost of funds for banks by suppressing com-
petition for deposits.
3. The Act regulated bank holding companies at the federal level by re-
quiring multibank holding companies to obtain Federal Reserve approval
before they could vote the stock of subsidiary banks, if any subsidiary
bank was a member of the Federal Reserve System.
4. Glass-Steagall also amended the McFadden Act (which restricted na-
tional banks to branch only within their home cities even in states where
state-chartered institutions had broader branching privileges)6° and per-
mitted expansion of the branching privileges of national banks.
5. Finally, the Act established a program of federal deposit insurance.'
The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA),' which altered
the impact of Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act,' had
more of an effect in California than it did nationally. CEBA temporarily
blocked banks from expanding into real estate, securities, and some insur-
ance activities. "Prior to CEBA, section 408 of the National Housing Act
prohibited savings and loan holding companies from owning thrifts in more
than one state. Shortly after CEBA was passed the Federal Reserve Board
proposed that bank holding companies regulated under BHCA, be permitted
to acquire healthy savings and loans insured by FSLIC."' In addition, "the
acquisition of a 'bank' is governed exclusively by section 3 of the BHCA,
which contains the Douglas Amendment's prohibition on interstate bank-
ing. '65 CEBA encouraged California banks positioning themselves to merge
and acquire other banking organizations to form bank holding companies of
their own.
b. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act
The purpose of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIC)66 is "to pro-
mote through regulation a safe and stable system of affordable housing fi-
60. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
61. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 22-23.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
63. Id, §§ 1841-1850.
64. Wiiam J. Sweet, Jr., Federal Reserve Board Proposes to Allow Bank Holding Con-
panies to Enter Savings and Loan Industry, 35 FED. BAR NEws & J. 202, 204 (May 1988)
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(e) (1982)).
65. It
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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nance. ' '6 FDIC was designed "to improve the supervision of savings asso-
ciations; to curtail investments and any other activities of savings associa-
tions that pose unacceptable risks to FDIC funds; to promote the independ-
ence of the FDIC from the institutions whose deposits it insures; to increase
the surety of FDIC funds; to establish both the Resolution Trust Corporation
to contain, manage, and resolve failed savings associations (the FDIC pro-
vides funds from public and private sources to accomplish this purpose) and
an Office of Thrift Supervision under the general oversight of the Secretary
of the Treasury; to strengthen the enforcement powers of federal regulators
of depository institutions; and to strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal
penalties for defrauding or damaging depository institutions and their de-
positors.
' 61
The FSLIC scandal increased the enforcement powers, expectations,
and operation of this Act. After the demise of FSLIC and during the opera-
tions of the Resolution Trust Corporation and the creation of the Office of
Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act was viewed as a law
to regulate savings institutions more stringently. Provisions of this Act were
strengthened and molded by several subsequent amendments enacted spe-
cifically to address banking matters concerning savings institutions, as well
as to refine its historical relationship with commercial banks.
In 1990, the FDIC increased the insurance rate for deposits. The new
rate, due to become effective on January 1, 1991, was projected to have a
phenomenal effect on non-interest expenses of savings institutions for future
years. Most savings institutions estimated a projected increase of millions
just for 1991 alone; for example, in the case of San Diego Trust and Savings
Bank the increase was over $1 million in 1991 in that expense category.69
FDIC deposit insurance and bank regulation continue to have an im-
portant role in creating a stable banking environment, which minimizes the
risk to FDIC funds.
[Recently] most everything has gone well for banks and thrifts. There
have been few failures, and earnings have achieved record levels, not only
in absolute terms, but measured as a percentage of assets and capital. Bank
performance has benefited from the combination of a growing economy,
relatively stable prices and relatively stable interest rates. Apart from eco-
nomic factors .... institutional factors also are contributing to [safer
banks]. ... The experience of the [1980s] probably has made bankers
more cautious about lending, concentrations and internal controls. Disclo-
sure has improved. Bank analysts and large customers use output from
bank reports, and the quality of data in those reports has improved, [partly
because of] more cautious behavior by accounting firms. Capital require-
ments are now uniformly monitored and enforced so that banks are pushed
to rectify shortfalls early. In addition, banks no longer have to compete
with [those banking organizations] whose pricing reflects excessive lever-
67. Id
68. Id
69. See SANDIEGO TRUSTAND SAVINGS BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1991).
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age. Early [regulatory] intervention is also likely to force troubled banks
to look for help while they still have positive value. High valuations...
[make] it easier to find help. The failures and/or absorptions of so many
[banking organizations] have lessened some excessive competition, al-
though geographic expansion through branching and computer-based
services may more than offset this reduction in competition. [Finally],
most banks have had the opportunity to eliminate or write off longer-term,
low-interest-rate loans and investments. 0
2. The Bank Merger Act (Section 1828 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act)
The Sherman Antitrust Act7 designed to prevent monopolies in trade or
commerce, and the Clayton Act,7 conceived to prohibit transactions which
would restrain trade, lessen competition, or create a monopoly, are also im-
portant components of antitrust banking law.
The Bank Merger Act (BMA)'73 prohibits mergers, consolidations, and
purchases of assets with assumption of liabilities between banks and savings
institutions unless the prior written approval of the appropriate bank regula-
tory agency has been obtained. Authority to administer the BMA is divided
among several responsible agencies that are identified in the act. The Office
of Thrift Supervision is responsible for mergers of federally insured savings
institutions.74 The FDIC is responsible for mergers, acquisitions, consolida-
tions, or assumption transactions between federally insured and non-insured
banks." The Comptroller of the Currency handles transactions between in-
sured national banks that are the acquiring bank, assuming bank, or resulting
bank." If a state member bank is the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank,
the Federal Reserve Board is the responsible agency; for a nonmember in-
sured state bank, FDIC is responsible.'77
Before proscribing any action on a proposed transaction, the responsible
agency is required to publish notices at certain intervals during the review
process prior to granting any approval. The lead agency must also request
and evaluate reports from any other responsible agency on the competitive
aspects of the proposed transaction. Like the BHCA, a BMA analysis re-
quires the responsible agency to consider the convenience and needs of the
communities to be served, products and services currently available and of-
fered via the proposed transaction, and the financial and managerial re-
sources of the acquiring or resulting bank. If the proposed transaction would
70. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, HISTORY OFTHE EIGHTI S: LEssoNs FOR
THE FUTURE, VOLUMEH-, SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 84 (Jan.16, 1997).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
72. Id. § 12.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
74. See id § 1462(a).
75. See id § 1828.
76. See id § 1813.
77. See id §§ 1828(c)(1), (2)(A)-(C).
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create or tend to create a monopoly or substantially lessen competition with-
out the justification of a "convenience and needs" rebuttal, then the respon-
sible agency must deny approval. This is the same process which is followed
under a BHCA procedure.
These BMA and BHCA regulatory provisions on federal merger law as
applicable to financial institutions differ from general federal antitrust law.
General antitrust law requires prior notification, but not prior regulatory ap-
proval for any of the proposed transactions described above. Therefore, these
transactions require additional time, analysis, reporting, and expense for
bandng organizations than for companies outside of the banking arena. The
BMA and BHCA require a thirty-day stay of the proposed transaction even
after the appropriate regulatory agency tenders its approval. In addition, the
financial regulatory agency regulations specifically impose a "public inter-
est" analysis when an antitrust violation is alleged pursuant to financial
regulations, whereas there is no specific "public interest" defense under gen-
eral antitrust laws. In fact, some anti-competitive transactions are entirely
permitted if the transaction could serve the "public interest" in some other
equally important manner.
3. The Direct Investment Rule of 1987
The "Direct Investment Rule"' was passed during the deregulation pe-
riod by the FHLBB in 1987 under the authority of the National Housing Act
of 19347' and the Federal Home Loan Bank Act." The National Housing Act
was used as the regulatory tool to establish FSLIC for the purpose of ad-
ministering a federal insurance scheme for savings institutions."
Direct investments were "investments in equity securities, real estate,
service corporations, and operating subsidiaries." 2 The Rule limited a sav-
ings institution's ability to make direct investments beyond a certain level
without the prior approval of the Board. 3 If a savings institution met its
regulatory capital requirements and it had capital equal to or in excess of 6%
of its total liabilities it was permitted to make direct investments up to three
times its capital, or if the institution's total liabilities were below 6% and it
still met its regulatory capital requirements, it was permitted to make direct
investments up to 3% of its assets or 2.5 times capital, whichever was
greater. 4 In both situations, capital was to be calculated at the end of the
month preceding the direct investment."5
78. 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-8 (1987) (repealed).
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
80. Id. § 1421.
81. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 24.
82. 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-8(b)(1) (1987) (repealed).
83. See id § 563.9-8(c)(2)(i)-(iii).
84. See id.
85. See id
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It was later the conclusion of the Bank Board that "direct investments
posed greater risks to the financial health of thrifts than mortgage [lending]
which was the traditional business of thrifts.""6 This became apparent be-
cause of the large number of savings institutions that failed or were visited
by financial difficulty throughout the 1980s, and the "unprecedented stress
placed on the FSLIC fund" because of the number of savings institutions in
this situation. The Bank Board "after investigation found a correlation be-
tween these emerging financial difficulties and the increasing trend of state-
chartered [savings institutions] to purchase 'direct investments', [such as] a
wide variety of commercial ventures, including equity securities and real
estate."88 This was particularly true for savings institutions chartered in Cali-
fornia, since "California regulations permitted unlimited direct investment
without regard to risk." 9
Time has proven that, among other regulatory innovations created in the
1980s to expand the power of savings institutions, the Direct Investment
Rule was a significant contribution to the desire of both bank and savings in-
stitutions to explore mergers and acquisitions as a primary means of expan-
sion and growth.
4. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
A bank holding company is "any company which has control over any
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company.""
The requisite control is defined as: (1) owning, controlling, or having the
power to vote 25% or more of voting securities of a bank; (2) the power to
control the election of a majority of directors of a bank; or (3) where the
Federal Reserve System Board of Governors determines the company con-
trols the management or policies of a bank.9
Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA)," a bank
holding company generally cannot acquire or retain direct or indirect owner-
ship or control of the voting shares of any company that is not a bank. A
"bank," as defined in the BHCA, is (1) an institution insured under the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act, or (2) one that accepts demanded deposits (any
deposits the customer may withdraw by check or similar means) and is en-
gaged in making commercial loans.93 The BHCA governs mergers, consoli-
dations, or acquisitions of banks or bank holding companies by institutions
86. Lincoln Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 670 F. Supp. 449, 451
(D.D.C. 1987).
87. ME at 450.
88. Id.
89. Id at 452.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
91. See id
92. Id § 1843 (a)-(c).
93. See Tart, supra note 12, at 932; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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that are or will become bank holding companies.94 The Change in Bank
Control Act" governs acquisitions of commercial banks or thrifts by indi-
viduals or groups of individuals, and the Savings and Loan Holding Com-
pany Act96 governs these same transactions involving savings and loan
holding companies.97 The acts all require the satisfaction of the Clayton and
Sherman antitrust acts as a precondition to approval of the merger.98
For example, when Wells Fargo & Company (the parent of Wells Fargo
Bank) owns or acquires ownership of more than 5% of the voting stock of
any company or bank or savings institution, the BHCA imposes certain re-
strictions on the company's activities. This has significant consequences on
the operations of a banking organization. Wells Fargo & Company was the
tenth largest bank holding company in the United States as of December 31,
1986." Its principal subsidiary is Wells Fargo Bank.' Under the Bank
Holding Company Act, Wells Fargo and any other bank holding company is
required to regularly file reports of its operations with, and is subjected to
examination by, the Federal Reserve Board.'
As a result of mergers and acquisitions, many banking organizations be-
come holding companies, subject to holding company regulation. Under fed-
eral law, the BHCA will define any company which owns another banking
organization as a holding company. For example, Washington Mutual is a
holding company because it owns three savings institutions, and has the right
to elect to be treated by the Board as a savings bank holding company for
purposes of the BHCA, if it so desires. The advantages of doing so could be
salient to a banking organization. Such an election could be made to win
regulatory approval for an amalgamation opportunity, to appear conciliatory
in regulated supervisory transactions if the compliance with certain activities
and investments is beneficial for a banking organization, or for the purpose
of obtaining advances from the FHLB.
5. The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966
The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act"° was designed to broaden
the regulatory and supervisory authority of federal agencies over insured
banks and savings institutions. It amended the Home Owners Loan Act of
1933 by giving the FHLBB, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC
the power to issue an order to cease and desist (after issuing a notice of
94. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 446.
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
96. Id § 1730a(e)(1).
97. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 446.
98. See idI
99. See WELLs FARGO & Co., 1986 10-K REPORT 3 (1997).
100. See id
101. See id.
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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service concerning the charges) through its own attorneys if it finds any rule,
charter, law, or regulatory violation in connection with the granting of any
application, request, or written agreement entered into with the Bank Board
that would lead to any unsafe or unsound practices committed by a savings
institution, a national bank, or a state member or nonmember insured bank'0 3
Specifications for cease and desist order proceedings, hearings and judicial
review, the initiation of any temporary orders, subpoena power, penalties,
and enforcement of such orders were addressed."° The Supervisory Act also
subjected directors and officers of an insured institution to cease and desist
orders for their involvement in any unsafe or unsound practice of the institu-
tion constituting a violation of their fiduciary duties. Provisions for the re-
moval of a director or officer from office and the appointment of a conser-
vator or receiver were made.105
The National Housing Act, section 407, and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act"' were amended by the Supervisory Act to allow for the voluntary
or involuntary termination of insurance for insured savings institutions and
banks. Provisions for the issuance of cease and desist orders, similar to those
cited immediately above, were instituted."°
Finally, the FDIC and FSLIC maximum insurance limits on a insured
deposit of any depositor was increased from $10,000 to $15,000 by the Su-
pervisory Act of 1966.
6. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980-DIDMC
Congress found that limitations on interest rates payable by banks and
savings institutions on deposits discouraged customers from saving money
because these customers knew the market rate of return on their savings was
limited by federal regulation. The Congressional concern was that these
limitations created inequities for depositors, impeded the ability of deposi-
tory institutions to compete for funds, and did not achieve their purpose of
providing an even flow of funds for home mortgage lending. On March 31,
1980, DIDMC"' was enacted for the purpose of providing for the phase out
and ultimate elimination (over a six year period) of the maximum rate of in-
terest and dividend limitations which may be paid by depository institu-
tions.0 9
103. See id § 1464(d).
104. See id.
105. See id
106. Id § 1818(a).
107. Termination under this amendment to the National Housing Act automatically con-
stituted a removal of the institution from Federal Home Loan Bank membership.
108. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3509 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
109. See Financial Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control § 121 (CCH 1980);
see also Public Law 96-221 (1996).
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Also under this Act, all depository institutions were required to maintain
reserves on their transaction accounts and non-personal time deposits; NOW
(negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts were nationally permitted; insur-
ance limits on deposit accounts were increased to $100,000; and S&Ls were
given the authority to invest up to 20% of their assets in consumer loans,
commercial paper, and corporate debt securities.' Savings institutions were
relieved of the $75,000 lending limit on real estate mortgages and were per-
mitted to lend up to 90% of the value of a home or more if the amount above
90% was covered by mortgage insurance."' State usury laws on first mort-
gages by banks, S&Ls, credit unions, and mortgage banks were preempted,
but the Act left a state with the ability to override this preemption if they
acted legislatively within three years from DIDMC passage."' The financial
regulatory agencies were directed to simplify their regulations generally, es-
pecially the truth-in-lending regulations."' All state imposed ceilings on
business and agricultural loans over $25,000 and small business loans were
also preempted by DIDMC."' Last, DIDMC imposed on national banks
changes in real estate holdings, preferred stock dividends, trust powers, holi-
days, appraisal rights and examinations, and imposed a moratorium on for-
eign acquisitions of United States depository institutions."'
Z The Depository Institutions Act of 1982-Gam-St. Germain
Gan-St. Germain.. granted financial institutions the power to offer in-
sured money market funds, eliminated the ability of a savings institution to
pay slightly higher interest on time and savings accounts than could banks
under Regulation Q, and authorized accounts with deregulated rates. Garn-
St. Germain led to the total deregulation of interest rates throughout the fi-
nancial industry. In San Diego this Act spurred banking organizations to be-
gin offering a myriad of new investment products in their branch locations,
including money market funds. This was the catalyst for banking organiza-
tions to begin cross-selling a variety of financial products to then existing
customers. By allowing savings institutions to offer a wider variety of prod-
ucts to their customer base, Garn-St Germain created more opportunities for
savings institutions to compete with commercial banks.
110. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(b), (c)(1) -(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
111. See Financial Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control § 10-231 (CCH
1980); see also 12 U.S.C. § 53 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
112. See Financial Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control § 10-231 (CCH
1980).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id
116. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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8. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act (TRA)"'7 made dramatic changes for every corporate
income taxpayer. The impact is no less for the banking industry .... Spe-
cific areas of the '86 Act aimed at the banking industry include net oper-
ating losses, bad debt expenses, disallowances of interest expense for ex-
cluded municipal obligations, favorable reorganization rules, and special
depositor casualty loss rules. [There are, however,] questions in many ar-
eas that still must be answered through regulations, rulings and perhaps
even court cases.18
The advantages of the TRA for commercial banks and certain savings
institutions which acquire a financially troubled savings institution were
twofold. First, these acquisitions were exempt from certain reorganization
and carryover rules."9 Second, "net operating losses" could be calculated dif-
ferently, allowing a commercial bank to carry certain losses under net oper-
ating losses forward for fifteen years, and an acquiring savings institution to
carry net operating losses forward eight years. 2' Tax-free reorganizations
were given certain concessions on bad debts, taxable income, interest ex-
penses, contributions by FSLIC to an acquiring institution excluded from
that institution's gross income, and, under certain circumstances, the conti-
nuity-of-interest test was simplified for mergers or reorganizations.'
117. 26 U.S.C. § l(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
118. Barry Hipshman, The Tax Reform Act of 1986 Applied to Banks, THE TAx ADVISER
90 (Feb. 1987).
119. See id. at 94-95.
120. See id
121. See id. at 91. "For tax years beginning before Dec. 31, 1986, commercial banks
could compute a bad debt deduction using either the direct charge-off method, allowing a de-
duction for those debts that had become partially or entirely worthless during the current tax
year, or a reserve method, allowing a deduction for specific additions to a reserve for a tax
year." Id. Under the TRA, the percentage method would not be available for tax years begin-
ning after 1987. For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1986, large commercial banks could
no longer use the reserve method to compute their bad debt deduction. (Under TRA, a bank is
considered a "large commercial bank if the average adjusted bases of all its assets exceed
$500 million or if it is a member of a parent/subsidiary controlled group with adjusted bases
of all assets in excess of $500 million.) Small commercial banks (those with gross assets of
$500 million or less), could continue to use the reserve method." Id.
"There is a suspension of the recapture for any tax year during which the bank is consid-
ered financially troubled. A bank is financially troubled if the average of its non-performing
loans exceed 75% of its average equity capital for the year." Id. The cut-off method as articu-
lated by the TRA is--once the reserve has a zero balance any recoveries will be taxable in-
come and bad debts will be deductions. The election, therefore, means that no income from
recoveries or deduction for bad debts is applicable until the reserve is reduced to zero. Sav-
ings institutions, (which include mutual savings banks, cooperative banks, and domestic
building and loan associations), may use the specific charge-off method or the reserve
method. See id,
[Therefore] as a result of the TRA, the applicable percentage of taxable income
was reduced from 40% to 8%. [In addition,] this method would be available only if
60% of the savings institution's assets are qualified under [the old requirements of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954]. For tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1986,
22
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The TRA altered the treatment of losses by depositors at troubled finan-
cial institutions. According to the new rules,
a reasonably estimated loss on a qualified deposit with a qualified finan-
cial institution incurred by a qualified individual due to the bankruptcy or
the interest expense to carry tax-exempt interest income securities acquired after
Aug. 7, 1986 will no longer be deductible. This rule will apply to all commercial
banks [and savings institutions]. The disallowance covers all amounts that could
be allocated as tax-exempt interest expense.
Id. The average adjusted basis was to be the assets' tax basis plus the adjustments contained
in new TRA § 1016. The old Internal Revenue Code of 1954, pertaining to a 20% tax-exempt
interest disallowance, will continue to apply to securities acquired after Dec. 31, 1982, and
before Aug. 8, 1986. The 20% rule reduces the deductible interest expense allocated to in-
debtedness incurred to purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations by 20%. See id.
The old Net Operating Loss (NOL) carryforward and caryback rule allowed fi-
nancial institutions to carry their NOL's back for 10 years and forward for five
years. This rule is repealed for all NOL's incurred in tax years beginning after cal-
endar year 1986. The new rule allows NOL's of financial institutions to be carried
back for three years and forward for 15 years. However, there are some special ad-
ditional rules. [For commercial banks], the portion of the NOL for any tax year
beginning after Dec. 31, 1986 and before Jan. 1, 1994 that is attributable to the de-
duction allowed for bad debts will have a special carryback period of 10 years and
a carryforward period of five years. Other losses of a commercial bank will be car-
ried back three years and forward 15 years under the new rules.
Id. As for savings institutions, for tax years 1982 through 1985 the savings institution may
have a carryback period of 10 years and a carryforward loss period of eight years. See iL
Special rules [enacted under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981-
ERTA, 26 U.S.C. § 1221] exempted the acquisition of financially troubled savings
institutions from the general reorganization and carryover rules. These rules
provided that the continuity-of-interest test was satisfied for tax-free
reorganizations, and the NOL's could be carried forward, if the depositors of the
financially troubled thrift become the depositors of the surviving thrift. These rules
specifically exempted from gross income payments of cash or property contributed
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. In addition, [these]
payments from FSLIC did not reduce the basis in the assets of the target
financially troubled thrift. If certain conditions were met, ERTA provided that the
continuity-of-interest test was satisfied for mergers involving savings institutions.
The first condition was that the institution must be a thrift, which included mutual
banks, savings and loans and cooperative banks. The next condition was that the
savings institution must have been certified insolvent by a state authority, the
FSLIC or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. An insolvent [savings institution]
was one that could not meet its obligations currently nor for the immediate future.
The final condition was that substantially all the depositors and other holders of
liabilities of the transferor institution had to become the obligors of the transferee
institution. When all of these conditions were met there was no need for any stock
or security distributions by the acquiring institution to the acquired institution in
order for the transaction to qualify as a tax-free reorganization.
Id.
"ERTA had created a special provision for financially troubled thrifts: they did not have
to reduce basis in their assets for money or other property payments from the FSLIC under its
financial assistance program. In addition, the amounts received from the FSLIC were not con-
sidered income to the thrift." Id. These special reorganization rules for financial institutions,
enacted under ERTA were all repealed by the TRA for reorganizations occurring after Dec.
31, 1988, in tax years ending after that date. See id
23
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insolvency of the institution will be deductible as a casualty loss at the
election of the individual. [A] qualified individual ... includes all persons
except a person who owns at least 1% in value of the outstanding stock of
the qualified financial institution, an officer of the qualified financial in-
stitution, or any person who is related to another person or entity that
owns at least 1% of the outstanding stock or is an officer of the qualified
financial institution. A qualified financial institution includes commercial
banks, thrifts, savings and loans, cooperatives, and any other similar in-
stitution chartered and supervised under federal or state law, [including]
credit unions whose deposits or accounts are insured under federal or state
law.12
2
Other areas of the TRA had limited or no impact on most financial in-
stitutions: the compliance and administrative sections, the foreign tax credit
calculations and limitations, and some of the personal income tax changes,
which will probably affect the way banking services are used or delivered."
9. The Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
"Prior to the passage of the [Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)],"4 federal savings and loan institu-
tions... were chartered and insured by a single entity, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)."" FIRREA, signed into law on August 1,
1989, abolished the FHLBB and FSLIC, splitting the responsibility for
chartering and insuring savings institutions between two agencies. 6 The
FDIC assumed control of the bankrupt savings and loan insurance fund and
transferred it to the newly created Savings Association Insurance Fund
(SAIF), which was kept separate and distinct from the Bank Insurance Fund,
(BIF), the fund that insures bank deposits."z "A newly created arm of the
Treasury Department, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), assumed all of
FSLIC's regulatory responsibilities, which include examining and regulating
all savings and loans and chartering federal savings and loans."'2 The OTS,
however, did not take over the responsibilities of the FHLBB until sixty days
after the enactment of FIRREA. National commercial banks are subject to
regulation and examination by the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Federal Reserve System, and the FDIC.
Section 5 of the Home Owners Loan Act of 193329 authorized the
FHLBB to "give primary consideration (when granting a charter) to the best
122. Id. at 96.
123. See id. at 97.
124. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1815 (1994&Supp. 1996).
125. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 93.
126. See id
127. See id FIRREA also created the Federal Housing Finance Board which has the
power to supervise federal home loan banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1422 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
128. Id-
129. 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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practices of thrift institutions in the United States." Now that FHLBB was no
longer in business, the OTS was given that charge and, like its predecessor
the FHLBB, OTS was to grant a thrift charter only:
1) to persons of good character and responsibility;'30
2) if in the judgement of the director (of OTS) a necessity exists for such
an institution in the community to be served;
31
3) if there is a reasonable probability of its usefulness and success; 32 and
4) if the association can be established without undue injury to properly
conducted existing local thrift and home financing institutions.
Therefore, despite the differences in statutory language between the
chartering standards used by the Comptroller of the Currency for granting
charters to banks and the chartering standards used by the OTS for granting
charters to thrifts, the substantive standards became very much the same.
34
By two different routes, the two agencies emerge at about the same point.
Both face "a short list of general standards in the relevant statutes for charter
approvals, which are either too narrow or too unspecified to serve as much
of a guide for restraint upon the exercise of [agency] discretion.' 3 s
FIRREA proved inadequate to address industry concerns. One purpose
for the creation of FIRREA was to further control and moderate the entrance
of large banking organizations into markets already well served, certainly a
purpose the climate of national banking cried out for. Instead, this particular
purpose was frustrated because these newly created statutory directions
given to the OTS to restrict new charters were no different from the previous
rule of FILBB or the prior requirements directed to the Comptroller of the
Currency for banks to follow. The passage of FIRREA was in part a direct
result of the perceived degree of fraud and insider abuse in the S&L industry
and because the OTS and the FDIC became more aggressive in their attempt
to recoup lost funds.'36
In the post FIRREA era, the number of San Diego savings institutions
continued to decline. California banking organizations who had been willing
during the 1980s to acquire the financially-troubled prodigious S&Ls were
130. See generally Eric G. Zajac, FIRREA and Federal Common Law: The Extent to
Which they Preempt State Law Regarding the Duties and Standard of Liability Imposed Upon
Financial Institution Directors. 37 ViLL. L. REv. 1461, 1466 (1992) (maintaining that this
was of vital importance to the FDIC, OTS, and FHLBB, because even though federal com-
mon law and state law articulated different standards for when directors/officers should be
held accountable, both federal and state law held a bank director to owe fiduciary duties to
depositors).
131. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 93.
132. See id
133. See id.
134. See id-
135. See id. at 93-94 (quoting both 12 U.S.C. § 1464(e) (1994 & Supp. 1996) and Ken-
neth Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U.
CH. L. REv. 235 (1975)).
136. See id
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no longer seeking these vulnerable institutions, having been temporarily
gratified by their already secured conquests. The large failing or closed sav-
ings institutions were no longer saleable, their liabilities contributing to the
collapse of FSLIC. The Resolution Trust Corporation, the OTS, and the
FDIC encountered increasing difficulty in locating buyers for these belea-
guered savings institutions without offering major deal enticements. Addi-
tionally, the degenerating California real estate market complicated the
regulator's ability to appropriate these losses. FIRREA was not helpful to
regulators because it essentially continued the status quo. It gave no new
tools to the regulatory agencies to deal with the S&L crisis.
10. Federal Reserve Act
The three commercial bank leaders in San Diego are subject to certain
restrictions under the Federal Reserve Act.137 Transactions and extensions of
credit between these banks and their subsidiaries are regulated by the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors. There is a specific formula limiting the pay-
ment of dividends by these banks to their parent organizations or holding
companies, which must be approved by the Comptroller of the Currency.
The Federal Reserve Act requirements affect many areas of banking, allow-
ing the Board to regulate electronic fund transactions, check collection,
equal credit opportunity and truth-in-lending rules, and the provision and
availability of funds.
Under Federal Reserve Board regulations, [certain banks] are... re-
quired to maintain reserves against their transaction accounts (primarily
checking and NOW accounts). Because these reserves must be maintained
in cash or in non-interest bearing accounts, the effect of the reserve re-
quirements is to increase an institution's cost of funds.... [Financial] in-
stitutions may designate and exempt [certain reservable liabilities] from
these reserve requirements. These amounts and percentages are subject to
adjustment by the FRB .... [D]epository institutions maintaining reserv-
able accounts may borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank discount win-
dow, but the [FRB's] regulations require a savings bank to exhaust other
reasonable alternative sources before borrowing from the Federal Reserve
Bank.1
38
11. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act,
(FDICIA),'39 was enacted December 19, 1991, but certain portions of its re-
quirements did not become effective until December 1992. The Act provided
for increased funding for the FDIC Bank Insurance Fund by assessment fees
137. 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
138. WASHINGTONMUTUAL, INC., 1997 10-KREPORT 19 (1998).
139. 12U.S.C. §§ 1817, 1825 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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on insured deposits.14 It also required establishment of a risk-based assess-
ment system by January 1, 1994.14 FDICIA contained provisions for new re-
porting requirements, real estate lending and capital adequacy requirements,
and expanded regulation for depository institutions and their parent holding
* companies.1
42
In addition, FDICIA established a system of corrective action for any
insured institution that falls below specified minimum capital levels. 143 The
highlight of this legislation was "the establishment of a five tier capital re-
quirement system;" the tiers were "well capitalized," "adequately capital-
ized," "undercapitalized," "significantly undercapitalized," and "critically
undercapitalized."' 44 The Act did not define the capital levels for each of
these terms, deferring instead to the federal financial regulatory agencies to
specify these levels by September 1992, and requiring these agencies to take
"prompt corrective action" on the banks which failed to meet minimum
capital requirements.45 Capital distributions, such as the paying of dividends,
were prohibited if the organization already was, or doing so would make, the
organization undercapitalized.'46 The ramifications for undercapitalization
included limitations on the depository institution's activities and an obliga-
tion to return the institution's capital to regulatory standards. 7
When FDICIA was first passed, the implications on commercial and
savings institutions were not clear. The financial regulatory agencies had yet
to act and quantitative measures of capital had not yet been defined. By
1996, the large commercial banks had generally deciphered how the Act
would affect them.
For example, Wells Fargo determined that "[flailure to meet minimum
capital requirements can initiate certain mandatory and possibly additional
discretionary actions by regulators that, if undertaken, could have a direct
material effect on the [bank's] financial statements.' 4' The quantitative
measures established by the regulators to ensure capital adequacy required
that Wells Fargo maintain minimum ratios of capital to risk-weighted assets.
There were two categories of capital under the guidelines.
Tier 1 capital includes common stockholders' equity, qualifying preferred
stock and trust preferred securities, less goodwill and certain other deduc-
tions (including the unrealized net gains and losses, after applicable taxes,
on available-for-sale investment securities carried at fair value). Tier 2
capital includes preferred stock not qualifying as Tier 1 capital, mandatory
140. See id
141. See id.
142. See id. See also WELLS FARGO & Co., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (1997).
143. See 12 U.S.C. § 1830(o) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
144. Id §§ 1817, 1825.
145. Id
146. See id
147. See id
148. WELLS FARGO & Co., 1996 ANNuALREPoRT 69 (1997).
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convertible debt, subordinated debt, certain unsecured senior debt issued
by the Parent [or the holding company] and the allowance for loan losses,
subject to limitations by the guidelines. Tier 2 capital is limited to the
amount of Tier 1 capital (i.e., at least half of the total capital must be in the
form of Tier 1 capital). Under the guidelines, capital was compared to the
relative risk related to the balance sheet.1
49
As a by product of FDICIA, most financial institutions in their annual re-
ports, and as part of most regulatory required reports, render an opinion of
their capital regulatory position. For example, in its 1996 Annual Report,
Wells Fargo offered the opinion that the bank had met all capital regulatory
requirements to which it was subject, and reported the most recent Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency notification categorized the bank as "well
capitalized."'' s
The effect of FDICIA was calculated to be the same on all San Diego
commercial banks, including market leaders Union Bank, BankAmerica,
Wells Fargo, and the other depository institutions.
12. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking & Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994' amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. It was federal legislation
that allowed for interstate banking transactions, bank branching, mergers,
and acquisitions. Pursuant to Riegle-Neal, federal banking agencies would
begin to approve the above described activities between insured banks with
different home states without regard to state law so that the resulting institu-
tion could be operated as one bank with interstate branches. There were
branching requirements, filing, notice and concentration stipulations, com-
munity reinvestment and operational considerations, and capital and man-
agement adequacy requirements. The federality of Riegle-Neal did not usurp
the state tax implications of a branch or bank located in a state that was
merged or acquired by an out-of-state bank.
On June 1, 1997, Riegle-Neal permitted national banks to branch na-
tionwide, even in states which had not yet enacted legislation allowing that
right to their own state-chartered banks. 2 The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ruled automated teller machines (ATM), remote service units
(RSU), and even automated loan machines (ALM) do not constitute bank
"branches" under the National Bank Act. 3 In effect, that decision creates
opportunities for banks to expand ATM, ALM, and RSU network systems
without consideration of state-imposed restrictions on bank branching. What
was left undecided, however, was whether and what other effects these op-
149. Id
150. Id
151. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831(u), 1842(d) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
152. See id § 1831(u).
153. See Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 772 (Mar. 6, 1997).
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portunities would have on amalgamation activity.
The Riegle-Neal Act became effective on September 29, 1995, one year
after being signed into law by President Clinton."54 Among other things, the
bill allows for the continuation of certain state powers, amendment of state
law to conform to this new federal law, and permits state governments to
opt-in or opt-out of allowing interstate branching before June 1, 1997.55
States could begin waiving the state concentration requirements, but never
the national requirements. So under Riegle-Neal, bank holding companies
which were adequately capitalized and managed were permitted to engage in
interstate acquisitions and mergers of banks and S&Ls, usurping the state re-
strictions. Banking organizations hailed Riegle-Neal as their own symbolic
victory in the increasingly competitive financial business world.
13. California State Regulations-Riegle-Neal Act
During 1987, "a number of states enacted or amended interstate banking
laws.' ' 56 "As of May 23, 1997, 47 states plus the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico had acted on interstate branching under the Riegle-Neal Inter-
state Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994."'" California permits
statewide branching." 8 Under legislation effective October 2, 1995, Califor-
nia permits a financial institution to opt-in to interstate branching through
the acquisition of a California bank or consolidation of previously owned
California banks."9 The legislation "prohibits de novo interstate branching as
well as the acquisition of individual branches and places a five year mini-
mum-age requirement on interstate bank acquisitions."'6 ' 'This law also al-
lows affiliate banks to act as agents for each other and eliminates discrimi-
natory provisions in the bank holding company statute.1 61 Riegle-Neal
allowed banks to fully enter the securities market, in turn increasing compe-
tition in the investment industry and leading to improved services and lower
costs for consumers."
Even prior to Riegle Neal, "beginning July 1, 1987, California permitted
154. See M. Brenot & E. D'Angelo, Regulatory Agency Action: Business, Transportation
& Housing Agency, Banking Department, 15 CAL. REG. L. RFP. 111, 114 (1995).
155. See id.
156. States Enact and Amend Interstate Banking Laws, 6 No. 13 BANKING EXPANSION
REP., July 6, 1987, at 3.
157. Interstate Banking-All But Few States Beat Trigger Date On Nationwide Branch-
ing, 16 NO. 11 BANKInGPoL'Y REP. 11 (June 2, 1997) [hereinafter Interstate Banking].
158. See There is a Reason FDIC Decisions Are So Juicy, 6 No. 17 BANKING EXPANSION
REP., Sept. 7, 1987, at 14. See also CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 3750-3754, 3825, 4828, 4880, 4895
(West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
159. See Interstate Banking, supra note 157, at 12; see also Geographic Expansion-All
But Few States Enact Laws Approving Interstate Branching, 16 No. 5 BANKING POL'Y REP. 5(Mar. 3, 1997).
160. Interstate Banking, supra note 157, at 12.
161. Id.
162. See Tart, supra note 12, at 949.
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out-of-state banking organizations to acquire in-state banking organizations,
provided an out-of-state banking organization's home state granted similar
privileges to banking organizations in California. The targeted reciprocal re-
gions included eleven other Western states, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Ha-
waii, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washing-
ton."" As a result, progressive California banking organizations originally
concentrated their activities and merger deals in these states. "The California
regional reciprocity limitation was dropped and the state opted into full re-
ciprocal interstate banking nationally on January 1, 1991. The law also was
extended to thrift institutions, except there was no provision allowing out-of-
state banking organizations to acquire California thrifts."'"
It was pursuant to Riegle-Neal that Wells Fargo was able to complete its
merger with First Interstate of California in 1996. First Interstate held bank
subsidiaries in six states, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington, and each of these states had opted-in early under the interstate
branching aspects of Riegle-Neal 65 "Even though state-chartered banks in
states that took no action before the trigger date [only Kansas, Missouri, and
Wisconsin] lack authority to engage in interstate branching, national banks
may now branch in and out of those states."'66 As a consequence, Wells
Fargo, BankAmerica, Union Bank, and even the smaller San Diego banking
organizations and savings institutions began to acquire and invest in busi-
nesses, expand their retail base, and make loans without regard to state lines.
'"The greatest movement toward expansion of banking powers has oc-
curred at the state level .... State laws began to change, however, when
banks began to realize that competition was inevitable and interstate expan-
sion could be beneficial if organized through regional banking centers."''
States were permitted to control how an out-of-state bank could operate its
branches as long as there was no discrimination against these out-of-state
banks or bank holding companies. 68 These state-imposed conditions were
inapplicable after May 31, 1997.69 "Most states [began to use] a combination
of two main types of restrictions when enacting interstate banking statutes:
(1) 'regional restrictions' requiring the expanding bank to be located in a
specific geographic region, and (2) 'reciprocity restrictions' requiring that
the state of the acquiring bank allow acquisitions within that state by banks
in the state allowing expansion.'
7
Without the federal regulation of banking organizations, protecting the
163. States Enact and Amend Interstate Banking Laws, 6 No. 13 BANKING ExPANsION
REP., July 6, 1987, at 3, 4, 12 (1987).
164. Id.
165. See WELLs FARGO & Co., 1996 ANNUALREPORT 8 (1997).
166. Interstate Banking, supra note 157, at 11.
167. Tart, supra note 12, at 936.
168. See id. at 939-42.
169. See id
170. Id. at 936.
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national economic health would be left in the hands of bankers. From the
stock market crash of 1930 to the savings and loan scandal and the deregu-
lation of the 1980s, this country has consistently proven the need for federal
bank regulation. Riegle-Neal, FDICIA, FIRREA, DIDMC, BHCA, and
BMA are but just a few examples. Despite the growth and innovation dem-
onstrated by San Diego banking organizations in the 1980s, a greater number
of the local bank and savings institution failures and economic hardships
would have resulted from decreased regulatory freedoms.
Yet regulation which "has come from both the federal and state gov-
ernments constrained the expansion of [banking organizations] and contrib-
uted to the widespread failure of individual institutions." ' In the final analy-
sis, the regulatory system may have impeded the growth of the American
banking industry, but it has also protected the commitment of financial in-
stitutions to the economic well being of their local communities and their
depositors.
B. Capital Adequacy Regulations for Banks and Savings Institutions: The
Effect on San Diego Institutions
The ultimate question for the San Diego financial institutions that were
trying to meet FDIC and FSLIC capital requirements became how capable
were they of servicing their debt while maintaining capital above the mini-
mum required levels?
1. Capital Adequacy Requirements for Banks
Capital regulation involves a comparison of a banking organization's
assets and liabilities. A financial institution's capital represents the excess of
its assets over its liabilities, or its cushion available to cover potential losses.
There are different types of capital, some more tangible than others, and dif-
ferent types of assets, some riskier than others. The purpose of capital regu-
lation is to insure that financial institutions do not fail for not being able to
cover their losses.
Federal regulations require that depository institutions maintain specific
levels of minimum capital. The National Bank Act specifies that national
banks start with an initial capital, the amount of which varies depending on
the location of the banking organization.' However, the Comptroller of the
Currency, which has supervisory authority over national banks, requires a
higher level of startup capital than is mandated under the statute.'
All capital stock must be paid in before the banking organization is
authorized to do business.'74 The law also generally requires that no insured
171. REFORMING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 4, at 85.
172. See 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
173. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.100 (1998).
174. See 12 U.S.C. § 53 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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depository institution may make a capital distribution if such institution
would be undercapitalized after making the distribution. 5 The FDICIA sys-
tem of corrective action requires "undercapitalized" institutions to submit
capital restoration plans to their supervisory agencies.' The capital restora-
tion plan must specify steps that the institution will take to restore capital
adequacy, set goals for capital restoration, and provide further information
regarding the activities that the institution will engage in while restoring
capital to a satisfactory level. If the capital restoration plan is not approved
or complied with, then the "undercapitalized institution is restricted in its as-
set growth and must receive prior regulatory approval for business expansion
plans.
1 77
More stringent limitations are applied to institutions deemed "signifi-
cantly undercapitalized." Federal regulators are required to implement cor-
rective action to get capital levels elevated to specified minimums." Such
corrective action can include restricting transactions with affiliates or re-
stricting the interest rates that the institution pays on deposits. Action can
also include "improving management, prohibiting deposits from correspon-
dent banks, or any other action" that the agency determines will ultimately
raise capital levels.179
Finally, institutions classified as "critically undercapitalized" are subject
to the most onerous regulatory constraints. Unless the FDIC approves, these
institutions may not enter into any material transaction other than in the
usual course of business."' Moreover, a critically undercapitalized institution
cannot extend credit for any highly leveraged transaction or make any mate-
rial change in accounting methods.' Early closure is also specifically re-
quired for critically undercapitalized institutions if they do not improve their
capital adequacy levels within ninety days from becoming designated as
critically undercapitalized." 2
Aside from FDICIA's classification scheme of undercapitalized institu-
tions and attendant system of corrective action, there are currently two sepa-
rate capital adequacy rules imposed on federal depository institutions. The
first capital adequacy rule is a leverage ratio. A leverage ratio compares the
"gross ratio of capital to assets without any adjustment for risk.""' 3 The fed-
eral regulatory agencies require depository institutions with high ratings to
175. See id § 1830(o).
176. See id.; see also id § 1464(t)(6)(A)(ii).
177. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 296; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(6)(A)(ii)(1994 & Supp. 1996).
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(4)(A)-(B) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (requiring the Director of the
OTS to take actions with respect to undercapitalized savings institutions and the Comptroller
of the Currency to do the same with respect to undercapitalized national banks).
179. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 296.
180. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 461(2)(A)-(D), 481 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
181. See id
182. See id
183. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 302.
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have "core" capital, such as common shareholder's equity, equal to 3% of
adjusted total assets for the highest rated institutions. ' Depository institu-
tions with lower ratings are required to maintain leverage ratios around
6%. ' For example, a low-rated banking organization with $100 million in
assets should expect to maintain "core" capital equaling close to $6 million.
The second capital adequacy rule involves risk-adjusted capital ratios.
Unlike leverage ratios that require banks to keep a minimum amount of
capital per dollar of assets, risk-adjusted capital ratios analyze the type of as-
set held by a depository institution. The entire asset-side of a banking or-
ganization's ledger is adjusted to reflect the risks associated with the assets.
In short, the risk-adjusted capital ratio involves a three-step process. The
first step is to sort each depository institution's assets into one of four differ-
ent risk categories. Each category then carries the following weight: (1) zero
percent for assets deemed essentially risk-free, such as loans backed by the
full faith and credit of the U.S. government; (2) twenty percent for slightly
more risky assets, like loans conditionally guaranteed by the U.S. govern-
ment; (3) fifty percent for still more risky assets, such as first mortgage resi-
dential loans; and (4) one hundred percent for all other assets, which include
private sector loans and bank-owned real estate. 8'
The total assets in each category are then multiplied by the applicable
risk-weight, and the products are summed. To illustrate, if a banking organi-
zation had $100 million in loans guaranteed by the U.S. government, then
there would be no adjustment to the $100 million. However, if the federal
banking organization had $100 million in first mortgage residential loans,
then their assets would be adjusted by $50 million. This adjustment reflects
multiplying the $100 million in assets by the 50% risk weight.
In addition, the guidelines also account for off-balance sheet items.
These items, such as letters of credit or identity of the borrower, "are multi-
plied by a credit conversion factor to determine the 'credit equivalent
value.""' The FDICIA legislation also requires regulatory banking agencies
to revise their risk-based capital standards to take adequate account of inter-
est-rate risk.'88 These risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratios did not originally
account for interest-rate risk.
Once total assets are adjusted to reflect their associated risks, the second
step is to calculate the depository institution's capital. Capital is divided into
two categories: (1) "core" capital, known as Tier 1 capital; and (2) "supple-
mentary" capital, identified as Tier 2 capital.189 As stated earlier, "core"
capital includes common shareholder's equity.9 ' Tier 1 capital also includes
184. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813, 1818 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
185. See idL
186. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 303.
187. Ia
188. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Insurance Act § 305(b)(1)(A)(I).
189. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 31, at 303.
190. See idt
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"noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and minority interests in equity
accounts of subsidiaries.'' But, Tier 1 capital does not include the goodwill
of the institution.'92
"Supplementary" capital, on the other hand, represents debt or equity
instruments that are deemed to be more ephemeral or to have less certain
value than the components of core capital. 3 This type of capital includes
allowances for loan and lease losses, subordinated debt, and preferred stock
not included in Tier V" The total capital is then determined by adding "sup-
plementary" and "core" capital.' However, there is a limitation that the total
of Tier 2 capital cannot exceed the total amount of Tier 1 capital."6
Finally, the third step in the risk-adjusted capital ratio is to determine
whether the depository institution's total capital exceeds the mandatory
minimum percentage of total risk-adjusted assets."n Under this comparison, a
ratio of 8% total capital to total risk-adjusted assets, effective December 12,
1992, is required. "' In other words, the minimum total capital that a deposi-
tory institution must maintain is established by multiplying its total risk-
adjusted assets by 8%. The guidelines in effect also require a separate "core"
capital to a risk-adjusted assets ratio of 4%."9 To illustrate, if an institution
had total risk-adjusted assets of $200 million, then its minimum total capital
would be $16 million and its minimum Tier 1 capital would be $8 million.
The regulatory banking agencies originally believed that they would dis-
regard leverage ratio requirements once risk-adjusted capital ratios became
effective. However, these agencies decided to retain the leverage ratios.
Thus, leverage ratios currently represent an additional level of capital ade-
quacy that every federal depository institution must maintain.
2. Capital Adequacy Requirements for Savings Institutions
Having examined capital adequacy requirements for national banks, it is
apparent that savings institutions' capital rules are quite differently enforced
and applied by bank examiners. For federal capital adequacy requirements,
savings institutions include savings and loans, thrifts, and savings banks."'
Again, the savings and loan industry is supervised and regulated by the OTS,
a subsidiary office within the Department of Treasury. Congress, under the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, im-
191. Id. at 303-04.
192. See iL
193. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)-(t) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
194. See id
195. See id
196. See id
197. See id §§ 461-483; see also id. § 1464(s)-(t).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id § 1464(t)(1)(A).
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posed rigorous capital adequacy standards on the savings industry." '
FIRREA subjects federally insured savings institutions to three capital
adequacy requirements. 2 First, savings institutions, must have a 1.5% tangi-
ble capital to total assets ratio." Tangible capital consists primarily of cash,
stocks, and property."' Thus, tangible capital represents items that can be
seized by a federal regulatory agency, in the event of a savings institution
failure, before federal insurance funds are tapped. For this reason, tangible
capital does not include "goodwill," which is the value of an institution's
customer base and reputation.
The second capital adequacy requirement imposed on federal savings
institutions is a 3% leverage ratio."' This means that federal savings institu-
tions must have a gross ratio of capital equal to 3% of assets without any
adjustment for risks. For example, if a savings institution has $100 million in
assets, then it must have at least $3 million in capital to satisfy federal regu-
lations. Even though 3% represents the statutory minimum, most savings in-
stitutions are required to maintain a 5% leverage ratio."6
Finally, there is a risk-based capital requirement applicable to federal
savings institutions, comparable to the risk-adjusted ratio imposed on na-
tional banks; but FIRREA additionally provides that the standards must not
be less stringent than the capital standards applicable to national banks."a In
other words, savings institutions must maintain at least 8% total capital to
risk-adjusted assets. This provision has created controversy because it places
the fate of many savings institutions in the hands of the Comptroller of the
Currency, an agency that regulates national banks. The Comptroller can, in
effect, regulate savings institutions by adopting stringent capital require-
ments for national banks.
While FIRREA has been heralded for imposing rigorous capital stan-
dards on savings institutions, the statute has not been promulgated without
criticism. One criticism is that FIRREA emphasizes book value net worth.2"3
Federal savings institutions are permitted to list their assets and liabilities at
the price they paid for them, and not at their current fair market value. 9 The
overall effect is that assets are listed by a federal savings institution to satisfy
capital adequacy requirements with assets not representing their current fair
market value. Thus, the book value of assets listed by a federal savings in-
stitution could be vastly inflated when compared to their actual value.
201. See id § 1464(t)(2)(C).
202. See id. § 1464(t)(2).
203. See id.
204. See id § 1464(t).
205. See id § 1464(t)(2).
206. See id § 1464(t).
207. See id § 1464(t)(1)(C).
208. See Susan Burkhardt, Fed Finds Flaws in S&L Law, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER,
Dec. 5, 1989, at D1.
209. See id
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A second criticism is that the statute does not require higher deposit in-
surance premiums for higher risk investments."' For example, savings insti-
tutions can maintain the same level of insurance premiums for loans guar-
anteed by the U.S. government, recognized as having no risk weight, as they
can for private sector loans having a risk weight of 100%. But, in 1994,
Congress, in an attempt to minimize the high-risk investments of savings in-
stitutions, passed legislation requiring savings institutions to dispose of junk
bonds, the high-risk, high-yield debt securities, from their portfolios. In spite
of these criticisms, it can be reasonably said that FIRREA has been instru-
mental in stemming the tide of savings institution failure so prevalent in the
late 1980s.
The scope of FIRREA is not, however, limited to federal savings insti-
tutions. In California, the Department of Financial Institutions imposes
analogous capital adequacy requirements on state-chartered savings institu-
tions. At present, there are six California state-chartered savings institutions.
California state savings institutions are required to make double regulatory
fee payments, one to the Office of Thrift Supervision and one to the Califor-
nia Department of Financial Institutions.21" ' As a result of converting to fed-
eral charters to avoid the extra regulatory fees, very few state-chartered in-
stitutions remain."'
Currently, "the powers and investment authorities of state-chartered in-
stitutions are virtually identical to those of federally chartered savings insti-
tutions."2 3 In fact, state-chartered savings institutions must adhere to federal
regulations promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision before they can
operate in California." 4 These institutions must also satisfy California statu-
tory net worth requirements."5 The net worth, or capital, may not be less
than 3% of an institution's total assets." 6 In defining total assets, the Califor-
nia Commissioner of Financial Institutions has great latitude. The Commis-
sioner may issue regulations to exclude from the total assets any item
deemed appropriate." 7
If the capital of a California savings institution falls below the statutory
3%, then the Commissioner may require the institution to increase its net
worth so as to bring the amount to a level determined adequate under Cali-
fornia law." 8 Any state savings institution may be required to do any one or
210. See id
211. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 270 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
212. See Mike Fitch, Thrifts Prepare for Stricter Capital Requirements, BUSINEss
JOURNAL-SACRAMENTO, Vol. 7, No. 41, Jan. 7, 1991, at 12.
213. Great American Shifts to Federal Savings Bank, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, July 3,
1990, at C03.
214. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 5606(c) (West 1989 & Supp.1998).
215. See id § 660.
216. See id § 6475(b).
217. See id § 660(b).
218. See id. § 6475(b).
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more of the following: (1) increase liquid assets; (2) stop accepting savings
accounts of all classes or categories; (3) cease all lending; (4) stop the pur-
chase of loans; (5) stop or limit promotional expenditures; (6) convene a
meeting of its board of directors to accomplish these objectives; and (7) take
any other steps that the Commissioner deems necessary to protect the inter-
est of the institution and the public."9
In sum, regulatory guidelines for state savings institutions are promul-
gated primarily by the federal government. But a state regulatory agency is
empowered with authority to take corrective action if the state savings insti-
tution falls below required state statutory capital requirements. The federal
government regulatory guidelines are imposed on California savings institu-
tions, but state law ultimately provides the remedies that are applicable to
these savings institutions if they do fall below the requisite minimum capital
adequacy requirements.
National banks, federal savings institutions, and California savings in-
stitutions are subject to objective capital adequacy requirements. However,
the State of California does not impose an objective criteria on its state-
chartered banks. Like state savings institutions, state banks are also regulated
by the Department of Financial Institutions. The Department, created in
1997, combines the previously separate licensing and regulation of banks,
savings institutions, credit unions, and investment loan companies.
This Department generally requires that starting a bank in California re-
quires about $5 million in start-up capital."' In addition the new bank needs
experienced management who will be acceptable to state regulators. At the
beginning of 1992, there were 262 California state-chartered banks with ap-
proximately $110 billion in assets.22" ' In May 1994, the California State
Banking Department reported that "California's state-chartered banks in-
creased their assets from $103.28 billion to $110.58 billion from December
31, 1990 to December 31, 1993. During the same time period, the average
capital-to-asset ratio increased from 7.41% to 8.31%; and increased capital is
always a positive sign for California's consumers." '222
Differing from the capital ratios imposed on national banks, California
banking regulations focus on a bank's "core" capital. State law examines
several factors in determining whether a bank's "core" capital, principally its
shareholder equity, is adequate. Ultimately, the California Commissioner of
Financial Institutions must consider the following factors regarding a bank's
"core" capital: (1) nature and volume of the bank's business; (2) amount,
nature, quality, and liquidity of its assets; (3) amount and nature of its li-
abilities; (4) amount and nature of its fixed charges; (5) history of, and pros-
pects for, the bank to earn and retain income; (6) quality of the bank's op-
219. See id. §§ 660, 8450(b). See also 9 CAL. JuR. 3d Banks § 305 (1993).
220. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 600 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
221. See Fitch, supra note 212, at 12.
222. CAL. STATE BANKING DEPT., 84' 7ANNUALREPORT (May 31, 1994).
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eration; (7) quality of the bank's management; (8) nature and quality of its
ownership; and (9) any other relevant factors.2
These factors are subjective when compared to the capital adequacy
standards imposed on federal depository institutions. Due to this subjectiv-
ity, state-chartered banks do not have a uniform minimum capital adequacy
requirement. To illustrate, a rural bank will likely have lower capital ade-
quacy requirements than a bank located in a big city. The volume of the rural
bank's business is less than the city bank's volume. Correspondingly, the
nature of the rural bank's assets and liabilities are usually smaller. These
facts may compel the state regulatory agency to impose lower capital stan-
dards on the bank located in the rural community.
Another important consideration in determining the capital adequacy is
the state bank's management. Management that is comprised of individuals
knowledgeable about operating a bank will be regarded more highly by the
regulatory agency than inexperienced management or management that has a
disreputable history of operating banks. Thus, the Department of Financial
Institutions will more likely impose lower capital adequacy standards on a
bank that is under management acceptable to state regulators.
Although these factors examining "core" capital can be described as
subjective, state banking law requires banks to make periodic reports and
submit their records to examination by the Commissioner's office. 4 These
reports must be submitted from all California state banks no less than once
every two years."' The reports itemize the assets and liabilities of a state
bank, thus enabling California regulatory agencies to determine whether
"core" capital requirements are satisfied.
In addition, these reports create a certain objectivity in California bank-
ing regulation. If the Department of Financial Institutions finds that one of
its state-chartered banks is undercapitalized, then it can take corrective
measures comparable to those imposed on state savings institutions to pre-
vent the bank from falling. Strengthening the veracity of these reports is the
fact that if a California deputy commissioner of the Department of Financial
Institutions learns of a bank's insolvency but fails to report it, then he or she
is guilty of a felony.
26
Basically, California savings institutions follow objective capital ade-
quacy requirements applicable to federal savings institutions. These state
savings institutions adhere to the three capital standards imposed by the Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision on all federal savings institutions. National bank-
ing institutions, like federal and state savings institutions, are also subjected
to objective capital adequacy requirements.
California banks, on the other hand, have their capital adequacy re-
223. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 660 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
224. See id § 1900.
225. See id. § 1900.3.
226. See id § 1910.
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quirements determined by subjective factors promulgated by the California
Department of Financial Institutions. These factors do not reflect the com-
plexity of the capital adequacy ratios imposed on national banks. However,
the recent stability of federal and state banking organizations and savings in-
stitutions underscore the point that different types of regulatory schemes
have been effective in minimizing failures of these financial institutions.
C. What Happened to Financial Institutions When Minimum Capital
Regulations Were Not Met
It was the inability or failure to maintain adequate capital which led to
the dissolution of a significant number of banking organizations. The push
for higher capital ratios resulted in chaos for smaller savings institutions.
The only source of capital for small savings institutions is retained earnings,
so their growth is slowed while they push to rise to new minimums. This in
turn caused these small savings institutions to lose market share to the larger
commercial banking organizations who had the ability to borrow to meet
new capital levels without slowing their own growth. Savings institutions,
which tend to lend to consumers and small businesses with less credit wor-
thiness, are required to charge off potential losses against earnings... fur-
ther reducing the savings institutions capital. Small banks and S&Ls must
either replace these charge-offs with new capital or shrink the level of credit
they can provide.'n
The failure of many banks and savings institutions connected with non-
bank-related business ventures resulted in a legislative response of specific
limits designed to safeguard bank stability in the economy. 8 Yet, from 1985
to 1996, there were sixteen financial institution failures in San Diego
County. (See Appendix B.)
IV. WHY FINANCIAL INSTITUTION MANAGERS & DIREcTORS CHOSE
AMALGAMATION TO PROMOTE GROWTH
Management practices are really what control the financial industry.
"[B]anking can't blame public policy, can't really blame the economy for its
problems. It can blame itself for failing to exercise proper private sector dis-
ciplines. We should have learned to expect public policies not to be very
smart-in most times-very politically driven, very expediently driven. In
the management side of this equation, we had competition in laxity. Unfor-
tunately the dumbest and weakest competitors in the marketplace set the ba-
sic standards of pricing and credit terms."2 9 Management decisions were at
227. See John Rau, Putting the Squeeze on Small Banks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1985,
available in 1985 WL-WSJ 211820.
228. See Tart, supra note 12, at 916.
229. JOHN G. MEDLIN, JR. in FDIC: HISTORY OFTHE EIGHTIET: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE,
VOLUMEII, SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 106 (Jan. 16, 1997).
39
Lee: Amalgamation of the Southern California Banking Industry: San Die
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
the heart of the banking failures of the past. However, management practices
are also the force driving the current merger and acquisition environment.
"In the final analysis, the socialization of the risks underlying credit (the
democratization and liberalization of credit to everyone, cheaper credit, more
liberal credit) ultimately falls back on the people." '0 The negative effects of
amalgamation also "falls back" on the bank customer.
In many cases, amalgamation is a practical management decision for fi-
nancial institutions. But a combination of many factors was responsible for
this choice as an expansion technique. Changes in federal and state regula-
tion, eliminating geographic boundaries, new product development, ex-
panding banking powers, and national, regional and local economic devel-
opments, are all factors in a financial institution's plans to diversify their
business and compete more directly with nonbank financial concerns.
Regulatory constraints, even after deregulation and Riegle-Neal, made
amalgamation a difficult task. "[T]he history of U.S. banking in the twenti-
eth century can be partly read as an attempt to escape regulation."'" It be-
came obvious, however, to financial institution executives that negotiating
the maze of banking regulation to win approval of a merger or acquisition
was well worth the corporate profits that their increased market share would
provide. Thus, "banks used legal loopholes to acquire other banks, changed
the law if they could, and when they failed, created surrogate forms-bank
holding companies and chain banks .... [L]arger financial institutions were
built [in this way], particularly in California.""2
Financial institutions most often cite the following reasons for making a
decision to merge or acquire another banking organization.
A. Decision Motivators
1. Increased Ability to Compete
Amalgamation increases competition and profitability. Increased com-
petition enhances financial institution opportunities in the marketplace and
increases the efficiency and soundness of all banking institutions. 3 Finan-
cial institutions also believe amalgamation will increase financial strength.
2. Increase Number of Depositors
While antitrust matters are a concern, the banking industry clearly sees
interstate banking as a tool to expedite growth. In order to expand into inter-
state banking and branching, commercial banks and savings institutions were
230. Id.
231. REFORMING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 4, at 86.
232. I&
233. See Tart, supra note 12, at 947.
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initially willing to sacrifice some profitability in exchange for large increases
in accounts, potential deposits, and customer base. Even before Riegle-Neal,
in 1992 well capitalized federally chartered savings institutions were al-
lowed nationwide branching by the Office of Thrift Supervision.' Such in-
terstate branching alone tremendously increased an institution's customer
base.
3. Efficiency
Greater efficiency would result from amalgamation. "Under the new
branching provisions [of Riegle-Neal], [bank holding companies could]
merge all affiliated subsidiary banks into branches, eliminating the need for
separate boards of directors, computer systems, record keeping, other bank-
ing technologies, and the extra costs associated with owning separate busi-
nesses. These cost savings could be used to replenish bank capital, thus in-
creasing the ability to absorb losses," and meet regulatory capital
requirementsY
5
4. Tax Implications
There were certain non-direct benefits of these cost savings to taxpay-
ers. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 offered certain incentives for calculating
net operating losses which occur in connection with the acquisition of an-
other institution. Possibilities like reducing the strain on the FDIC insurance
fund, reducing regulatory burdens on banks, and possible deposit insurance
reform were not outweighed by the potential pitfalls such as compliance
with stricter consumer protection laws, notice and filing requirements, and
additional costs imposed on newly-formed interstate branches by requiring
state or federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) compliance. 6
5. Market Position
Branch banking would enable national and state-chartered banks to ex-
pand their deposit bases and loan service areas and increase potential for
growth. Arguably, the greater diversity would lead to greater security if a
certain banking area or region were to become financially unstable. 7
6. Product Development
The Glass-Steagall Act 38 restrictions were relaxed in the 1990s, allow-
234. See Branching by Federal Savings Associations, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,203 (1992).
235. Tart, supra note 12, at 944.
236. See id-
237. See ict at 945.
238. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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ing banking organizations the ability to offer certain security and investment
products directly to their customers. An increased customer base provided
more opportunities and need for a greater array of banking products.
7. Regulatory Flexibility.
Savings institutions were able to diversify without conforming to the
stricter rules placed on commercial banks by the regulatory agencies. Also,
antitrust concerns have been somewhat relaxed by the financial regulatory
agencies.
V. THE GROWTH OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THROUGH AMALGAMATION
Between 1925 and 1945 the number of savings institutions fell from a
peak of roughly 12,500 to about 6,700. In the same period the number of
banks fell from about 30,000 to 14,000. The decline reflected the large
number of institutions that failed after the [stock market] crash and during
the depression and the mergers that ensued as the turmoil tapered off, the
economy stabilized, and banks and thrifts became more conservative in
their business strategies. Then the good times reigned. For the next twenty
years, beginning with a veteran-driven home-buying boom at the end of
World War II, the [savings institution] industry prospered.13
By the 1980s, financial institutions again began to die. "In 1985, 120
federally insured banks failed, the highest number since 1933 .... This
contrasts sharply with an average of four failures per year in the sixties, eight
per year in the seventies, and ten failures in 1981 .... [A]bout 1,100 of the
14,500 commercial banks are considered 'problem banks,' that is, banks
having a significant chance of failure."240 This situation created plenty of op-
portunities for large banking organizations to merge or acquire the troubled
institutions.
In the mid-1980s several major San Diego savings institutions converted
from federal savings and loans to state-chartered savings banks, Great
American and Home Federal among them. In 1987 there were thirteen state-
chartered savings banks doing business in San Diego.24 Coast Savings and
Loan Association and Great Western Bank led this group with twenty-four
and nineteen branches respectively. 42 California regulatory law offered tools
to state chartered savings institutions that many other states did not. There
was greater flexibility in licensing, examination, supervision, and enforce-
ment. Put simply, California regulatory law created an environment that both
encouraged expansion and permitted savings institutions to move rapidly
239. DAY, supra note 34, at 50.
240. Albert J. Boro Jr., Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behav-
ior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431,442 n.53 (1986).
241. See Top Area Savings and Loan Associations, SAN DiGo Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS,
Dec. 1987, at 79.
242. See id
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into what, for them, were new areas of business. In this climate, several of
the savings institution subsidiaries became significant profit-centers and
were better positioned as state corporations than as federally regulated serv-
ice corporations. The California regulatory structure originally administered
by the California Financial Code gave way to a Department of Savings and
Loan headed by a commissioner with "general supervision over all associa-
tions, savings and loan holding companies, service corporations, and other
persons.""24 But by the fall of 1994, the trend was away from state-chartering
of savings institutions and the California Department of S&Ls was
downsized by then Governor Pete Wilson to only four employees (an In-
terim Commissioner, an examiner, a staff analyst, and a part-time assistant)
who regulated state-wide only fourteen state-chartered savings institutions.
The Office of Savings and Loan no longer performed audits of state-
chartered savings institutions and was restricted to simply a review and
analysis actually performed by the federal Office of Thrift Supervision.'
Between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the opportunities for amalga-
mation existed, the state and federal regulatory scheme promoted such ac-
tivity, profits from amalgamation were apparent, financial products were ex-
panding, and the larger institutions were well leveraged; it was obvious:
tremendous growth was achievable through amalgamation and it was the
right time to begin.
VI. SAN DIEGO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1985
San Diego was one of the first places amalgamation was successful.
Banking organizations doing business there were catalysts for merger and
acquisition activity in this country and for how banking is now organized.
The most recent mergers to affect the San Diego community are the 1998
BankAmerica/NationsBank and Wells Fargo/Norwest mergers. They are, for
the moment, the last Southern California examples of the continued amal-
gamation of banking organizations.
Largely because the primary growth product for savings institutions,
and to a lesser degree for banks, are home mortgages and housing develop-
ment loans, the impact of amalgamation in San Diego logically began with
the housing market. Housing development grew at a phenomenal pace into
the San Diego suburbs during the mid-1980s. "One in every eight home
sales in the United States in 1985 occurred in California.""24 San Diego resi-
dents spend approximately 33.3% of their income on housing, compared to
28% spent by consumers nationally. 46 Consumers began locating their ac-
counts and banking more in the areas in which they lived. San Diego bank-
243. CAL. FIN. CODE § 8050 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
244. See 12 U.S.C. § 1462(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
245. GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1987).
246. See UNITED WAY OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, FuruRE ScAN: SAN DIEGO COUNrY-THE
1990's 32 (1989) [hereinafter FuruRE SCAN].
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ing organizations, which were in a growth mode, quickly built retail
branches in these newly populated suburban areas. Strategic planners at San
Diego financial institutions saw these banking customers as their future.
Management of these institutions also sought retail branch networks and in-
dividual branches either through mergers with, or acquisitions of, banks that
already had retail systems well positioned in these areas. This was one rapid
response to service those quintessential affluent financial institution custom-
ers. There were fierce battles from 1985 through the 1990s among San Di-
ego banks and savings institutions for growth-oriented, home-owning, dual
income depositors, who regularly made large durable goods purchases.
Clearly, these were the depositors to court if a bank or S&L was to survive
and ultimately prosper in the San Diego economy.
Southern California banking has always been distinct from banking in
the rest of the country. From the pioneering use of ATMs in Southern Cali-
fornia, to widespread amalgamation beginning in the early 1980s, San Diego
has been on the forefront of the financial industry's progression.
While banking organizations throughout the country were in a continu-
ous state of turmoil, the 1980s were a time of tremendous growth and pros-
perity for the financial institutions doing business in the San Diego market.
In 1985 in San Diego, BankAmerica was the Commander of commercial
banking; Home Federal and Great American were the savings institution
Generals. Locally based savings institutions particularly experienced high
profitability. Great American posted a lending volume of $3,874,244 for
1986, and by December 31, 1986, were calling themselves "the [seventh]
largest publicly-held FSLIC-insured savings institution in the United States,
based upon assets as of December 31, 1986. "247
San Diego Trust had assets of $1,341,190, a total of $1,194,305 in de-
posits, 1,400 employees, and forty-eight branches as of December 31,
1986.48 Home Federal reported a healthy $103,358 net income, a total in-
come of $1.2 million, and 3,640 employees,249 while Wells Fargo reported
$44,577 million in assets and loans of $36,771 million at year-end 1986.'
Wells Fargo still had not entered the San Diego market in a big way. Bank-
America reported $91,606 million in assets, liabilities of $87,825 million,
and $75,998 million in deposits at December 31, 1986."'
Those sixteen banking organizations, major players in the San Diego
market in 1987, had already been reduced in number substantially by 1992. 2
"[P]ublic policy [had] shifted to a clear and substantial favoritism toward big
247. GREAT AMERICAN OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 38, at 17.
248. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO BUS. J. BOOK OF LISTS, Dec.
1987, at 29.
249. See Top 25 Area Public Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS, Dec. 1987,
at 53.
250. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1987).
251. See BANKAMERECA CoRP., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1988).
252. See supra note 9 for a listing of the sixteen organizations.
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banks-a favoritism that [was] especially lethal at a time when small banks
[were] under severe competitive pressures from geographic and pricing de-
regulation." 3 "The latent effect of deregulation was to move the basis of
competition onto those parts of the playing field (economies of scale, price,
technological product development) in which the larger institutions excelled,
and away from those aspects (personal service, convenience, community
emphasis, etc.) in which smaller institutions had traditionally been stronger.
Many small banks were willing to pay a price for the opportunity to compete
more effectively on their own terms. But they made the mistake of assuming
deregulation meant just that, less regulation, not more. They also assumed
that the regulations remaining in force would be administered even hand-
edly. But deregulation, as it evolved, meant disproportionately higher costs
of doing business for small banks." 4
In 1985, the primary business of savings institutions in San Diego was
lending for improvements on, or the purchase and construction of, residential
and commercial properties secured by first and second liens. Typically these
loans, secured by single family dwellings, multifamily residences, construc-
tion loans, commercial and light industrial properties, and loans made for the
acquisition and development of unimproved property, were the focus of
savings institution business in the 1980s. This was due largely to regulatory
constraints imposed on savings institutions prior to 1980 that limited long-
term permanent, fixed interest rate loans on residential properties. 5
Garn-St. Germain and the deregulation acts broadened the scope of S&L
lending activities, consumer products, and commercial banking powers." 6
Both deregulation and Garn-St. Germain had the effect of dramatically in-
creasing competition by narrowing the distinctions between savings institu-
tions and banks. Under deregulation, the cost of funds and interest rate sen-
sitivity was intensified and ultimately increased, leading to the termination
of differentials in interest rates on deposits between savings institutions and
commercial banks by January 1, 1984.' However, most savings institutions
recognized, even as they diversified their lending activities, that profits
would be impaired as a direct result of deregulation of deposit liabilities be-
cause of the number in their portfolios of long term loans with either fixed
interest rates or adjustable rates. These loans had narrow features that would
hinder the savings institutions from adjusting yield on its loans to offset the
increase in the market interest rates on their sources of funds.
After these Acts were passed, savings institutions began to diversify by
expanding the types of products and accounts they could offer. S&Ls pro-
moted a new array of consumer and commercial loans, from home equity,
mobile home, home improvement and education loans, to auto, recreational
253. Rau, supra note 227.
254. Id
255. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1701 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
256. See, e.g., id. § 1464.
257. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
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vehicle, boat, credit card loans, and secured and unsecured commercial busi-
ness loans. Deregulation also prompted savings institutions to venture into
the making and purchasing of more adjustable rate mortgages and to in-
crease their fee income by servicing loans for other financial institutions.
Savings institutions were highly skilled in this area since servicing had been
such an intimate aspect of their loan maintenance activities. Amid this finan-
cial climate and the beginnings of amalgamation activity, savings institutions
found their loan servicing skills highly marketable and lucrative.
From 1985 to* 1989, a lower national interest rate environment caused
savings institutions to experience a marked increase in the local origination
of both fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages. Heightened consumer pref-
erences and competitive pressure during this period created a climate in
which savings institutions were able to continue and to increase their utiliza-
tion of devices such as due-on-sale clauses in fixed-rate conventional mort-
gages, origination fees, late fees and prepayment clauses, and even introduce
other fee generating novices such as loan modification and change of prop-
erty ownership fees. Income realized from these fees proved to be significant
for the San Diego-based savings institutions.
Most California and San Diego savings institutions attempted to re-price
and restructure their match of assets to liabilities using their knowledge of
historical market product performance. They increased their participation in
reverse repurchase and interest rate swap agreements, limited their invest-
ments in mortgage-backed securities, and used cap agreements to try and
manage interest rate risk. Some were more successful than others. Great
American managed to regulate their match of assets to liabilities to around
2% between December 31, 1984, and December 31, 198658 Some measured
their results differently. Home Federal's results were a 7.3% increase of total
assets from December 31, 1986, to June 30, 1987, and a net income of
$26,600 for the same period."9 San Diego Trust had a return on assets of
.83%, a slight decrease from 1989 results. 6 ' On June 30, 1987, Imperial
Savings was one of the largest thrifts with $10 billion in assets and $5.5 bil-
lion in deposits. 61 The commercial banks were somewhat more successful.
According to the San Diego Business Journal, Wells Fargo was still not a
major player in the San Diego market in 1986.62 BankAmerica held the
strongest position of the commercial market leaders in 1987 with assets of
$93 billion and deposits of $76 billion.63
258. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 5 (1987).
259. See Top Area Savings and Loan Associations, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS 79
(Dec. 1987).
260. See SAN DIEGO TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1991).
261. See Top Area Savings and Loan Associations, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS 79
(Dec. 1987).
262. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTs 29 (Dec.
1987).
263. See BANKAMERICA CORP., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1988).
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Effective December 15, 1987, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) issued new accounting rules which altered the accounting
procedures for non-refundable fees and costs associated with both originat-
ing and acquiring loans through mergers or acquisitions. The new rules re-
quired loan origination fees to be deferred and attributed to income over the
life of the loans, instead of being recognized at the time of origination. These
FASB regulations focused on the timing of reporting fees and expenses.
There was no effect upon fee income generated from borrowers, or loan
origination and purchase loan costs, however certain loan origination costs
were now required to be capitalized and amortized just as loan fees were.
During this time, FSLIC insurance regulations limited the maximum
amount secured by real estate that a savings institution could lend to any one
borrower and that borrower's related business/personal entities, to the lesser
of that institution's regulatory net worth or 10% of the institution's separate
net withdrawable accounts."6 However, on August 15, 1986, the FHLBB, as
operating authority of FSLIC, proposed amending the regulation limiting
aggregate loans to one borrower by reducing the limitation to 25% of regu-
latory capital.
265
"Government regulation sheltered [savings institutions] from competi-
tion [prior to deregulation], allowing the industry to be profitable and fail-
ures to be rare. As long as interest rates did not rise substantially, [savings
institutions] faced little risk. '266 "Federal deposit insurance was provided as a
subsidy allowing savings institutions to raise large amounts of funds at less
than market interest rates so that they could finance long-term, fixed rate,
home mortgage loans."' It was in this climate that several of San Diego's
hundred-year-old S&Ls first prospered greatly and then, after deregulation,
ultimately failed.
All of these factors indicated that financial institutions in the mid-1980s
would have to design new ways to prosper. Because of a few national and
local successes, increasingly the directors and executives of San Diego
banking organizations began to look to amalgamation as a means to increase
profits.
A. Successes and Impacts of Initial Merger and Acquisition
Activities in San Diego
It was no aberration that amalgamation began with savings institutions
in the San Diego area. In 1985, the three major San Diego born and bred
S&Ls, Great American, Home Federal, and San Diego Trust, were well-
capitalized, self-assertive, strategically-located in the national and California
264. See 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
265. See id. § 1828.
266. ORIGiNS & CAUSES, supra note 42, at 1.
267. Id
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banking market, and keenly aware of the market opportunities deregulation
had provided. They began at that time to take advantage of their strength in
the market and expand by merging. The first banking organization to do so
was Great American Bank. Perhaps coincidentally, Great American was
home to both "Lawrence Taggart, California's... Commissioner of Savings
& Loans [in 1983], who worked for twelve years for [the bank, and] Gordon
Luce, CEO and Chairman of the Board of Great American, [Ronald]
Reagan's confidant and thrift guru, [who was] later appointed by Reagan to
be a delegate to the United Nations.
268
1. Great American First Savings Bank
Great American completed the sale of its retail branch network to Wells
Fargo and was closed by the OTS in August 1991. Headquartered in San Di-
ego, the bank was originally organized in 1885, as a California mutual stock
institution under the name San Diego Building and Loan Association. In
1936, the bank converted to a federally chartered mutual savings and loan
association and changed its name to San Diego Federal Savings and Loan
Association. To reflect its expanded market area, San Diego Federal changed
its name to Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association in 1982.
After the implementation of the provisions of the Gain-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982,9 Great American changed its designation
from a savings and loan association to a savings bank, and assumed the
name Great American Federal Savings Bank." Because California law was
more favorable to savings institutions,"' in 1983 "Great American converted
from a mutual [savings organization] to a stock form of ownership .... 1 2 In
July 1984, "Great American became a California licensed savings bank,
changing its name to Great American First Savings Bank,"' "S under which it
operated until its demise.
Like most California savings institutions, Great American's deposits
were insured by the FSLIC, governed by the provisions of the California
Savings Association Law, subject to the regulations of the California Sav-
ings and Loan Commissioner, and Great American was a member of the
268. DAY, supra note 34, at 131, 175.
269. The Gan-St. Germain Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994 & Supp. 1996),
permitted emergency interstate acquisition of failing savings institutions regardless of state
anti-branching laws, and was passed in response to the S&L crisis of the 1980's when institu-
tions began to fail in record numbers.
270. See supra note 17 (describing the differences in types of savings institutions).
271. California law provided greater freedom of business to savings institutions. The
capital ratios were lower, the political climate favored management decisions to merge and
acquire other banking organizations, but there was a double regulatory fee (if the savings in-
stitution was state-chartered)-one fee paid to OTS and one fee paid to the California De-
partment of Financial Institutions. See supra Part IH.B.
272. See GREAT AMERiCAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 1 (1987).
273. See idU
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Federal Home Loan Bank SystemY4 When it acquired Home Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association of Tucson, Arizona, it became a savings and loan
holding company and thus subject to the holding company regulations of the
FSLIC." At year-end 1986, the bank believed itself to be the seventh largest
FSLIC-insured savings institution in the United StatesF'6 and operated 190
branch offices,77 sixty-one of those branches in San Diego county." In
1986, Great American Bank had 600,000 customers and offered 100 prod-
ucts and services to them. 9
Again, as with most California savings institutions, Great American was
primarily involved in the business of "attracting deposits from the general
public and using [those] deposits, [along] with borrowings and [other]
funds.. ., to make mortgage loans primarily secured by liens on residential
and other real estate... [along with] consumer installment and business
loans." 8 The bank's income came from loan principal payments, interest on
and fees in connection with real estate loans, interest and dividends on in-
vestment securities, increases in deposits, cash received as a result of the
maturity of securities investments, securities sold under agreements to repur-
chase, mortgage-backed securities, advances from the Federal Home Loan
Board, other borrowings, and the income received in connection with loan
amortization, prepayments, loan sales, and participation in loans. 8' Through
its 180 retail offices in California and Arizona, and through its subsidiary
corporations, the bank offered "insurance brokerage, mortgage origination,
securities brokerage, advertising, marketing," a myriad of loan products and
services, and real estate development.282
Great American was the first savings institution in San Diego to use
amalgamation as a tool to increase their market share. "In 1981 and 1982,
Great American expanded its operations in California by merging with eight
savings and loan associations. 283 Prior to these mergers the bank reported
total assets to be around $6 billion.' By the conclusion of the first eight
mergers, Great American's asset size increased to $8 billion.285 By 1986, the
bank had completed 14 mergers within 16 years. 6 However, the bank's last
major merger was its downfall.
274. See GREAT AMERICAN OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 38, at 17.
275. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAvINGS BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 2-3 (1987).
276. See GREAT AMERICAN OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 38, at 17.
277. See id. at 18.
278. See Top Area Savings and Loan Associations, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS,
Dec. 1987, at 79.
279. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (1987).
280. GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 1 (1987).
281. See GREAT AMERICAN OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 38, at 18.
282. GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 1 (1987).
283. Id- at 2.
284. See id at 41.
285. See id.
286. See id at 2-4.
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In March 1986, the bank acquired Home Savings and Loan Association
of Tucson, Arizona. At first, the Home Federal merger appeared to success-
fully accomplish what amalgamation had done for Great American in the
past. By June 30, 1987, Great American's total assets were reported to be
$13.7 billion, a 30.3% increase from December 31, 1986, with deposits of
$9.2 billion and a net worth of $779,803 million In connection with the
Home Federal acquisition, Great American, through an agreement with
FSLIC, also acquired Hacienda Federal Savings and Loan and First Federal
Savings and Loan of Redding California, which were both insolvent institu-
tions. 8 On May 7, 1986, Great American acquired Los Angeles Federal
Savings Bank and on March 9, 1987, the acquisition of First Security Sav-
ings and Loan Association of Grand Junction, Colorado, was completed. 9
Also in 1987, the Bank completed its final merger with Capital Savings
Bank, F.A., which had offices in the states of Washington and Montana."'
During 1986, the Bank had increased regulatory capital 49%, to $755 mil-
lion, "positioning Great American with the seventh highest regulatory capital
base in the industry.""29
At the end of 1986, Great American believed itself to be the seventh
largest publicly held saving institution with $13.7 billion in assets.2 Then
the real estate assets acquired in the Arizona market through the Home Fed-
eral merger bottomed out. Both the California and Arizona real estate mar-
kets took a huge downturn and Great American sold its entire California re-
tail branch network in 1990 and 1991 to Wells Fargo Bank."3 Subsequently,
the bank was taken over by the Office of Thrift Supervision in 1991.4
Great American's disappearance was Wells Fargo's great emergence in
the San Diego banking market. Wells Fargo's acquisition of the Great
American branch network brought the total of Wells Fargo branches to 612,
292 in Southern California alone at the end of 1991."' At the end of the
branch acquisition, Wells Fargo initially retained fifty-seven of the sixty-
four San Diego Great American branches and twenty of its own twenty-six
Wells Fargo San Diego branch offices. The number of San Diego branches
fluctuated wildly throughout the following years with Wells Fargo closing
some offices and acquiring more as it increased its own acquisition activities
287. See Top Area Savings and Loan Associations, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS,
Dec. 1987, at 79.
288. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1987).
289. See id at 56.
290. See id
291. Id. at 5.
292. See GREAT AMERICAN OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 38, at 17; see also Top 25
Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OFLISTS, Dec. 1987, at29.
293. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1992); see also L. Erik Bratt,
Great American Expects Second-Quarter Loss of $70 Million, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE,
Aug. 2,1991, at C1.
294. See STATISTICS oNBANKING, supra note 3, at D-34.
295. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1991 10-KREPORT 3,5 (1992).
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in San Diego. Yet, Great American's 100+ years of citizenship in San Diego
left indelible marks on the City, its real estate, the 4000+ San Diegans it had
employed, countless community projects, and ultimately its depositors.
Great American and savings institutions like it created certain expectations
in the minds of depositors, as both bank customers and members of the San
Diego community.
2. First National Bank
"National Bank of La Jolla and National Bank of Fairbanks Ranch
merged with First National Bank on May 29, 1987."'g It was a total combi-
nation of the organizations yielding $382,075 million in assets: National
Bank of La Jolla's $157,842 million in assets and First National's assets of
$224,733 million.297 First National was established in 1981. By December
31, 1996, First National Bank had leveled out to $293 million in assets, and
$263 million in deposits." 8 The Bank currently has four local branches, 184
employees, and its primary activity is real estate lending. 9
3. Crocker National Bank
Crocker was the first bank to disappear from the San Diego market as a
result of amalgamation. In 1986, Crocker National Bank became the first
bank with a large presence in the San Diego market to be acquired by an-
other financial institution, Wells Fargo Bank Wells Fargo paid $1.1 billion
in cash for Crocker."' At the time of acquisition, Crocker had 319 branches
in the state of California, approximately seven in San Diego county."1 Wells
Fargo operated 517 branch offices, 187 in Southern California. 2
With this merger, Wells Fargo increased their market share of total de-
posits from approximately 1.5% of all deposits in the California financial
market to 3.6%, making Wells Fargo, by their own assertion, the fifth largest
domestic lender in the United States? 3 Wells Fargo understood the benefits
of amalgamation perhaps because the bank is the product of a merger itself.
The Wells Fargo California banking business, originally founded in 1852,
was separated in 1905 from the Pony Express stagecoach business and
296. Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTs, Dec. 1987, at
29.
297. See id. Total asset size of National Bank of Fairbanks Ranch at the time of merger
unknown.
298. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO BUSINESs JOURNAL-THE LISTS,
Dec. 1998, at 52-
299. See id
300. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1987).
301. See id; see also Telephone Interview with Dan Conway, Vice President of Public
Relations, Wells Fargo Bank (Apr. 27, 1998).
302. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1986 10-KREPoRT 3 (1987).
303. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1987).
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merged in 1960 with American Trust Company.l
It was during the Crocker merger in 1985 that Wells Fargo announced
its intention to become a major regional banking company. Crocker made a
major contribution to Wells Fargo's ability to target the San Diego market.
In its 1986 Annual Report, Wells Fargo clearly stated that the bank's objec-
tives were to increase competitiveness by expanding its retail presence in
Southern California, more effectively marketing services, making inroads
into specialized areas of wholesale banking in the California middle market,
focusing on trade financing among Pacific Rim nations and the United States
(especially trade moving through the West Coast), and moving into more
commercial real estate development-particularly single-family housing
projects,"' which traditionally had been the business of savings institutions.
Crocker had been the seventeenth largest bank in the United States at
the time of acquisition by Wells Fargo."6 While the announcement of the
deal was a shock to both the San Diego and the banking communities,
Crocker's loss to the San Diego market did not cause continued anxiety be-
cause of the perceived advantages to be gained by Wells Fargo's entry.
4. Home Federal Savings & Loan
Home Federal was placed in RTC conservatorship and subsequently
closed by the OTS in July 1992."° In addition to amalgamation activity,
selling and buying branches was also a popular way to consolidate market
share and minimize competition among savings institutions and banks in the
San Diego market. As it had done many times before in connection with
Home Federal applications, on May 28, 1987, the FDIC approved the trans-
fer of the Julian BankAmerica branch to Home Federal Savings and Loan.
On the date of the transfer, Home Federal reported $8.2 billion in total de-
posits."'
As of June 30, 1987, Home Federal's total assets were reported to be
$12.8 billion, a 7.3% increase in total assets from December 31, 1986; $9.1
billion total deposits and $11 billion in loans." 9 With fifty-two branch of-
fices in San Diego, a net worth of $854 million, and 4,223 employees, the
savings institution was second in San Diego only to Great American.10
By early 1991, Home Federal appeared to be having difficulty servicing
its debt while maintaining capital above the minimum required levels, lead-
304. See WELLs FARGO & CO., 1986 10-K REPoRT 3 (1987).
305. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT at 4-5 (1987).
306. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1991 10-K REPORT 3(1992).
307. See STATISTICS ON BANING, supra note 3, at D-37.
308. See There is a Reason FDIC Decisions Are So Juicy, 6 No.17 BANKING EXPANSiON
REP., Sept. 7, 1987, at 14.
309. See Top Area Savings and Loan Associations, SAN DIEGO Bus. L BOOK OF LISTS,
Dec. 1987, at 79.
310. See id
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ing to its closure. Ultimately, its own retail branch system was packaged and
sold to various other banking organizations. Because of its philanthropic
contributions, its competitive nature among other banking organizations, and
its history in the city, the closure was a significant loss to the San Diego
community and its depositors.
5. San Diego Trust and Savings Bank
Although First Interstate Bank's acquisition of San Diego Trust in 1994
was not one of the mergers that initially impacted amalgamation in San Di-
ego, the impact of its leaving as the last large savings institution based in the
city was of major significance to the community, its depositors, and the
bank's employees. Of the dominant San Diego savings institutions, San Di-
ego Trust was the only savings institution to be sought after and acquired
while still financially healthy. At the time of the 1994 acquisition, San Diego
Trust was also the last remaining of the three savings institutions"' that had,
for decades, dominated the San Diego market.
Headquartered in San Diego, San Diego Trust was organized under the
banking laws of the State of California, began to conduct business in 1889,
and to provide trust services in 1929. San Diego Trust and Savings Bank was
a subsidiary of San Diego Financial Corporation, a California corporation
organized on July 7, 1969, to function as a holding company for the Bank."
Unlike its San Diego competitors, San Diego Trust had the foresight to or-
ganize as a California corporation years before Great American and Home
Federal. Executive management of San Diego Trust recognized early the ad-
vantages to being subject to the California Department of Savings rather
than being a federal savings and loan.
In 1990, the bank regarded itself as the largest locally headquartered
trust department with market value assets of $2.8 billion. The trust products
offered included personal trusts, business trusts, which included retirement
services, and investment real estate trusts. In addition, the bank provided
trust security products like mutual funds, annuities, and investment advising
through a full service securities brokerage affiliate, San Diego Trust Securi-
ties, Inc. and San Diego Financial Capital Management, Inc."' The bank's
basic array of services included business, money market and personal
checking, an array of savings accounts, telephone banking, cash manage-
ment services, certificates of deposit, commercial loans, personal business
banking, lines of credit and business loans, home equity credit lines, equip-
ment financing and leasing, receivable and inventory financing, auto loans,
real estate construction loans, consumer loans, customer credit card services,
311. The largest last remaining savings institutions were San Diego Trust, Great Ameri-
can Bank, and Home Federal.
312. See SAN DIEGo TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1991).
313. See id at 6-7.
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and merchant processing credit card services, 314 the full gamut of traditional
savings institutions products plus some.
As of 1990, the bank had a total of fifty-five offices and drive up loca-
tions in San Diego County and operated forty-eight automated teller ma-
chines throughout San Diego at leased sites not attached to branch offices. 15
On December 31, 1986, San Diego Trust reported having 1400 employees. 6
In 1990, the bank reported a significant increase in earnings, income of
nearly $13 million, a 3% growth from 1989 year-end, a total deposits in-
crease of 10.4% over the previous year to $1,481 million, and increases to its
loan portfolio of 9.7%, expressed in dollars as $72 million.17 Net interest in-
come before loan losses increased 6% in 1990.318 Year-end total assets were
reported as $1,629 million and deposits as $1,481 million. 9 The bank was
ranked as one of the fifty safest banks in the country, one of the ten safest
banks in California, and the safest bank in San Diego County. 2
Collectively, these five initial mergers and bank transactions in the San
Diego market incited aggressive amalgamation. However, "[b]y 1992, a re-
cession that negatively impacted real estate values was in full-swing, and a
majority of the banks and thrifts in the southern part of the state, and some
up north, were experiencing serious asset quality problems. The problems
were so severe that between 1992 and 1995, 34 California commercial banks
and 32 California savings and loans, with combined assets of about $24 bil-
lion, failed."3"'
The California State Banking Department's 84e Annual Report noted
that in 1993, seven state-chartered and nine federally-chartered banks failed
in California; those banks included two state-regulated banks in the San Di-
ego market, the Bank of San Diego, and First California Bank. "According
to the report, the performance of California state-chartered banks improved
in 1993 as compared to 1992; earnings were up 36% from the previous year
and the aggregate return on assets and equity increased 0.44% and 5.3%, re-
spectively; over 70% of state-chartered banks were profitable; state-
chartered banks strengthened their capital positions and increased their loan
loss reserves; cut back on construction lending, and total loans and leases
were up a fraction in the last quarter of 1993, to $66.6 billion."3 However,
for the year of 1992, the State Banking Department found there was a net
314. See id at 10-12.
315. See id at 8, 32.
316. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS, Dec.
1987, at 29.
317. See SAN DIEGo TRusT & SAVINGs BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 2 (1991).
318. See id
319. See id.
320. See id at 3.
321. Danielson, supra note 7, at 7.
322. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA BANKING DEPT., 84eh ANNUAL REPORT 6 (Dec. 31, 1993);
see also Brenot & D'Angelo, supra note 154, at 112.
323. STATE OFCALIFORNIA BANKINGDEPr., 84rdANNUALREPORT 11 (Dec. 31, 1993).
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decrease of ten state-chartered banks. 4
It was during this time that an amalgamation of the last large locally
based San Diego savings institution occurred. San Diego Trust and Savings
Bank agreed to First Interstate Bank's merger offer in 1994.
VII. How AMALGAMATION AFFECTED THE SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION CUSTOMERS, AND EMPLOYEES
[Around 1981,] the thrift industry was a mess. Technically it had
failed. Of the country's four thousand savings institutions, Bank Board of-
ficials estimated that only forty or fifty-at most maybe a hundred-were
solvent. Even these struggled .... [M]ost of the big California [savings
institutions], touted as the industry's largest and healthiest, were hurt-
ing .... Nineteen eighty had been the first year in FSLIC history that its
expenditures to handle problem cases exceeded its income from insurance
premiums paid by the thrifts it insured... California, Illinois and New
York emerged as key problem states early on. 1
In San Diego, in spite of the industry's condition, amalgamation was
just beginning. The two large local S&Ls (Great American and Home Fed-
eral) had begun to utilize opportunities to acquire other healthy banking or-
ganizations. The major commercial banking organizations were actively re-
searching other institutions of like size with product compatibility and
similar business ideologies. The amalgamation that was to come in the late
1980s had begun to materialize. Its appearance had a major effect on San
Diego.
A. Impact of Amalgamation on Financial Services Availability and
Efficiency, Products, and Customer Service Culture
Prior to the San Diego Trust merger with First Interstate Bank of Cali-
fornia, after which First Interstate was merged into Wells Fargo Bank, San
Diego Trust was known as a local bank with excellent customer service.
Customer service was a major focus of San Diego Trust business; the bank
stressed to both employees and the public their commitment to providing
prompt, personal, and efficient service. During 1990, a program called
"Customer Comments, Opportunities to Improve" was implemented."2 The
program specifically reacted to customer comments and suggestions and ini-
tiated internal operations changes in response to those comments. As part of
that customer service emphasis, San Diego Trust offered "the largest full-
service, card-accessed banking system" in the county of San Diego, which
accommodated point-of-sale capabilities at Carl's Jr. restaurants, ARCO gas
324. See icL; see also B. Lebrecht, Regulatory Agency Action: Business, Transportation
and Housing Agency, Banking Dept., 14 CAL. REG. L. REP 92, 94 (1994).
325. DAY, supra note 34, at 92.
326. See SANDIEGO TRUST & SAvINGS BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1991).
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stations, and local grocery stores." San Diego Trust claimed that its banking
card "provided instant access to funds at virtually every type of ATM
throughout the United States. ' '31 San Diego Trust was the last major San Di-
ego savings institution to continue to offer drive-up banking when the others
had ceased to believe this service was cost effective.
Pioneer Mortgage Entities was a mortgage provider in the San Diego
real estate market and a customer of San Diego Trust and Savings Bank. The
company sold trust deeds to investors in exchange for the funds required to
make the underlying loans, and made regular monthly payments to the in-
vestors as borrowers paid off the loans.29 This practice required a constant
large cash flow. 3 ° In the late 1980s during the Southern California real estate
market downturn, Pioneer fell upon hard times.3 ' "Many of the company's
loans went into default, resulting in a shortage of incoming revenue ....
Pioneer continued to make advances to investors, but had to borrow money
from several San Diego banks to stay in business.""33
Partially because of its customer service policies, the bank granted Pio-
neer "'provisional credit' on all... deposits Pioneer made.., to various
commercial accounts it maintained at the bank" 333 The San Diego Trust
"provisional credit" service meant that "when Pioneer deposited checks into
its account at [San Diego Trust], the bank posted a credit to Pioneer's ac-
count and permitted Pioneer to withdraw the funds before the deposited
checks cleared through the clearinghouse system."M San Diego Trust regu-
larly granted provisional credit to all of its customers in good standing, as
did many other smaller banks in the San Diego area." '335 In addition to al-
lowing Pioneer this courtesy service (which Pioneer regularly utilized), the
bank's customer service included almost daily calls to Pioneer "to say that it
needed a deposit to 'cover' the amount of checks presented for payment the
previous day." '336 Pioneer always brought in a covering deposit, and San Di-
ego Trust always paid the checks. 37 The problem was that the check Pioneer
deposited to cover account "A" was drawn on another Pioneer account (ac-
327. See id
328. Id
329. See Consol. Pioneer Mortgage Entities v. San Diego Trust and Say. Bank (In re
Consol. Pioneer Mortgage Entities), 211 B.R. 704, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
330. See id
331. See id
332. Id at 707-08.
333. Id at 708.
334. The term "clearinghouse," as used here, refers to a local organization that provides
clearing, netting, or settlement services for all financial institutions which are members of the
organization. Member banks exchange checks and other negotiable instruments for payments
that were drawn on other member banks. The local organization usually performs this task
through the regional Federal Reserve Bank. See generally id
335. Id
336. Id
337. See id
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count "B") that did not have sufficient funds. 38
There were, of course, formal allegations of check kiting made during
Pioneer's bankruptcy proceedings during 1997 in United States District
Court, but the court ultimately found no fraudulent intent to exist on behalf
of Pioneer or San Diego Trust."
The type and extent of customer services San Diego Trust provided to
Pioneer is not extended by the large financial institutions, and therefore
hardly exists in the San Diego market. This kind of customer service culture
is not a priority for over half of the sixteen financial institutions that remain
in the banking business in San Diego. Without smaller financial institutions
(commercial and otherwise) and large savings institutions, there is a notice-
able void in the local market. The implications of the customer service cul-
ture of financial institutions on small businesses, minority- or women-owned
businesses, or businesses which experience cash flow or financial problems
because of market effects are compelling. Customer services are particularly
important to the survival of the large number of small businesses and sole
proprietorships that make significant contributions to the San Diego econ-
omy and employment rate.
San Diego Trust's motto in 1990 had been "This City and this Bank
Have Grown Up Together," to reflect their known customer service think-
ing.34 The motto was replaced with a new one which said "The Bank Where
Money Matters, But People Count," to reaffirm its commitment to the city of
San Diego. 4' Like San Diego Trust, Great American also hailed customer
service principles as central to their success. The bank regularly introduced
new promotion campaigns directly targeting customer service goals. In
1986, Great American's retail branch system, loan, finance, operations, and
executive groups launched a new customer service campaign known as
"C.A.R.E.: Customers Are the Reason We Exist."' 2 The bank strongly be-
lieved it could hold its market share in an increasingly competitive market-
place by "affirming its principles of customer service" and offering "a diver-
sity of products with a showing of respect, enthusiasm, and professionalism
at each point of customer contact.
343
Even though merged banks insist they can nurture relations with small
business borrowers while cutting costs, small business owners fear that
mergers will bring conservative standards and a decline in personal service.
Wells Fargo and other big banks say they "can maintain personal relations
with business owners who demand it, while relying on automation to serve
the rest."' Three examples which suggest the opposite of that very idea
338. See id
339. See id at715-16.
340. See SANDIEGo TRUsTAND SAVINGS BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1991).
341. See ide
342. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1987).
343. Id
344. Michael Selz, Bank Mergers Reduce Loans to Small Firms, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10,
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follow:
In 1995, four years after Allied Irish Banks, PLC, acquired her com-
pany's bank, Ms. [Patricia] Cumor sought to double a $200,000 credit line
that she had obtained [for her business] before the merger. In the past, [her
business'] receivables secured the credit line .... [B]ut... the bank's
new owner wanted additional collateral, including real estate her company
owned as well as some of her personal assets.
"My bank had changed and I was paying for it," [said] Ms.
Cumor. When a bank representative told her, "My hands are tied," Ms.
Cumor switched to an independent local bank.
During its acquisition of First Interstate Bancorp, Wells Fargo closed
the San Diego branch that had served Linda Hanover's clothing and cos-
tume store. Ms. Hanover [said] she knew the branch's staff so well that the
manager would call to warn her that a check might bounce. "There's no
way that would happen" at the Wells Fargo branch that now handles her
account. Ms. Hanover [said she was] switching to a savings bank that still
operates a branch on her store's street. "There's a branch manager there
who will talk to me," she [said.]
[There are still some occasional, but real attempts on the part of big
banks to demonstrate their commitment to customer service. Prior to its
merger with Washington Mutual,; Great Western branch managers] hand-
delivered nearly 1,400 pre-approved loan applications to business owners
in California and Florida .... The promotion produced $22.5 million of
loans to 752 borrowers ....
[Last, in] October of 1996, Luis Hernandez's dental supplies export-
ing concern in Miami borrowed $50,000 from Great Western when a local
branch manager called on him .... While [Mr. Hernandez] has kept a
commercial account with another bank that bought his old lender, he has
never applied for a loan there. "I don't have a relationship with any people
there," [said] Mr. Hernandez. "They never came to see me at all."
B. San Diego Amalgamation Antitrust Implications
Antitrust matters have increased in importance because of the unusually
high number of financial institution mergers in San Diego, as opposed to
merger activity in other industries and other geographic markets. The last ten
years has seen a consolidation in the banking industry resulting in greatly re-
duced competition in San Diego. The large homegrown institutions are
gone."6 The out-of-town banks led by BankAmerica, Wells Fargo, and Un-
1997, atB1, C3.
345. Id
346. See, e.g., WASHmNGToN MUTUAL, INc., 1997 10-KREPoRT 12 (1998) (listing smaller
58
California Western Law Review, Vol. 35 [1998], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol35/iss1/3
1998] THE AMALGAMATION OF THE So. CAL. BANKING INDUSTRY 99
ion Bank, all got bigger by acquiring smaller banking organizations and now
dominate the local market.34 Washington Mutual alone, from 1988 to 1997,
acquired five banks which had done business independently in San Diego.4 8
The banking regulatory agencies and the Justice Department both re-
view the competitive effects of bank mergers.4 9 Often these agencies review
the impact of a proposed merger from different perspectives, using different
standards and reaching different results."' Whatever their collective findings,
the anti-competitive effects of a merger can always be remedied by a federal
agency inspired divestiture plan. The Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, OTS,
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency often focus on the CRA
implications of a bank merger, variability in competition in the proposed
merger market, the relevance of geographic and market products, economic
measures of concentration, and mitigating factors of an increase in competi-
tion.
The bank regulatory agencies such as the Federal Reserve tend "to ad-
vocate bank mergers. In light of past savings and loan failures, the [FRB] fa-
vors banking consolidations in order to advance the safety and soundness of
the banking industry. Conversely, the [Department of Justice (DOJ)], along
with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) tend to scrutinize mergers more
closely. As a result at times, the FRB will approve a proposed merger and
the acquirer will move forward under the impression that the application
process is essentially complete. Then the DOJ will file suit based on antitrust
implications of the merger .... or delay the transaction based on potential
anticompetitiveness in the post-merger environment.""3 ' However, DOJ's ul-
timate focus is on how a particular transaction will affect competition.
"[C]ompetitive problems are generally localized and can [usually] be re-
solved through targeted divestitures." '352 The treatment of the Bank-
America/Security Pacific merger is one example. "In [this] merger, the
[DOJ] found that the divestiture of branches, vault and operational facilities,
deposits and related earnings assets, such as commercial loans, in local mar-
kets in each of five states (Arizona, Nevada, California, Oregon, and Wash-
institutions acquired by Washington Mutual and noting that most of the company's growth
has come through acquisitions).
347. See id
348. See il The five acquired institutions were Pioneer Savings Bank, World Savings
and Loan Association, Far West Federal Savings Bank, American Savings Bank, and Great
Western Bank. See id
349. See generally Steven C. Sunshine, Clearing a Bank Merger Through the Depart-
ment of Justice: The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 110 BANNG L.J. 188 (1993).
350. See id
351. Gina M. Kilian, Bank Mergers and the Department of Justice's Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: A Critique and Proposal, 69 NoTRE DAMvE L. REv. 857 (1994).
352. Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Janusz A. Ordover, The 1992 Agency Horizontal
Merger Guidelines and the Department of Justice's Approach to Bank Merger Analysis, 37
ANTITRUST BULL. 667, 685-86 (1992).
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ington) were sufficient to remedy likely competitive effects."3'
The Federal Reserve Board and the DOJ will also evaluate a bank
merger's impact using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index."
No banks have litigated a merger case to conclusion in nearly a dec-
ade. 5 A surprisingly minute number of bank merger cases are ever litigated
at all, partially because the Bank Holding Company Act3 6 (BHCA) and
Bank Merger Act357 (BMA) allow the Department of Justice to issue an
automatic stay of a transaction when negotiating divestiture plans with
merging bank organizations. Yet the DOJ often fails to give clear and uni-
form guidance on their enforcement policies as a regulator in this area.
The Federal Reserve Board will not approve any acquisition, merger, or
consolidation that results in a monopoly, which would lessen competition or
restrain trade, unless it finds that it would produce a public benefit that
would outweigh these negative effects. 5 Furthermore, the Board will take
into account the resources of the company and the conveniences it would
provide the community 9 In addition to the federal regulatory agencies,
merging financial institutions must also take into consideration the views of
state banking agencies that take an active role in amalgamation matters.
The California State Banking Department precludes the department su-
perintendent from approving any application unless it is determined
that the public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the estab-
lishment of the proposed bank; conditions in the locality of the proposed
bank... afford reasonable promise of successful operation; the bank is
being formed for legitimate proposes; the capital is adequate; ... and the
applicant has complied with all applicable laws.36
One factor in each of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's deci-
sions concerning acquisitions, mergers, branch sales, and purchases is al-
ways whether the transaction in question would have a significant impact or
"adverse effect" on competition.
353. Id
354. The HHI measures pre- and post-merger markets by adding the squares of each
firm's market share to arrive at an HI value between zero and 10,000-where 10,000 is a
pure monopoly. For banks, the total deposits are weighed in the market concentration meas-
urement. For instance, if four merging firms (banks, for example) have a market share of 25%
25%, 35%, and 35% respectively, the HEi is calculated as (25)2 + (25)2 + (35)2 + (35)2 =
3700, resulting in a HHI total of 3700 points. See UNIrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.51 (Apr. 2,
1992; revised Apr. 8, 1997).
355. See, e.g., United States v. Cent. State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276, 1292 (W.D. Mich.
1985), affd, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987).
356. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
357. Id § 1828.
358. See id § 1842(c)(1)-(2).
359. See id.
360. Brenot, supra note 39, at 102.
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The FDIC considers the structure and planned implementation of the
transaction in question, the number of commercial banking and savings
organizations in the specific marketplace, how many offices each institu-
tion has in that marketplace, whether there are adequate banking alterna-
tives, the particular organization's financial condition and managerial re-
sources, the impact the consummated transaction would have on direct
competition, earnings capacity, capital adequacy, Community Reinvest-
ment Act issues, and possible adverse competitive effects. In addition, as
the late [1980s] progressed, the FDIC increasingly reviewed real estate in-
vestment activities in connection with merger and acquisition activity.
361
"The Federal Reserve Board uses similar criteria as the FDIC in its own
merger, acquisition and even its bank holding company formation decision
making processes., '3" The Board's overall objective however, is to insure
that the proposed transaction not have a significant adverse effect on existing
competition in the banking market under consideration."
During 1988 the Federal Reserve Board made several merger and acqui-
sition decisions that involved substantial competition problems. The trans-
actions in question had the potential of eliminating a considerable amount of
existing competition. However, in all cases the Board found off-setting cir-
cumstances such as a satisfactory number of competitors remaining in the
market upon consummation of the proposed transaction, that a particular
bank may not have been an aggressive competitor or active lender in the
market, the concentration of bank resources in the market, the presence of
thrift institutions in the banking market with the potential to become major
competitors of commercial banks, and the convenience and need considera-
tions of customers." Despite the Board's standards, because of the offset
analysis there have been very few denials of San Diego banking organiza-
tions' merger applications on antitrust grounds.
The DOJ's approach to competition was liberalized further by revisions
made to its formal guidelines in 1997.65 "The overall effect of the revisions
to the DOJ's Guidelines is that the DOJ has abandoned its past rigid position
in merger analysis by explicitly denouncing pure reliance on market struc-
ture as the primary indicator of anti-competitiveness. By moving toward a
more flexible approach in the evaluation of proposed bank mergers, the DOJ
has increasingly come to resemble the FRB as a facilitator of banking merg-
ers. Although tension between the DOJ and the FRB still exists, the extent of
their disagreements may narrow as the DOJ's new Guidelines are applied in
a more liberal fashion than permitted under prior Guidelines.""36
361. Bank-Thrift Transactions Continue to Dominate FDIC Decisions, 6 No. 8 BANKING
EXPANSION REP., Apr. 20, 1987, at 13.
362. Competitive Concerns Do Not Halt Fed Approvals, 7 No. 6 BANKING EXPANSION
REP., Mar. 21, 1988, at 14.
363. See id
364. See id
365. See Kilian, supra note 351, at 858.
366. Id
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Arguably there are antitrust problems that now exist for certain banks in
San Diego, but these problems already existed when the institutions made
application to the Board to further their amalgamation activities.
From a bank perspective, California has become a "duopoly" with Bank-
America and Wells Fargo holding about one-third of the state's deposits
and almost 60 percent of the commercial bank deposits. This domination
was solidified when Wells Fargo's required divestitures in the First Inter-
state deal were allowed to go to a thrift. The next largest domestic bank
has less than 1 percent of the deposits, and among the foreign banks, the
Bank of Tokyo affiliate-Union Bank-is the leader with a 4.2 percent
deposit share. No other foreign bank in California has more than a 1.1 per-
cent share.67
Mergers are regulated by section 7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribes
transactions that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.
Both the financial regulatory agencies and the courts use the authority of the
Clayton Act, and the Sherman Act in bank antitrust matters. The courts have
some latitude to interpret the law, and recent decisions have varied from
Consolidated Gold Fields v. Anglo American," in which a merger was en-
joined because it marginally increased concentration in an oligopolistic in-
dustry, to United States v. Synfy Enterprises,69 in which a merger to near
monopoly was considered legal due to the lack of entry barriers. All deci-
sions are subject to review by the Supreme Court, but the Court did not re-
view the merits of a merger case in the 1980s."' Cases in this area focus on
the likely effect of a merger, with emphasis on market shares, barriers to en-
try, efficiencies, and structural conditions affecting the outcome of federal
court decisions.
Merger enforcement in the courts is generally based on United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, in which the Supreme Court ruled that high
concentration established a rebuttable presumption of illegality.371 The level
of evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption appears to have evolved over
the years. The BMA and BHCA "convenience and needs" defense was
largely a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Philadelphia National
Bank. 'The fact that the financial services industry is in the midst of a com-
petitive and technological revolution makes it imperative that the DOJ and
bank regulators take steps to analyze bank competition in a way that is not
unduly dismissive of the speed with which the industry is changing." ' In the
same case in which it analyzed a bank merger in "local" geographic markets,
367. Danielson, supra note 7, at 6-7.
368. 698 F. Supp. 487, affd, 1989-1 Trade Case (CCH) 68,500 (2d Cir. 1989).
369. 712 F. Supp. 1386, affid, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
370. See Malcolm B. Coate, FTC, Bureau of Economics, Merger Analysis in the Courts
1 (Working Paper No. 207, Aug. 1994).
371. 374 U.S. 321, 363-65 (1963).
372. Brian W. Smith & Mark W. Ryan, E-Banking Challenges Traditional Approaches
To Antitrust Analysis, 16 No. 11 BANKING POL'Y REp. 1, *17 (June 2, 1997).
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the Supreme Court also explained that the relevant product market was the
"cluster of products and services" offered by commercial banks. 3" But again,
as time passed, different agencies developed different approaches, with the
Federal Reserve Board and OCC favoring the cluster of services approach
and the DOJ favoring "a disaggregated 'business line-by-business line' ap-
proach to product market definition."374 The DOJ Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines were issued in 1992, governing mergers in all industries, including
mergers involving banking organizations. 7 However, the tension between
the DOJ and regulatory banking agencies prevails.
Early Supreme Court decisions in cases such as U.S. v. [Von's Grocery
Company] 6 established almost a per se rule against mergers in concen-
trated industries, the [U.S. v. General Dynamics Corporation]m decision
highlighted the importance of competitive factors other than market share.
The Court ruled that full consideration of a market's 'structure, history
and probable future' was necessary to measure the competitive impact of a
transaction, but the court decisions do not give any obvious way of
weighing the various economic factors in the legal decision?"
Obviously, this is also true of the financial regulatory agencies. The
FDIC, OTS, the FRB, and the Comptroller of the Currency all consider eco-
nomic factors a predominant factor in evaluating a banking organization's
entry into a particular market, yet will part from a traditional application of
antitrust law to approve an adverse bank combination if doing so addresses
demonstrated public need. Financial regulatory agencies routinely consider
these needs to be the provision of services otherwise unavailable from the
existing financial institutions or eliminating an unhealthy, insolvent or non-
responsive depository institution so as to strengthen the local banking mar-
ket.
C. Impact of Amalgamation on the San Diego Economy
Staying competitive in the financial services industry continues to be a
major concern nationally for both banks and savings institutions. Congress
and the Federal Reserve Board have demonstrated some legislative intent for
commercial banks and savings institutions to remain conscious and respect-
ful of public needs while lobbying for amalgamation and product growth.
From the beginning of San Diego amalgamation to date, the ability to offer
competitive financial products and services in the banking and nonbanking
realm drove commercial banks, and to a lesser degree the savings institu-
373. See Philadelphia National Bank 374 U.S. at 356-57.
374. Smith & Ryan, supra note 372, at *17; see also Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.S. at 356-57.
375. The 1992 DOJ Guidelines were revised and re-adopted by the DOJ in 1997.
376. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
377. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
378. Coate, supra note 370, at 3.
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tions, to formulate annual strategic plans which focused on that goal. Such
strategic planning, especially of the San Diego savings institutions, often led
to a restructuring which included forming a corporate entity (a bank holding
company) from which to operate both banking and nonbanking activities.
Creating a holding company allowed savings institutions to diversify the
products and services they were permitted to offer their depositors.
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956"79 was a Congressional re-
sponse restricting bank holding companies from engaging in some non-
banking activities. Under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, the Federal Reserve Board must grant approval for a
bank holding company to engage in activities "closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks."3"0 The Board grants this approval by exam-
ining two aspects of the activity. First, the Board determines whether the
non-banking activity is "'proper incident' to banking or managing or con-
trolling banks.""38 Then, a second determination is made as to whether the
activity is a "benefit to the public, as anticipated by the Act." ' Federal
courts and the Board have determined that the public benefits test weighs the
advantages of the proposed nonbanking activity against the possible adverse
effects on the public by examining 1) whether banks generally "conduct the
proposed activity;" 2) whether banks "provide services that are operationally
or functionally so similar to the proposed activity as to equip them particu-
larly well to provide the proposed services;" or 3) whether banks generally
provide services "that are so integrally related to the proposed service as to
require their provision in a specialized form."383
The Board shall consider whether its performance as an affiliate of a
holding company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the
public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in ef-
ficiency, that outweigh possible adverse affects, such as undue concentra-
tion of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest or
unsound banking practices. 84
Public benefit, therefore, remains central to the expansion of banking activi-
ties. The logical query then becomes whether the expansion of banking ac-
tivities, one of the core reasons for the concentration of amalgamation in
Southern California, has been beneficial to the public, i.e., the San Diego
community.
379. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1849(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
380. Id § 1843(c)(8); see also Part lI.A.l.a.
381. Id
382. Id
383. Jonathan Zubrow Cohen, The Mellon Bank Order: An Unjustifiable Expansion of
Banking Powers, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 335, 346 (1994).
384. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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1. Has the Local Economy Benefited From Amalgamation?
In its 84 Annual Report,385 the California State Banking Department
found that
[tihe California economy appeared to move in a positive direction in 1993;
the state's unemployment rate fell to 8.8% from 10% earlier in the year,
while the national average dropped to 6.3% from 7% during the same time
period.... Other economic indicators began to show improvement; for
example, retail sales in key urban areas of the state increased by 6%-8%.
In 1993, sales of single family homes increased by 3.2% over 1992 fig-
ures.
86
On December 31, 1997, the California unemployment rate stood at 4.3% and
was projected to decrease to 4.0% by the end of 1998."'
Central to San Diego's economy are the biomedical, military, aerospace,
defense, electronics manufacturing, retirement communities, and tourism in-
dustries. 88 Except for the addition of international trade, from 1985 to 1998
the economy has not changed.89 The city's economy is well-diversified and
experiencing constant growth. The military payroll has a tremendous impact
on San Diego's economy. 9 Financial and business services have increas-
ingly become a force in the past twelve years. 9' Conservative estimates are
that the county's economy will grow at a rate of 4% per year.92 In 1987, San
Diego County had a $42 billion dollar economy, a figure larger than the
economies of several states.93 Factoring in ten years of growth, the San Di-
ego Chamber of Commerce estimates gross regional product alone will be
over $88.7 billion by year-end 1998,394 outperforming both the state and the
nation. What continues to fuel population growth, gross regional product
growth, and housing construction is San Diego's strategic geographic loca-
tion. Being positioned between Los Angeles and Mexico creates two huge
markets in which San Diego can expand its economic success. "San Diego's
international border crossings continue to be the busiest in the world, with
52.5 million crossings recorded in 1996 .... The San Diego International
Lindbergh Field Airport reported 6.9 million passenger arrivals in 1996, a
385. STATE OF CALIFORNIA BANKING DEPT., 84" ANNUAL REPORT 6 (Dec. 31, 1993).
386. Brenot & D'Angelo, supra note 154, at 112.
387. See GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUREAU,
SELECTED SAN DIEGO COUNTY ECONOMIC INDICATORS (1998) [hereinafter SELECTED
ECONOMIC INDICATORS].
388. See generally GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC BULLETIN
(Aug. 1997).
389. See id
390. See id.
391. See id.
392. See id
393. See FUTURE SCAN, supra note 246, at 27.
394. See SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, supra note 387.
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record for the airport. ' '31- "[Tihe number of overnight visitors to San Diego
[in 1988 just] during the traditionally slow holiday period... increased
9.4% to over 1.1 million and visitor spending... increased 26.7% to over
$337 million."396
A high cost of living and the changes in the job market have adversely
affected a significant portion of the local population. The average household
income in San Diego at the end of 1997 was estimated to be $72,100, and is
projected to be $75,000 by the end of 1998.3" "Although the regional econ-
omy is strong, a significant segment of the population is being adversely af-
fected by the high cost of living and the changing job market. This segment
is growing, is becoming poorer, and is requiring more assistance from our
community's health and human care services." '398 "Movements to stem
population growth through residential development moratoriums may nega-
tively impact the economy by reducing the amount of affordable housing
and incurring losses in the construction industry." '399 These growth initiatives,
particularly a factor in the north and east county areas of San Diego, may
negatively affect home lending activities for banks and S&Ls. Ultimately,
however, population growth and in-migration will continue to create plenty
of new opportunities for financial institutions because of San Diego's favor-
able climate, proximity to Los Angeles and Mexico, and its quality of life.
Even during the national recession in 1990, San Diego avoided the full im-
pact of any economic slowdown because of its diversity, rapidly growing
population, significant defense spending, and strong tourist industry.
The amalgamation of San Diego's banking organizations has had rela-
tively little negative impact on the local economy. Despite the demise of the
three largest San Diego based savings institutions in the early 1990s, the San
Diego economy continues to thrive. The market shares these savings institu-
tions left was quickly absorbed by the big banks: BankAmerica, Wells
Fargo, and Union Bank. Changes in employment, diminished competition,
community support by banks, a lessening in the credit available to small
businesses, and a devaluation of depositors needs are all results of amalga-
mation, but the local economy has been substantively unaffected. It appears
the growth of financial services in general and changes in the banking or-
ganizations doing business locally will continue to contribute to the overall
growth of San Diego's economy.
395. GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC BULLETIN 4 (Aug. 1997).
396. Reint Reinders, 1998 a Banner Year for San Diego's Visitor Industry, Letter from
the President & CEO of the San Diego Convention & Visitors Bureau, SAN DIEGO BUS. J.,
Nov. 30, 1998, at Supp. A2.
397. See SELECTED ECONOMICINDICATORS, supra note 387.
398. FuTuRE SCAN, supra note 246, at 27.
399. Id
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2. Have There Been Increased Employment Opportunities in San Diego as a
Result of this Extreme Amalgamation?
At one time the government was the largest employer in San Diego
County; today, the services and retail market far outrank the military, and
soon the agricultural business will also. Still, San Diego is home port to over
90 military ships." In 1987, approximately 1,011,000 people were employed
in San Diego County, by year-end 1998 that number is forecasted to be
1,232,000, a growth of over 200,000 in employees in just over ten years."'
The strength of the region's economy is revealed by San Diego's relatively
low unemployment rate.
Unemployment rates for most ethnic groups in the region tend to be higher
than the unemployment rate for Caucasians .... [E]stimated unemploy-
ment rates by ethnic group were: Caucasians, 4%; blacks [African-
Americans], 8%; Hispanics, 6%; Asian/Pacific Islanders, 4%; American
Indians, 8%; and Other, 7%. The youth unemployment rate in the San Di-
ego region [was in 1989] estimated to be 16%, compared to a [1989] na-
tional rate of approximately 25%. Unemployment rates for most ethnic
youth also tend to be higher than the rate for Caucasian youth. Unem-
ployment rates among the region's black [African-American] and His-
panic youthe[Jwere] estimated [in 1989] to be as high as 36% and 24%, re-
spectively 4
San Diego's work force is composed of a higher number of women and eth-
nic groups than ever before. Still the county's unemployment rate is ex-
pected to remain lower than forecasted rates for the state of California and
the nation.4"3
Hostile takeovers often bring job layoffs or severe reductions in worker
compensation to companies targeted for acquisition. At an individual com-
pany, the acquisition process may eliminate a significant portion of the
workforce. Such was certainly the case during the San Diego Trust, First In-
terstate, BankAmerica, and Wells Fargo mergers. The Great American and
Home Federal preliminary layoffs could be attributed to amalgamation, but
the final layoffs could perhaps be more directly attributed to capitalization
problems than the final merger activities of the two institutions. Conversely,
these same final mergers caused immediate and long-reaching capitalization
failures that led to their demise.
At year-end December 31, 1986, one of its most successful years, Great
American employed 3,394 people and considered its employee relations to
be excellent." 4 At its demise in 1992, the number of Great American em-
400. See GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC BULLETI 2 (Aug.
1997).
401. See SELECrED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, supra note 387.
402. FUTURE SCAN, supra note 246, at 28.
403. See id
404. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 39 (1987).
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ployees had trickled down to 187.41 Many financial institution employees
were assisted with outplacement, but an estimated 1,200 remained out of the
workforce for a significant period of time .4 1 Still, San Diego County was
expected to add 30,000 new jobs to its workforce in 1998, a 3% increase
over 1997. 0l
On December 31, 1986, after Wells Fargo's acquisition of Crocker Na-
tional Bank, Wells reported a total of 21,500 employees, a 54% increase in
the number of Wells employees at year-end 1985.408 As part of the Crocker
Merger, Wells Fargo fired 4,000 people. 9 Of that number only 620 were
employed at operations in San Diego County.40 By the time of the next ma-
jor Wells Fargo deal in the San Diego area, the purchase of the Great Ameri-
can retail branch network, Wells had reduced its employees in San Diego
county to approximately 300.411 Combined Wells Fargo and Great American
employees in the San Diego area by year-end 1991 totaled 2,500.4"
This suggests that between 1986 and 1992, an estimated 2,900 Crocker,
Great American, and Wells Fargo employees in the San Diego area were
terminated or outplaced in some manner. The more amalgamation activity,
downsizing, and bank failures, the greater the tendency to also use contract
and part-time workers. "Three thousand San Diego jobs were lost in 1990
alone as a result of the failure of Imperial Savings Association.74 13 Four
thousand jobs vanished when the First Interstate merger swallowed up San
Diego Trust. The effect these employment changes had on the San Diego
community was profound. During this same time period the San Diego aero-
space industry suffered a large decline, but the services industry experienced
phenomenal growth.414
Industry executives seemed to think that layoffs would be minimal in
the 1996 merger rush for Great Western. Employment effects were consid-
405. See Telephone Interview with Dan Conway, Public Relations Officer, Wells Fargo
Bank (Apr. 27, 1998).
406. See id.
407. See SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, supra note 387.
408. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1986 ANINUAL REPORT 1, 13 (1987).
409. See Matt Murray, Norwest, Wells Fargo Agree to a Merger, WALL ST. ., June 9,
1998, at A2.
410. See Telephone Interview with Dan Conway, Public Relations Officer, Wells Fargo
Bank (Apr. 27, 1998).
411. See id
412. See id.
413. Id. At the "end of the Second Quarter of 1987 [June 30, 1987] Imperial Savings was
ranked the third largest San Diego area savings institution, with $10.1 billion in total assets,
approximately $5.6 billion total deposits, and $3 billion in loans. The company's net worth
was $215,512 million. At that time, Imperial had 3,000 employees and 15 branch offices in
San Diego County." Id See also Top S&Ls, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS, Dec. 1987, at
79. But, on February 23, 1990, the Office of Thrift Supervision seized Imperial Savings. See
generally STATISTICS ON BANKING, supra note 3.
414. See generally GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC BuLLETIN
(Aug. 1997).
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ered a plus factor for one of the possible suitors, NationsBank, because the
operations of the two institutions would not overlap; however, since the
victor, Washington Mutual, completed the merger in March 1997, 2,290
Great Western and Keystone employees have been casualties!"1 Pursuant to
a restructuring plan, the resulting number of Washington Mutual employees
declined by 1,737 full time employees by December 1997, to 19,880 total
Washington Mutual employees.4 16 An additional 1,190 employee separations
were planned for completion by the end of June 1998.'
During 1996, Ahmanson made a hostile takeover bid for Great Western.
It was expected that if the Ahmanson hostile deal had been successful, the
lions share of layoffs would of course come from Great Western employees
rather than what would be the newly combined pool of both Ahmanson and
Great Western employees. As of June 30, 1997, Great Western had a labor
force of 12,000 employees,"' approximately 500 in San Diego County alone.
In March 1997, Great Western agreed to be acquired by Washington Mutual,
certainly a decision in no small way effected by the plight of Great Western
employees. In connection with the Great Western merger, Washington Mu-
tual recorded transaction-related expenses of $431.1 million in 1997.' The
largest of these expenses were in the category of severance and management
payments and other direct transition costs.42 Great Western originally had
over 1,000 mortgage lending, retail banking, and consumer finance offices
operating in twenty-three states.4  Washington Mutual planned to close
ninety of these offices by the third quarter of 1998.422
Wells Fargo completed its purchase of the entire retail branch opera-
tions of Great American on August 1, 1991, displacing 200 of the remaining
Great American employees in the months immediately preceding and fol-
lowing the purchase.
41
Bank of America merged with Security Pacific National Bank in 1992,
the Bank of America Merger Transition Program is attributed with saving
the jobs of approximately 1,100 Security Pacific and Bank of America em-
ployees. 424 However, a large number of employees were terminated, accepted
severance packages, or elected premature retirement between 1991 and
415. The Keystone Holdings, Inc., merger with Washington Mutual was completed in
1996. See WAsHINGTONMUTrUAL, INc., 1997 10-K REPORT 27 (1998).
416. See id. at 34.
417. See id. at 35.
418. See Letter from Timothy McGarry, Corporate Communications Office, Washington
Mutual, April 24, 1998 (on file with author).
419. See WASHINGTONMurUAL, INc., 1997 10-KREPORT 35 (1998).
420. See id
421. See id at 27.
422. See idt at 35.
423. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1992); see also, WELLS FARGO
& Co., Press Release of 7/17/90; WELLS FARGO & Co., Press Release of 1/15/91.
424. See Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 761-62 (9 Cir. 1995).
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1993.44
First Interstate Bank of California acquired San Diego Trust & Savings
Bank in 1994. The acquisition brought the number of First Interstate em-
ployees in the San Diego area to 1,900. When Wells Fargo completed its
merger with First Interstate Bank of California during 1996, and closed forty
San Diego First Interstate branches while divesting itself of ten more, several
hundred of the combined employees of San Diego Trust and First Interstate
were affected. A total of 12,000 jobs were eliminated as a result of the $11.3
billion merger between Wells Fargo and First Interstate."' "A significant
portion of the decrease [in Wells Fargo's 1997 fourth quarter noninterest ex-
pense] was related to reduced salaries, incentive compensation and employee
benefits due to staff reductions after the merger with First Interstate Ban-
corp."4 As some indication of the total number of First Interstate and Wells
Fargo employees affected by this merger, note that Wells Fargo disclosed an
estimated $270 million restructuring charge/severance cost to be incurred in
connection with this merger .4 ' Today, San Diego area Wells Fargo employ-
ees total 2,000.429
[During 1993], B[ank] of A[merica]... asked all employees to sign 'at
will' statements acknowledging that the bank may fire them without cause
at the employer's pleasure, work hours may be cut and health care and
other benefits taken away, and employees may be transferred anywhere in
the bank's system; [this kind of] personnel action compromises the princi-
ple of employer responsibility by implying that the cutting of employee
hours, salaries and benefits is acceptable behavior while the bank contin-
ues to earn large profits; the elimination of employee benefits by [Bank of
America] may place an additional burden on the state budget by increasing
the costs of the Medi-Cal system and of state hospitals for uncompensated
care.
430
A reduction in employment sometimes comes into focus as a result of
the accompanying scrutiny of merger activities. Bank of America, known as
the leading bank in the West and one of the most profitable financial institu-
tions in America, made a profit of $1.5 billion in 1992; the bank had
achieved this success in part through federal subsidies of FDIC guaranteed
borrowing and mergers approved by the federal government.431 California
House Resolution 20 (HR20) chastised Bank of America's Chief Executive
Officer's salary of $1.6 million in 1992 and his exercise of approximately
425. See Alberto v. Bank of America, No. C-94-1283-VRW, 1995 WL 562170, *8 (N.D.
Cal.) (Unpublished opinion).
426. See Murray, supra note 409, at A2.
427. WELLS FARGO & Co., FOURTH QrR. EARNINGS PRESS RELEASE (Jan. 20, 1998).
428. See FIRST INTERSTATEBANcORP & WELLS FARGO & CO., JOINT PROxY STATEMENT I
PROSPECrUS 85 (1996).
429. See Telephone Interview with Dan Conway, Vice President of Public Relations,
Wells Fargo Bank (Apr. 27, 1998).
430. B. Lebrecht, 14 WTR Cal. Reg. L. Rep. 92, 95 (1993).
431. See id (citing California House Resolution 20 (1993)).
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$12 million in stock options between 1987 and 1991, as well as the bank's
opening of overseas offices in Vietnam while at the same time closing
neighborhood banks in California communities.432 Further, citing Bank of
America's decision to move its credit card operations to Arizona, transfer-
ring 1600 jobs out of San Francisco and Glendale in order to escape Califor-
nia consumer protection laws,433 and Bank of America's banking dominance
in the state of California,4 HR20 author Representative Burton recom-
mended a complete divestiture by the State Treasurer and state agencies
from Bank of America, "in accordance with ordinary care, prudence, skill
and diligence that a prudent person would use in conducting or making state
financial investments.
435
If the type of actions and ethics commented upon by HR20's author are
embraced by a financial institution partially to maximize the implications of
the merger activity in which the bank has participated, how could California
in general, and San Diego particularly, possibly expect local employment in
any way to be positively impacted by amalgamation?
Perhaps partially as a result of negative public discussion of Bank of
America's employee relations, prior to the Security Pacific merger, the bank
created a Merger Transition Program (MTP), a severance program for bank
employees whose positions were eliminated or displaced by merger or con-
solidation.436 MTP provided:
"Transition assistance which included Program pay, including severance
pay; Outplacement assistance, Continuation/extension of certain benefits;
Special treatment of stock based benefits; AND Additional special bene-
fits." Thus, the MTP provide[d] discrete benefits for former employees
who were guaranteed and received continuous employment, without inter-
rption.... after [a] divestiture, and for the displaced employees. Under
the MTP, divested employees are entitled to appropriate positions with
[the entity acquiring the sold BankAmerica business unit. If a divested
employee did not receive an appropriate position, that employee [was] eli-
gible for benefits under the MTP. In contrast, displaced employees were
entitled to transition benefits upon being notified that their employment
would be terminated.
437
MTP packages were expensive, however, and were not used with notable
discretion. As a result, several lawsuits were filed by employees and former
432. See id.
433. These consumer protection laws do not apply if the credit card business is head-
quartered in a state with weaker regulations. See id.
434. As the depository bank for the State of California, 91% of all deposits from Califor-
nia state agencies are deposited with BofA, during the 1991-92 fiscal year the State of Cali-
fornia's total dollar investment in BofA of $3.9 billion, and the State of California's $131
million in debt issuance corporate notes from the Pooled Money Account were with the BofA.
See id.
435. Id. See also Cal. Pub. Law 95-129-8 (1985).
436. See Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1995).
437. Id at 761.
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employees of Bank of America and Security Pacific in connection with what
was perceived as discriminatory practices via unfair application of the
MTP. 4
38
3. Have the Community Reinvestment Activities of the Remaining San Diego
Financial Institutions Been Affected by Amalgamation?
Adopted by Congress in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA)439 became effective November 6, 1978. Since then it has become
known for a longstanding history of inspiring compliance and service to the
communities in which branches of either a savings institution or bank oper-
ates. "[T]he CRA is designed to promote affirmative and ongoing efforts by
regulated financial institutions to help meet the credit needs of their entire
communities... consistent with safe and sound operations."" Under CRA,
banks and other depository institutions are required to meet the credit needs
of the entire community in which they operate, including low-and moderate-
income neighborhoods. CRA performance by banking organizations must be
taken into account by regulatory authorities in judging expansion applica-
tions.
During the 1980s, savings institutions, especially in the San Diego area,
appeared to take great pride in their CRA service to the community. Several
of the San Diego savings institutions were not only headquartered in San Di-
ego, but were originally owned by founding citizens of the city and managed
for decades by their descendants. This was true of Home Federal, Great
American Bank, and San Diego Trust. Annually, Great American issued a
CRA Statement and, in May 1989, even published a detailed, expansive, and
cumulative account of their own community reinvestment service throughout
San Diego County, Los Angeles, and the communities in which they oper-
ated in Arizona, Montana, Washington and Colorado."' Home Federal and
San Diego Trust regularly released to the public their own record of CRA
activities in the city of San Diego. CRA accomplishments still appear to be a
source of pride for all locally based banking organizations.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San
Francisco operated a Community Investment Fund (CIF) Program which en-
couraged participant banks and savings institutions to extend reduced rate
home loans to mortgage deficient (defined as low/moderate income and mi-
nority) areas throughout the State of California."2 Under the CIF loan pro-
gram, home loans were made at twenty basis points below the interest rate
438. See, e.g., idU See also Alberto v. Bank of America, No. C-94-1283-VRW, 1995 WL
562170.
439. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
440. Lebrecht, supra note 430, at 93.
441. See generally GREAT AMERICAN BANK, COMMUNrrY REINVEsTMENT Acr STATE-
MEW FOR 1988 (1989).
442. See ide at 13.
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on current loan rates. In 1988, Great American reported making over $22
million loans under this program."3
During this time at the state level, an organization called the California
Equity Fund, a subsidiary of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, oper-
ated a program to create affordable housing in local neighborhoods through-
out California.' In 1988, Great American contributed $1 million to the Cali-
fornia Equity Fund." Between 1991 and 1995, BankAmerica became one of
the largest investors in the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (which is a
national nonprofit group that provides equity financing for affordable hous-
ing under the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program)."
San Diego Trust and Savings Bank saw itself as a leading San Diego
corporate citizen and, as such, claimed to support over 250 community or-
ganizations." 7 This bank actively encouraged its employees to contribute
volunteer hours and make monetary donations to the community organiza-
tions of their choice.
However, application of CRA standards were not consistently applied
and enforced by the financial regulatory agencies or by the financial institu-
tions themselves.
[Thus, in July 1993,] President Clinton asked the four major banking
regulatory agencies.., to work together to "reform the Community Rein-
vestment Act enforcement system... [to] replace papervork and uncer-
tainty with greater performance, clarity, and objectivity."... [Tlhe four
agencies held six public hearings around the country to obtain public input
on improving federal enforcement of the CRA.... '
In December 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency(OCC), the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, and the Office of Thrift Supervision proposed new regulations to
implement the federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). [The pro-
posed regulations would replace the existing CRA regulations in their en-
tirety. The continuing purpose of the CRA being to promote the] affirma-
tive obligation of regulated financial institutions to help meet the credit
needs of their communities.., consistent with safe and sound operations;
the proposed regulations are intended to provide guidance on how the
agencies assess the performance of institutions in meeting that obligation.
In response to the initial rule-making proposal, the agencies received over
6,700 comments, which they spent ten months reviewing.
On October 7, [1994,] the four agencies published a revised rule-
making proposal... [to] provide guidance to financial institutions on the
nature and extent of their CRA obligation and the methods by which that
443. See id.
444. See id
445. See id
446. See, e.g., BANKAmERIcA CoRp., COMMUNITY AND THE BANK 1995 ANNUAL REPORT
14(1995).
447. See SANDIEGo TRUSTAND SAvINGS BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1991).
448. Lebrecht, supra note 430, at 93.
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obligation will be assessed and enforced, emphasize performance rather
than process, promote consistency in assessments, permit more effective
enforcement against institutions with poor performance, and reduce un-
necessary compliance burden while stimulating improved performance.
As compared to the December 1993 proposal, the agencies contended that
the revised proposal broadens the examination of performance, more ex-
plicitly considers community development activities, and makes other
modifications and clarifications.
[T]he revised proposal... eliminate[d] the existing regulation's
twelve assessment factors and substitute[d] a performance-based evalua-
tion system.... [It also made] explicit the assessment context against
which the tests and standards set out in the proposed regulations would be
applied, including consideration of demographic data about the commu-
nity, information about community characteristics and needs, ... informa-
tion about the institution's product offerings and business strategy, data on
the prior performance of the institution, and data on the performance of
similarly-situated lenders. [This proposal gave] particular attention to an
institution's record of helping to meet credit needs in low- and moderate-
income geographies.. . and individuals where appropriate, given commu-
nity characteristics and needs. The revised proposal retain[ed] the lending,
service, and investment tests as the primvary method by which the agencies
will assess... CRA performance ....
In addition to this rulemaking, the agencies proposed to work together
"to improve examiner training and to increase interagency coordination re-
garding application of standards, performance of examinations, assignment
of ratings, and use of enforcement tools. The agencies are also committed to
work together to improve public access to data collected pursuant to the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act [HMDA]."'45 "HMDA is a 1975 law that re-
quires banks and other depository institutions to compile and make available
to the public and supervisory authorities information about home mortgage
and home improvement lending practices."" According to the agencies,
these efforts "should produce a CRA assessment process that is less burden-
some for many institutions and yields more results for the local communities
the law is intended to benefit." '452 "Within days of the release of the proposed
rules, banking industry trade associations began to voice opposition to vari-
ous elements of the plan."453 There were issues with the proposed loan-to-
deposit ratio for smaller banks because of the feeling that in order to meet
the suggested lending ratio, banks may feel forced to engage in risky lending
practices. 4
The California State Banking Department administers all laws applica-
449. Brenot, supra note 39, at 102-03.
450. Lebrecht, supra note 430, at 93.
451. Mergers & Acquisitions: 12 First Quarter Actions Include Okay of Deal Once De-
nied Under CRA, 13 No. 8 BANKNG POL'Y REP. 12, 12 (Apr. 18, 1994).
452. Lebrecht, supra note 430, at 93.
453. Id
454. See id
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ble to corporations engaging in commercial banking, including those regu-
lating the establishment, operation, relocation, and discontinuance of various
types of offices of these entities, ' 5 As part of this administrative duty, the
chief officer of the Department, the superintendent, must consider and de-
cide what the implications of these matters will be on the CRA.4 56 The De-
partment coordinates its examinations with the FDIC so that every year each
agency examines certain licensees."
At the state level, the California State Banking Department recom-
mended a further redraft of the revised CRA proposal of the four key federal
agencies because of its concerns that: the new data collection and reporting
requirements were onerous; the tests were vague and could be implemented
inconsistently; the statutory authority may not exist for proposing sanctions,
such as civil money penalties and cease and desist orders; and finally, that
such proposed sanctions could encourage banks to ignore safety and sound-
ness for the sake of compliance with the regulations.458 Even the Consumer
Federation of America joined the criticism of the revised CRA proposal by
their contention that it failed to give proper weight to a bank's record of pro-
viding branch and deposit service in low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods, citing the provision of deposit services as both a very basic and gen-
eral obligation under the CRA, and a critical aspect of meeting both the
convenience and community needs of these communities. 9 The Consumer
Federation's position was that the regulatory agencies must support revisions
which provide that no bank may receive a passing composite rating unless it
earns a satisfactory or better score under the service test for delivering com-
plete deposit-side services.46 These services should be measured for success
by whether there is an increase or decrease in new accounts in low-income
and minority neighborhoods.46" '
On occasion, without competitor or community intervention, the Federal
Reserve Board has, on its own initiative, raised the matter of Community
Reinvestment Act records of institutions seeking approval for merger or ac-
quisitions.462 At least one institution, perceived by the Federal Reserve as
needing improvement in this area, responded to the Board's concerns by
submitting a new plan found acceptable by the Board.4" The plan required
the bank to submit semi-annual reports updating the Board on promises
made by the plan, including:
455. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 100(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
456. See Lebrecht, supra note 430, at 93; CAL. FIN. CODE § 4886(g) (West 1989 & Supp.
1998).
457. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 488 6(g) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
458. See Brenot, supra note 39, at 103.
459. See id.
460. See id
461. See id
462. See Capital, CRA Issues Dominate Recent Board Decisions, 7 No. 16 BANKING
ExPANSiONREP., Aug. 15, 1988.
463. See id
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With regard to "Banking Services,"... [the bank] will:
p romote services to its communities through regular product advertis-
ing in mass media newspapers and locally targeted publications, and
through special advertising programs;
" develop employee understanding and awareness through written com-
munications, formal training, internal publications and quarterly review
meetings;
" ascertain community needs through a "grassroots" outreach program
which will be developed by an experienced individual;
" evaluate existing products and address changing needs through analysis
of market penetration by product and review of consumer and small
business lending activity;
" develop and introduce new products such as credit cards, student loans,
subsidized loans, and small business loans and deposit accounts; and
" evaluate services offered and address changing needs through a market
research project and a program for the hearing impaired.
With regard to "Housing Services," [the bank] will:
" promote existing mortgage products through traditional and special ad-
vertising programs;
" ascertain community needs through work with [community/city] hous-
ing offices;
" evaluate products and address changing needs through analysis of
mortgage applications, approved and denied by census tract, review in-
vestments in government housing related securities .... making avail-
able adjustable rate mortgages and no income check mortgages;
participate in housing development and redevelopment programs; and
make funds available for participation in rehabilitation projects and
mortgage loans.
With regard to "CRA Compliance," [the bank] will:
" Revise its CRA statement as needed;
" review and revise community delineations, as needed;
* provide employee training on CRA;
* evaluate CRA compliance;
* document CRA compliance; and
e revise its community action program.
Despite CRA's notable successes, bank and thrift industry, community,
consumer, and other groups maintain that its full potential has not been re-
alized because, in large part, compliance efforts have focused on process at
the expense of performance.465
Along with federal and state antitrust laws that apply to interstate bank-
ing, the Federal Reserve Board must also consider Community Reinvestment
Act compliance in connection with any merger or acquisition application.
For example, in its analysis of the antitrust concerns and of a CRA protest of
Security Pacific National Bank's acquisition, the Federal Reserve Board
found "the convenience and needs considerations in this case were consistent
with approval of Security Pacific National Bank's acquisition application." 66
464. Id at 28-29.
465. Lebrecht, supra note 430, at 93.
466. Application in connection with the acquisition of American Asian Bancorp, San
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The Board did an analysis of both applicant financial institution's CRA rec-
ords, the CRA compliance of all Security Pacific's subsidiaries, and Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act data for the years and the geographic area in ques-
tion and concluded there existed no pattern of discrimination against minor-
ity and low-income neighborhoods."'
Security Pacific held a meeting to discuss the establishment of a work-
ing group within the bank to increase its CRA program coordination and to
establish system-wide CRA compliance and reporting programs. The Board
cited Security Pacific's involvement with organizations that identify the
needs of low- and moderate-income persons and develop and manage pro-
grams that address those needs. Further, the Board found Security Pacific
placed advertisements in local publications targeted to low- and moderate-
income persons and practiced some flexibility in its underwriting criteria and
loan application procedures.46
A community organization in California also protested the First Inter-
state merger with San Diego Trust and Savings Bank. The protest charged
that both institutions "failed to meet the credit needs of minorities and low-
and moderate-income individuals in the San Diego area," and that "the
merger would reduce the credit products available to the San Diego commu-
nity.""9 The Federal Reserve Board rejected this complaint based on 1) First
Interstate having received "outstanding" or "satisfactory" CRA performance
ratings from regulators during its most recent examinations, 2) First Inter-
state-California's offering a variety of relevant loan products, including a
down payment assistance program to make home ownership more afford-
able, and 3) First Interstate's commitment of $7.8 million in construction
and permanent financing for a 53-unit, single-family residential housing
project in a predominately minority, low- and moderate-income area of San
Diego." In addition, the Board recognized First Interstate's support of the
California Community Reinvestment Corporation in financing a rent-
controlled housing project in San Diego.47
Through the years there have been consistent attempts in California
State government to encourage financial institution compliance with the
CRA. California Assembly Bill 1756, which died in committee during 1994,
would have prohibited state, city and county governments from contract-
ing for services with financial institutions with $100 million dollars or
more in assets unless those companies file Community Reinvestment Act
reports annually with the [State] Treasurer. [In turn,] [tlhe Treasurer
Francisco, and Security Pacific National Bank, Los Angeles. Competitive Concerns Do Not
Halt Fed Approvals, 7 No. 6 BANING EXPANSiONREP., Mar. 21, 1988, at 15, 16.
467. See id
468. See ide
469. 12 First Quarter Actions Include Okay of Deal Once Denied Under CRA, 13 No. 8
BANINGPOL'Y REp. 12, 13 (Apr. 18, 1994).
470. See idt
471. See il
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would have been required to annually submit a report to the legislature and
to make summaries available to the public. These reports would have in-
cluded specified information regarding the nature of the governance of the
companies, and their lending and investment practices, with regard to race,
ethnicity, gender, and income of the governing boards and of the recipi-
ents of loans and contracts from the institutions. 7
What better way would there ever be to determine if California banks had in
fact or were attempting to meet the credit needs of the entire communities in
which they operated, especially the low and moderate income neighbor-
hoods? Yet as late as 1995 the California political climate would not support
such a bill.
In 1998, with local savings institutions nearly extinct, community rein-
vestment in San Diego by the major market banks is tremendously different.
Washington Mutual made a point of emphasizing its reputation for commu-
nity giving during and after the Great Western merger, citing its activities
"through grants, volunteer time, in-kind services and other support, the com-
pany strives to give back 2% of its pre-tax earnings to the communities
where it does business. This equates to over $10 million in grants, services
and volunteer time given back to the community.""' 3 Also, in connection
with the Great Western merger, Washington Mutual pledged $75 million to
CRA activities in the communities in which it does business."4
Wells Fargo made a $45 billion, ten-year community reinvestment
commitment in connection with the acquisition of First Interstate Bancorp. 75
Two and one half years into the pledge, the bank reports a $16 billion ac-
complishment in CRA lending. 76 As of June 30, 1998, Wells Fargo has
made $213 million in community investment commitments toward its $500
million, ten year CRA investment goal and $300 million in corporate contri-
butions to the communities in which the bank conducts business.47
BankAmerica reports earning three consecutive Community Reinvest-
ment Act ratings of "Outstanding. 4 78 Through its Bank of America Commu-
nity Development Bank, it provides affordable low-to-moderate income
housing in over 40 states. 9 The bank committed $140 billion to community
development lending over ten years, the largest goal set by a bank.80 During
1998 a new branch, staffed by tribe members, was opened on an Arizona In-
472. Brenot & D'Angelo, supra note 154, at 114.
473. Letter from Michael L. Amato, Senior Vice President of Great Western Bank to
Great Western Customer (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author).
474. SeeWAsHINGTONMUrUAL, INC., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1998).
475. See WELLS FARGO COMMUNrrY REINvEsTmENT LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT,
<http://weUsfargo.comncra/craltrl/> (Oct. 1, 1998).
476. See id
477. See i
478. See BANKAMERICA CORP., COMMUNrTY AND THE BANK: 1997 COMMUNrrY
REiNVEsTMENT Acr STATEMENT 4 (Aug. 1997).
479. See id
480. See ide
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dian reservation.
If there is a weakness in the bank's community relations it is among its
own workforce. BankAmerica has long been known for lagging behind other
banking organizations in the areas of hiring, promoting, and valuing diver-
sity in its own employees. This perception is being addressed by a program
to train 12,000 of its middle management staff on diversity in the workplace,
having already trained 20,000 in this area in recent years.48'
Union Bank has devised and published an annual plan specifically ad-
dressing its Community Reinvestment activities since 1988, as well as a
Community Reinvestment Act Statement reporting the results achieved in
connection with the plan, each year. The first sentence of the 1988 plan
(originally a California First Bank publication) acknowledges the bank's
awareness of its "responsibility as a corporate citizen in the communities it
serves."48 It lists those responsibilities as "the provision of credit and deposit
services to Californians of low and moderate income; cash contributions to
non-profit community organizations, assistance to local governments in fi-
nancing public projects, and the involvement of local employees in commu-
nity service. Furthermore the Bank recognizes that it will, as a result of its
pending merger with Union Bank, accept a greater responsibility to help
meet the financial needs of the community." 83 This approach, while it sim-
ply communicates the underlying theme of community reinvestment in gen-
eral, is certainly novel to make such a statement so immediately and em-
phatically. Certainly the conglomerate banks of today have begun to directly
approach the issue of corporate responsibility.
Union Bank's results have been significant. The bank has consistently
met or exceeded its set lending goals. The bank exceeded the 1988 lending
goal of $84 million, reached its goal of $148 million in lending for 1991-
1992, and set a community-lending goal of $184 million in the 1993-1994
plan.484
The locally based small banking organizations also uphold their CRA
responsibilities. In fact, several "local" banks have earned "Outstanding"
CRA ratings consistently."'
In 1940 it was said:
[The big banks are the leaders in the savings-bank field. They are not al-
ways followed, but they set the pace. They have done little to clean out the
slums. They have overbuilt Park Avenue. They have shown no leadership
toward a social use of the funds they guard... [or the] great power they
have... [b]ut of what use is this power to their city, to the state or to the
nation? They cannot be trusted adequately to represent such power, nor
481. See id
482. CALIFORNIA FIRST BANK, SERVICE ACION PLAN 1988-1990 1 (1988).
483. Id
484. See UNIONBANK, 1994 COMMUNITY REINVEsTMENT Acr STATEMENT 3 (1995).
485. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO Bus. J.-THE LISTS, Dec. 1998, at
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can any surrogate for them do so. Power corrupts the user. It blinds his vi-
sion. It deprives him of kinship with the lowly. Holding in his hands the
right to vote a half billion dollars, he soon fails to feel the essence of his
power-the $800 deposited on the average by each of the depositors in hisbank 86
Some truth still rings in this statement today; if it did not, we would not need
four regulatory agencies to lord over the business of bank amalgamation.
The time is long past when challenges to bank mergers and acquisitions,
targeted against transactions involving large institutions and coming princi-
pally from community interest groups, only involve claims of inadequate
compliance with CRA or fair lending laws." There remains a high percent-
age of CRA protests; however in late 1996, a trend of attacking banking and
product expansion applications on much broader grounds began. 8' During
the third quarter of 1997, protests raised by both competitor organizations
and community interest groups have been more broadly-based on concerns
about managerial resources; adverse competitive effects on markets served
by existing financial institutions; concentration of banking resources; dis-
criminatory hiring practices of an incoming banking organization; under-
writing activities of an acquiring institution; allegations of price fixing and
other impermissible market-making activities; and improper sales practices
of nondeposit investment products."9 In one such instance an argument was
made that the demographic and economic characteristics of a new bank's
proposed trade area showed insufficient demand to support another bank and
the new bank's projections for deposits and income were exaggerated.49
This new community interest group strategy has even been used in a
protest over an application of a routine bank merger to simply reorganize its
operations."' It seems as if all aspects of bank merger and acquisition activi-
ties are now fair game. The seven major banking organizations that today do
486. ERNST, supra note 15, at 110.
487. See Wide-Ranging Protests Target Third Quarter Applications of All Kinds, 16 No.
22 BANKINGPOL'Y REP. 10 (Nov. 17, 1997).
488. See id.
489. See id. at 10-12.
490. See id. at 11. Well into 1997, the strategy by activist and community coalitions was
to continue these new lines of attack on banking expansion. These coalitions questioned many
other issues such as capital adequacy considerations, state deposit caps, a bank subsidiary's
relocation of its main office, the competitive effects of automated teller machine (ATM) sur-
charges on both customers and non-customers, problems with ATM services, billing errors
with secured credit cards, management competence, the departure of mid- and high-level
management executives, the effectiveness of boards of directors, Department of Labor re-
views of a bank's labor practices, incidents of alleged employment discrimination, branch
closing practices, trading in unregistered futures, mutual fund sales practices, minority in-
vestment in the applicant bank, the reliability of data submitted under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, and even a bank's luxury auto lending practices that allegedly excluded low-
and moderate-income and minority borrowers. See Activists Are Challenging Bank Expansion
on Much More than CRA Perfornance, 16 No. 3 BANKiNGPoL'Y REP. 7, 7-10 (Feb. 3, 1997).
491. See id (reorganization of Chemical Bank by Chase Manhattan).
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business in San Diego492 remain very conscious of their CRA responsibilities.
Most still publish annual CRA statements that highlight their achievements
even though federal law passed in 1997 no longer requires them to publish
this data publicly. Financial institutions never know if or when inattentive-
ness to CRA matters will affect their next amalgamation plan.
4. Have the Needs of Small San Diego Businesses Been Negatively Impacted
as a Result of Amalgamation?
On September 29, 1994, the governor of California signed into law As-
sembly Bill 2233 which directed "the California Research Bureau of the
California State Library to conduct a study of factors affecting credit for
small businesses, including the effect of state and federal financial institution
laws and regulations on small business loans and report to the legislature by
July 1995."" 3 The problems of small businesses in California are of utmost
importance to its economy because the majority of employers and contribu-
tors to the gross regional product in each California county are small busi-
nesses.
San Diego has a "small business" character that continues to increase.
Its myriad of major educational centers, biomedical research, and genetic
engineering has become an "incubator" for emerging companies in the high-
tech field and entrepreneurs who convert research findings into marketable
products. San Diego is now the nation's fourth largest center for the bio-tech
industry.494 The County's bioscience employment in 1996 numbered 21,290,
an 8.5% increase over 1995.
495
The "start up" companies of the late 1980s will become the mid-sized
and large corporations in the years ahead. "Of the estimated 64,000 busi-
nesses [in 1989] in San Diego County, 95% employ fewer than 50 persons,
with 75% of these companies employing fewer than 10 persons. Approxi-
mately 700 companies employ[ed] 100 or more persons." '496 San Diego sta-
tistics now report 70% of San Diego companies qualify as small busi-
nesses.4" In 1995, there were 76,727 small businesses with ten or less
employees and 12,248 small businesses with 11 to 50 employees.498 These
88,975 small San Diego businesses employ 534,024 of the total San Diego
492. Those seven are BankAmerica, Wells Fargo, Union Bank, Grossmont Bank,
Washington Mutual, Scripps Bank, and Peninsula Bank.
493. Brenot & D'Angelo, supra note 154, at 114.
494. See GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIc BULLETM 7 (Aug.
1997).
495. See id.
496. FUTURE SCAN, supra note 246, at 31.
497. See id "Small Businesses" are defined in this study as "those businesses employing
less than 50 employees." Id
498. See SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS (SANDAG), POPULATION AND
ECONOMIC CHARACrERISTICS (SAN DIEGO REGION) 3 (1995).
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workforce of 1,091,190, or 49% of San Diego's total employment4 9
San Diego is still the largest county in the country for military and ci-
vilian salaries/wages by the Department of Defense. For the year-ended De-
cember 31, 1996, the San Diego County payroll for military/civilian wages
was $3,658,889."oo "The defense industry accounted for 12% of San Diego's
gross regional product (estimated to be $79 billion in 1996). Only manufac-
turing has a greater impact on the local economy, although some defense
revenues are also counted as manufacturing."'" In "1996 San Diego was
home port to 96 Navy ships, including two aircraft carriers," with active-
duty naval personnel totaling 67,400, down from over 94,000 in recent
years.2 Marines based in San Diego increased to 45,740.3 "San Diego is
home to the largest number of military retirees anywhere in the nation."
Over 260,000 military veterans, receiving $953 million in retirement com-
pensation, live in San Diego."5
High technology employment in San Diego rose 18.2% to 104,250 in
1998, and is on a pace to double within five years." 6 There were 16,310 new
jobs added by high-tech companies during 1997, "accounting for 36% of all
new jobs created in San Diego during the year. ' The San Diego computer
and office equipment industry alone employed 15,722 San Diegans as of
year-end 1996, in the manufacturing of component parts and software devel-
opment and design, and includes thirty seven companies." 'The end of the
Cold War brought an almost total collapse of San Diego's defense industry
during the early 90's. Aerospace and defense had dominated local economic
activity for at least the past fifty years. The downsizing of defense brought
on and prolonged the longest and deepest recession in the area since the
Great Depression of the 1930's. Two of every three aerospace and defense
jobs existing in San Diego... vanished, falling from 44,000 in 1990 to
fewer than 15,000 by 1996."" °
Tourism is the heart of many small businesses in San Diego. The num-
499. See id
500. See GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOlIC BULLErIN 1, 2 (Aug
1997).
501. Id
502. Id
503. See id at 3.
504. Id
505. See id at 7.
506. See GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC BULLErI 1 (Sept.
1998).
507. Id
508. See High-Tech Employment in San Diego Up 18 Percent in '98, SAN DIEGO Bus. J.,
Dec. 7, 1998, at A15. The leading computer companies in San Diego are SAIC (Science Ap-
plications International Corporation), NCR Corporation, Qualcomm, Maxwell Technologies,
Hewlett Packard, Sun Microsystems. Gateway 2000 has recently announced its management
is relocating to San Diego. See Top 100 High-Technology Firms in San Diego, TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTORY 1997 SAN DIEGO COUNTY EDrrION at v (1997).
509. GREATER SAN DIEGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC BULLETIN 6 (Aug. 1997).
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ber of visitors to San Diego has increased each year since 1987."'0 Approxi-
mately 13.9 million tourists came to San Diego in 1996 and contributed ap-
proximately $4 billion to its economy."' On December 31, 1996, tourism
supported 125,300 jobs in the county."' "Visitor revenues represent San Di-
ego's third largest [industry, with] visitor spending account[ing] for 5.1 per-
cent of San Diego's 1996 gross regional product (GRP), estimated to be
$79.1 billion.""5 3 San Diego small businesses receive billions of dollars in de-
fense contracts for shipbuilding, military facility maintenance, aircraft, mis-
sile, aerospace, and avionics work each year. In addition, the defense indus-
try significantly contributes to San Diego small business income. Total
defense-related spending was estimated to have a $17 billion impact on San
Diego's economy during 1996.14
The lending policies of the major commercial banks that now predomi-
nate in San Diego are not supportive of small businesses. For example,
James Worrell [owner of a small heating and air conditioning company]
says the banking industry's wave of mergers left his business treading
water.
After National Westminster Bank PLC in 1995 acquired the lender
[Worrell's] business used, [he] tried to increase his $15,000 credit line. In-
stead, the bank cut the credit line by one-third.
After mergers, "there are always people... who for any number of
reasons have their credit scaled back," says Joseph Wessley, an executive
vice president at Boston's Fleet Financial Group Inc ....
Many small business owners like Mr. Worrell worry that they will
lose out after mergers. Now, a Wall Street Journal computer analysis of
federal banking reports suggests that their fears are justified. The Journal
examined the five biggest bank holding company acquisitions and mergers
completed at least a year ago. In every case, small business's share of the
companies' combined business-loan portfolios declined. The drop repre-
sents $1.9 billion in loans that small businesses didn't get.
Overall the small-business loan portfolios of the merged bank hold-
ing companies fell 6% while their total business loan portfolios grew
slightly. By contrast, the small business portfolios of the six biggest hold-
ing companies that did not go through major mergers rose 7.5% during the
same period. All but one of those companies increased small businesses'
share of their business-loan portfolios.
510. Seeid at 4-5.
511. See id at4.
512. See id
513. Id
514. See ic at 1, 2.
83
Lee: Amalgamation of the Southern California Banking Industry: San Die
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
* .. At Fleet, whose small business loan portfolio declined the most
among the merged companies, nearly a third of the drop stemmed from
divestitures required by regulators for antitrust reasons." '
Although nationally small business loans tend to decline after a merger,
in recent years, SBA loans made in San Diego County by local commercial
banks have rebounded. For the period of October 1, 1997, through Septem-
ber 30, 1998, Union Bank made thirty-three SBA 504 loans totalling $24,
486,050.16 These loans are guaranteed by the SBA and provide 90% financ-
ing to small businesses who are buying or building commercial properties."'
Grossmont Bank made eleven 504 loans for a total loan amount of
$8,875,750 in San Diego, Riverside, Orange, and Los Angeles counties." 8
Others making 504 loans included:519
Banks Making 504 Loans No.ofn54 Total of Loans
Loans
BankAmerica Community
Development Bank 16 $8,039,000
Scripps Bank 14 $7,099,258
Wells Fargo Bank 12 $6,517,500
Peninsula Bank 4 $3,907,250
Bank of Commerce 7 $3,500,473
First National Bank 1 $1,050,000
San Diego National Bank 1 $252,000
In addition to 504 loans, the BankAmerica Community Development
Bank also made eighty-four SBA 7A loans in San Diego County from Octo-
ber 1, 1997, through September 30, 1998, totaling $6 million."0 In that same
period, Bank of Commerce made fifty-three 7A loans totaling $22 million;
however, only a portion of these loans were made in California generally. 2 '
515. Selz, supra note 344, at B1.
516. See Special Report: Finance, Largest 504 SBA Lenders, SAN DIEGO BUs. J., Nov.
23, 1998, at 20.
517. See id,
518. See id
519. See id
520. See id at 18. These 7A loans are guaranteed by SBA and are for the general busi-
ness needs of qualifying businesses, such as debt refinance, real estate, inventory, equipment,
and company acquisitions. See id
521. See id
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Other lenders under 7A included:22
Banks Making 7A Loans No. of 7A Total of Loans
Loans
Scripps Bank 50 $9,000,000
Pacific Commerce Bank 24 $4,000,000
Peninsula Bank 20 $3,000,000
Grossmont Bank 17 $4,000,000
In conjunction with the Great Western merger, in April 1997 Washing-
ton Mutual announced a commitment to make $9 million in small business
loans of $50,000 or less over a ten year period.5 3 In comparison, in 1993
Union Bank announced a plan to extend $110 million in small business loans
and lines of credit to non-profit community organizations.52 Four full-time
SBA specialists in Northern California, Los Angeles, Fresno, and San Diego
administer Union Bank's plan."
At the time of the Crocker acquisition by Wells Fargo, Crocker had
demonstrated a virtually unmatched commitment to small businesses and
entrepreneurial activity in Southern California, at least among commercial
banks. Wells Fargo pledged to continue Crocker's attentiveness to that line
of business, however in the years from 1990 to 1996, especially in the San
Diego market, Wells Fargo divested itself of a great many of these types of
business customers, even though it reported business lending of $1.3 billion
at December 31, 1991, up from $1.0 billion at year-end 1990.6 Wells Fargo
admits it focuses on small businesses with annual sales of up to $10 million
in which the owner of the business is also the principal financial decision-
maker.' Credit products available to these businesses are "lines of credit,
receivables and inventory financing, equipment loans and leases, real estate
financing and SBA financing."'" The Bank uses a focused product group
that "utilizes automated credit decision methods... to approve or decline
requests for credit."5 9
Yet, changes to Wells Fargo's small business lending program is a
prime example of the fact that the threat of competition from out-of-market
institutions has arrived. As detailed in a recent press report, Wells Fargo
pioneered a national small business loan program conducted through the
mail.50 The program was initiated in 1992 in California, and has helped in-
522. See id
523. See WAsoNGTON MuTuAL, INC., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1998).
524. See UNIONBANK, COMmuNry RErNvESTmENT Acr STATEMENT 19 (1993).
525. See id
526. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1991 10-K REPORT5 (1992).
527. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1996 10-K REPORT 9 (1997).
528. Id at9&10.
529. Id
530. See Sara Oppenheim, Wells' Small-Business Lending via Mail Pays Off, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 23, 1996, at 10.
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crease Wells Fargo's share of California's small business loans from 1% to
20%." The program was expanded nationwide three years later, offering
loans from $5,000 to $100,000 in all fifty states.53 The bank reportedly plans
to make $25 billion in small business loans through the program over the
next ten years. 3 Recently, perhaps to address Wells Fargo's past oversight
of the female and African-American small business market, Wells Fargo
launched a nationwide $41 billion African-American loan program in June
1998."34 "[Wells Fargo] then created a $1 billion latino loan program last
year, 5P
35
In 1990, BankAmerica created the Bank of America Community Devel-
opment Bank and the Community Development Division of Bank of Amer-
ica's Federal Savings Bank as a way to combine its core products with
community-based organizations and meet varying community credit needs.
Between 1990 and August 1997, those entities developed a $1 billion port-
folio of affordable housing and small business loans by partnering with fed-
eral and state public agencies such as the U.S. Small Business Administra-
tion, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, local agencies, and community-based non-profit
organizations.5 '"The bank established a $1 billion women's loan program in
1995, which it expanded to $10 billion in 1996." 3
In 1994, BankAmerica made $1.1 billion small business conventional
and government assisted loans. The Advantage Business Credit program was
introduced in 1992 in order to widen the availability of loans and credit lines
under $100,000 to small business owners.53 That program nearly doubled in
size in the first two years.539 During 1996, BankAmerica reports having made
$409.6 million in "Special Small Business Programs," which are loans under
government-guaranteed and other programs for small businesses and for
commercial improvement or development"0 The bank also reports $3,299.4
million in loans up to $750,000 each to conventional small business."
BankAmerica considers itself "[tihe number one provider of SBA loans
among banks in America and among the top providers of commercial and
531. See id
532. See idU
533. See idt
534. See Chandrika M. Jones, Newspoints: Wells Fargo Commits $1 Billion in Loans,
BLACK ENTERPRISE 18 (Oct. 1998).
535. Id
536. See BANKAMERICA CORP., COMMUNrrY AND THE BANK: 1997 COMMUNrrY
REINVESTMENT Acr STATEMENT 4 (Aug. 1997).
537. Id
538. See BANKAMERICA CORP., CoMMUNrrY AND ThE BANK: 1995 COMMUNrrY
REINVESTMENT Acr STATEMENT 13 (1996).
539. See id
540. See BANKAMERICA CORP., COMMUNrrY AND THE BANK: 1997 COMMUNrrY
REiNVESTMENT Acr STATEMENT 2 (Aug. 1997).
541. See id
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industrial loans worldwide with more than $52 billion outstanding in
1997.
"
,542
In the San Diego area during 1995, BankAmerica extended a small
business loan through its Minority- and Women-Owned Business Enterprise
Program to The Bread Basket bakery which employs 12 people. 3 Admit-
tedly, loans of this size are atypical of the large commercial banks, some-
times even under CRA programs. BankAmerica also joined with local gov-
ernment, through a partnership with San Diego City Councilman George
Stevens and the San Diego Housing Commission, to complete the construc-
tion of a 54-unit affordable housing development that had been abandoned
for eight years.5
Union Bank has also created minority- and women-owned vendor pur-
chasing programs as well as minority- and women-owned business assis-
tance programs. In 1994, Union Bank provided $24.7 million in small busi-
ness loans, which contributed to the creation of 523 jobs." Union Bank
pledged $110 million in small business loans and lines of credit to nonprofit
community organizations and small businesses. 6 The funds are adminis-
tered through four California sites, including San Diego. 7
It appears that the three major San Diego commercial banks have in re-
cent years reaffirmed their commitment to San Diego's small business mar-
ket. The challenge for these banks, as they amalgamate, is to continue a
commitment to the small business growth and the economic well-being in all
the communities in which they currently operate, as well as every commu-
nity into which they expand.
Often the Justice Department, in connection with a merger decision or
an antitrust evaluation of a competitive geographic market, will restrict its
competitive analysis to smaller geographic markets because it considers
small business lending to be a local matter. Obviously tools like DOJ dives-
titure requirements, the elimination of legal barriers to geographic expansion
of banking, and even the revolution of technology in the financial services
industry are good for small businesses seeking competitive loan rates, and
will help assure the commitments of major banks to meet those needs.
542. BANKAMEmiCA CoRp., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998).
543. See BANKAMERICA CORP., COMMUNITY AND THE BANK: 1995 CoMMuNrrY
REiNvESTMENT Acr STATEMENT 11 (1996).
544. See BANKAMERICA CORP., COMMUNITY AND THE BANK: 1997 CoMMUNrrY
REINVESTMENT Acr STATEMENT 2 (Aug. 1997).
545. See UNION BANK, 1995 COMMUNTY RENVESTMENT ACr STATEMENT 11 (1995).
546. See id.
547. See id
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5. Have the Needs of the Depositors in San Diego Been Met During
Amalgation?
"'Banking' has existed for some 5,000 years." 8 In that time, banking
organizations have reinvented themselves repeatedly. The products available
to the public have grown beyond comprehension. Both cash and checks have
lost popularity to electronic transactions and credit exchanges. The stock of
both banks and savings institutions are traded on various stock exchanges.
Mutual funds and the borrowing public have, for the first time in years, the
advantage of lower interest rates and a larger array of choices. All changes
are due in large part to the competition that now exists between banking or-
ganizations.
Bank fees have markedly increased in California in recent years. Since
1990, Banks have introduced 150 new fees. A 1994 Federal Reserve Report,
based on a survey of more than 1,000 banking organizations, found that
"fees charged by out-of-state banks are significantly higher than those at in-
state banks."549 The study also found that "services at banks were reduced in
1994. '"5'o "Out-of-state banks usually are larger than in-state banks and may
be concentrated in large cities where costs are higher."'55
A study by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group "compared fees of
271 banks in 25 states and the District of Columbia with a similar study of
23 states performed by the consumer group in 1993" and found that many
checking and savings account fees rose in the past two years by 11 per-
cent."552 In 1997, the same research group "surveyed 419 banks in 29 states
and found that consumers paid on the average 15% more to maintain a
regular checking account at a big bank. A June 1997 study by the Federal
Reserve showed similar results. Stop payment orders at banks that operate in
more than one state cost an average 30% more."'553 There are now fees for
calls to the bank which exceed the proscribed number and ATM access fees
charged to non-customers are higher and more prevalent.5' But, big banks
are more likely to receive governmental aid to avoid liquidity crises and pos-
548. Pat Dye, Jr., Case Note, Banking Law-Deposits and Collections-California Su-
preme Court Declares That NSF Charges May Be Held Unconscionable, 16 Cum. L. REV.
393, 395 (1986). "The University Museum in Philadelphia has a clay promissory note of
Babylon, circa 3000 B.C., which provides for repayment of principal and interest on a speci-
fied date. An Egyptian clay tablet, circa 2000 B.C., constituting an instrument payable to the
bearer and promising repayment in produce of a loan in money, also has been found." Id at
393 n.26 (citing Rufus J. Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HAIv. L.
REv. 981, 982 (1948)).
549. James H. Rubin, Study Says Out-Of-State Banks Charge Higher Fees, ORANGE
CouNrTY REG., Sept. 6, 1995, at CO3.
550. Id
551. Id
552. Id
553. Christine Dugas, Customers Aren't Sold on Bank Mergers, USA TODAY, Apr. 14,
1998, at Al.
554. See id
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sible failures."
The bank-customer contract arises from special relationship features.556
"First, the customer... is 'totally dependent' upon the bank's honesty and
expertise. Second .... [noneconomic motives, primarily convenience and se-
curity, encourage customers to open bank accounts.] Third, banks offer 'vi-
tal' services to the public."' But the contract between the bank and cus-
tomer is a standardized contract; like a contract of adhesion, it gives only
two choices: adherence or rejection.55 Customers rate "convenience as the
most important motivation for choosing a particular bank, [and] other im-
portant factors include recommendations, helpful personnel, and reputa-
tion.''559
"Ihe fear of large banks having too much power... still exists in soci-
ety today.""56 But, regardless of what consumers think, there is no sign that
bank mergers are slowing. In the first half of 1998, 277 bank mergers were
announced worth $240 billion.56' Most customers, when their bank is bought,
simply resolve themselves to live with the resulting merged institution.
"Mark Caron was one of about 150,000 customers at Shawmut Bank who
had a checking account that required a balance of $3,000 or $5,000 to avoid
monthly fees. When Fleet Bank bought Shawmut in 1996, it promised to
keep those accounts. But after about a year, Fleet eliminated them and
shifted customers to one requiring a $10,000 balance. 'I wasn't pleased,' Ca-
ron says."56 2
The past may have foretold the future. Looking back, perhaps "1987
[was] the 'crossroads' in the post-deregulation evolution of the [savings] in-
dustry... [clearly] the optimism of 1985 and 1986 ha[d] come face-to-face
with some disturbing realities as to whether there really is 'life after deregu-
lation."'563 While antitrust concerns remain a consideration in the path of
amalgamation, gone now are the regulatory schemes that gave banks protec-
tive armor against outside competition. The competition in San Diego today
comes not simply from national, regional, or local competitors, but from Pa-
cific Rim banking organizations. For example, in 1996 "Bank of Tokyo's
Union subsidiary [bought] the Mitsubishi-owned Bank of California."'5
"The foreign banks in Southern California, the largest of which are Japanese
555. See Boro, supra note 240, at 466.
556. See Terrence S. Morrow, Balancing the Checkbook: Re-allocating Economic Power
Between Banks and Depositors, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1275, 1291 (1988).
557. Id at 1291-92.
558. See id at 1291 n.88.
559. Id at 1291 n.92.
560. See Tart, supra note 12, at 916.
561. See BankMerger OK'd-BankAmerica, NationsBank approved by Federal Reserve,
THiE DALLAS MoRNINGNEwvs, Aug. 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13095820.
562. Dugas, supra note 553, at Al.
563. The Thrift Industry: Facing Reality, 6 No. 21 BANKING EXPASiON REP. 1, Nov. 2,
1987, at 1.
564. Danielson, supra note 7, at 10.
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owned, were somewhat protected from failure by deep-pocket parents, but
they were not totally immune to problems and consolidation."565
The new challenge in banking is technology, and how information proc-
essing will change the business of banking. "The exchange of informa-
tion... is really what electronic financial commerce is all about. It is, there-
fore, inevitable that banks will join forces with technology and
telecommunication providers."' 66
Banks are already starting to develop virtual branches with no bricks and
mortar. In a virtual branch, all bank products and services are being pro-
vided in an electronic format. But that's not all. A virtual branch can also
offer other financial services, such as investment and insurance products.
More importantly it can even offer services.. . for such things as financial
market research, travel and entertainment arrangements and products, and
online newsletters and magazines. The possibilities are countless. [Of
course, in] a virtual branch all this [happens without regard to] geography
and government borders, [which are] key factors in traditional antitrust
analysis governing bank mergers and acquisitions.5 '
Technology has transformed everything banks do ....
The goal: integrated, high-speed computer networks that sell everything
from mutual funds and insurance policies to simple checking accounts, all
aimed at consumers around the globe.
Such networks are "the fuel" of the bank consolidation drive, says Jim
Dixon, president of technology and operations at NationsBank Corp.,
which recently announced a $60 billion merger with BankAmerica Corp.
Customers, he says, want to do their banking anytime of the day and by
using whatever "appliance" they choose, be it a phone, home computer,
automatic teller machine, or other device.... Experts at IBM are now
being called in as soon as a merger is finalized.56
Consider the ongoing evolution of electronic banking and commerce:
* Nearly 1,000 banks have created or are in the process of creating Inter-
net Websites to market their products and services. Some 94 insurance
companies, and 40 securities firms also have done so. About 1.5 million
securities accounts are now on the Web.
" Many banks have initiated home banking programs, offering full-scale
services and 150 banks offer moderate scale programs.
" About 2.1 million households are engaged in home banking. Some 40
million customers are using online services such as America Online 69
565. Id
566. Smith & Ryan, supra note 372, at *15.
567. Id
568. Matt Murray & Raju Narisetti, Bank Mergers' Major Engine is Technology, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at Bl, B9.
569. Smith & Ryan, supra note 372, at *19-20; see also Munray & Narisetti, supra note
568, at B9 ("On-line banking is another way banks hope to keep customers happy and save
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Yes, the way banking services are delivered will constantly change over
the next millennium, but the needs of bank customers remain essentially the
same as they were when the first savings bank was created in Boston in
1816." At the center of all this remains the customer, the depositor, without
whom the growth of this industry would be largely irrelevant. These de-
positors continue to need banks to encourage savings, facilitate home owner-
ship, and supply credit, and "for all the breakthroughs, many of the advances
that technology can bring are more promise than reality. Many customers
still prefer doing business at their local branch. PC banking has yet to take
off as optimists have been projecting for years. And integrating computer
systems will be one of the biggest headaches for newly merged banks. '' 1
VIII. THE CURRENT SAN DIEGO FINANCIAL MARKET
San Diego County is California's second highest populated area with
almost 2.9 million residents, the country's fifth largest population. 2 In 1986,
San Diego ranked among the top forty economies in the world. 3 Today it
remains one of the top economies in the world.
The discrepancy in asset size and services alone of the ten banking or-
ganizations that remain in San Diego is astounding. Of the major commer-
cial banking organizations, BankAmerica with $263,527 million in total as-
sets 4 is at the top of the market. Wells Fargo Bank follows with $97.5
billion, 5 and Grossmont Bank with $628 million in assets576 is the leader of
the small commercial organizations. There are no savings institutions which
remain a factor in the local banking equation, but there has been a tremen-
dous development in the size and services of the local credit unions, which
now number 19 and have $4,350,200 million in total assets, 1,707 employ-
ees, and 108 branch offices collectivelyY7
Corporate restructures, mergers and acquisitions, the nationalization of
banking, layoffs, and cost containment efforts have reduced the time com-
mitments banking executives in the past pledged to community involvement
In some cases, the monetary support financial institutions gave to the com-
munity has also been reduced. In past years, the major banking organizations
money. It typically costs 90 cents to $2 every time a customer does a transaction with a bank
teller. That falls to about 40 cents at an ATM, but costs around a nickel on the Internet.").
570. See Ernst, supra note 15, at 97.
571. Murray & Narisetti, supra note 568, at B9.
572. The Dec. 31, 1998, forecast figure is 2,869,437 residents. SELEcTED EcoNoMIc
INDICATORS, supra note 387, at 53.
573. See GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAviNGS BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 8 (1987).
574. See BANKAMERICA CORP., FIRST QrR. 1998 EAR INGs STATEMENT 16 (Apr. 15,
1998).
575. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998).
576. See Largest Area Commercial Banks and Largest Nonlocal Commercial Banks, SAN
DIEGO Bus. J.-TE LISTS Dec. 1998, at 52, 56.
577. See Largest Area Credit Unions, SAN DIEGO Bus. J.-THE LIsTs, Dec. 1998, at 66.
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doing business locally were headquartered in San Diego, now the largest
banks are ionlocal. Some do not consider themselves corporate citizens of
San Diego, except for CRA purposes.
1. Wells Fargo Bank
"Among commercial banks, [Wells Fargo was] the second largest
holder of customer deposits in California" in 1996." Other than this, it is
difficult to calculate a real meaningful measure of overall market share
within the broadly defined financial services industry. "Ongoing consolida-
tion has increased pressure on [Wells Fargo] from its most significant com-
petitor in California, [BankAmerica, which was] the third largest bank
holding company in the United States based on assets as of December 31,
1996. [F]ederal and state legislation adopted in recent years has increased
competition by allowing banking organizations from other parts of the
country to enter [Wells Fargo's] core geographic market." 9 On January 20,
1998, Wells Fargo reported "net income of $298 million for the fourth
quarter of 1997, compared with $123 million for the fourth quarter of 1996.
[Fourth quarter] [p]er share earnings were $3.40, compared with $1.12 in the
fourth quarter of 1996." '' For first quarter 1998, Wells Fargo announced net
income of $315 million and net interest income of $1.130 billion, as com-
pared to $1.216 billion in the first quarter of 1997.581 The decrease from a
year ago was attributed to a decline in earning assets.58 Wells Fargo total as-
sets at the end of first quarter 1998 decreased to $94,820 million from
$101,863 million at the end of first quarter 1997."' 3
Wells Fargo Bank is headquartered in San Francisco, California. On
December 31, 1996, Wells Fargo Bank had 1,947 retail outlets, comprised of
1,274 traditional bank branches, 298 supermarket branches, operated 2,672
ATMs and 375 banking centers in tenth western states,5' 115 located in San
Diego County.585 The bank reports having 1,350 employees in San Diego.58
Outside of San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego have the largest num-
ber of Wells Fargo branch offices.5" During 1997, the bank announced its
578. WELLS FARGO & Co., 1996 10-K REPORT 4 (1997).
579. ld
580. WELLS FARGO & Co., FOURTH QrR. EARNINGS NEws RELEASE, Jan. 20, 1998, at 1.
581. See WELLS FARGO & CO., FIRST QrR. EARNINGS NEws RELEASE, Apr. 21, 1998, at
1.
582. See id
583. See id at 3.
584. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1996 10-K REPORT 14 (1997); see also WELLS FARGO &
Co., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1998). The bank operates in California, Washington, Colorado,
Arizona, Texas, Utah, Nevada, Idaho, Oregon, and New Mexico. See id at 1-8.
585. See Largest Nonlocal Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO BUSINESS JOURNAL-THE
LISTS, Dec. 1998, at 56.
586. See id
587. See generally WELLS FARGO & Co., 1991 10-K REPORT 14 (1992); see also WELLS
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plan to open 450 new retail outlets in Safeway stores in the Western United
States. By January 1998, Wells Fargo operated 897 in-store branch offices.
Wells Fargo reported assets of $50,316 million on December 31, 1995, and
$108,888 million in assets at December 31, 1996; it had generated net in-
come of $1,032 million and $1,071 million in 1995 and 1996 respectively.588
This tremendous growth in a one year period is directly attributed to the First
Interstate acquisition completed April 1, 1996.9 This kind of growth has
never been achieved as quickly, other than through amalgamation. As of De-
cember 31, 1997, Wells Fargo had assets of $97.5 billion, deposits of $72.2
billion, 33,100 full time employees, and was the 10th largest bank holding
company in the country.59
2. BankAmerica, National Trust & Savings Association
As the largest West Coast bank and the largest bank in California,
BankAmerica reported net income of $812 million and profits from fees and
other noninterest earnings of $1.63 billion in the fourth quarter of 1997.591 At
year-end 1997, the bank had representative offices in 38 countries, main-
taining 973 branches in California.592 The bank is a wholly owned subsidiary
of BankAmerica Corporation."3 BankAmerica Corporation, headquartered in
San Francisco, is the one of the largest bank holding companies in the
United States.594 BankAmerica Corporation operates several other chartered
financial institution subsidiaries in California, Nevada, Oregon, Alaska,
Washington, Arizona, Texas, Illinois, Idaho, and Hawaii.595
Even though BankAmerica is supervised by several different federal and
state regulatory agencies, the Federal Reserve Board has primary responsi-
bility for the supervision of the holding company, BankAmerica Corpora-
tion."6 As of December 31, 1997, the bank had total assets of $260.2 billion,
total deposits of $172 billion, with total loans of $167 billion.597 The bank's
primary business is retail and wholesale banking.59 BankAmerica has over
90,000 employees in 38 countries around the world,599 and 2,500 in San Di-
FARGO & Co. Homepage (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://wellsfargo.com/about/today>.
588. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1997).
589. See WELLS FARGO & Co. Homepage (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://wellsfargo.com
/about/today>.
590. See id.
591. SeeBANKAMERicA CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 92 (1998).
592. See BANKAMERICA CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1998).
593. See BANKAMEmCA CORP., 1996 10-K REPORT 5-6 (1997).
594. See BANKAMERICA CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 9-19 (1998).
595. See BANKAMERICA CORP., 1996 10-K REPORT5 (1997).
596. BANKAMERICA CORP., 1996 10-K REPORT 16 (1997).
597. See BANKAMERICA CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1998).
598. See id. at 9-10.
599. See BANKAMERiCA CORP., 1998 FIRST QrR. EARNINGS STATEMENT (visited Apr. 19,
1998) <http:/lwww.bankamerica.comlbatodaylearnings.html>.
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ego County.""
BankAmerica's reputation is that of an extremely well managed banking
organization, highly profitable, and protective of shareholder investment.
For example, "per share earnings rose more than net income because Bank-
America bought back 31.7 million shares of its common stock during the
year."' The buyback apparently incited the increase to per-share earnings.
"In the face of falling currency, stock and bond markets in Asia, Bank-
America retrenched, cutting its outstanding assets in the region by 13% to
$14.1 billion during the period while earmarking about $400 million of its
existing loan loss reserves to cover its Asian exposure."6" As a result of its
aggressive actions, the Bank's depositors and customers are also well pro-
tected. BankAmerica's major business activities are commercial, corporate
lending and business services, and real estate lending."3
3. Union Bank of California
The three major commercial banks doing business in San Diego are all
headquartered in San Francisco, but Union Bank has openly declared its
principal San Diego location to be its regional headquarters.0 4
UnionBanCal Corporation, a holding company which owns Union
Bank, also headquartered in San Francisco, is itself owned by The Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., the world's largest bank, with assets of $750 billion
and a branch network of over 450 offices worldwide. 5 Union Bank is the
third largest bank in California, reporting assets of $29 billion at December
31, 1996, 243 branches on the West Coast, 238 in California, 65 in San Di-
ego County, three in Washington, two in Oregon, facilities in Texas and
New York, and 17 overseas branch and business offices.0 6 The bank consid-
ers itself to rank among the top 25 banks in the United States.6
The bank is a full-service commercial bank providing a broad mix of fi-
nancial services, including business lending, commercial and corporate
lending, trust and investment management services, real estate-oriented
services, and private banking.0" Union is in a head-to-head competition with
Wells Fargo and BankAmerica for commercial bank market share. While
their business focus (consumer and small and middle-market business
600. See BANKAMERICA CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1998); see also Largest Non-
local Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGo BusiNEsS JOURNAL-THE LIsTs, Dec. 1998, at 56.
601. BANKAMERICA CORP., 1997 FOURTH QTR. EARNINGS STATEMENT (visited Apr. 19,
1998) <http://www.bankamerica.com/batoday/eanings_4q97.html>.
602. Id
603. See BANKAMERICA CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 9-19 (1998).
604. See UNIONBANKOFCAL. CORP., 1996 ANNUALREPORT 65 (1997).
605. See id at 1.
606. See id
607. See id
608. See id
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banking services) is slightly different than either of their competitors, Union
Bank's strategy is to entrench itself more visibly in the communities in
which it conducts business. Its CRA activities, conducted through seventeen
different programs, appear to be conducted more vigorously than the other
two major San Diego commercial banks. In fact, CRA matters were empha-
sized independently in the three banking organizations that made up Union
Bank6 9 prior to the April 1996 rebirth of the bank. Union Bank continued the
community-based approach the three separate banks projected before the or-
ganizations were combined. This approach has given Union Bank a particu-
lar character and authority in both the San Diego business community and
the community at large.
4. Great Western Bank/Washington Mutual, Inc.
There is immense speculation among industry analysts on the future of
Southern California savings institutions. What is not intangible however, is
the role Great Western Bank (now Washington Mutual as of July 1, 1997)"0
will play in this scenario. Great Western's financial strength, and position in
the market, made a perfect springboard for entry into the southern California
market by a national bank or one of the large regional savings institutions,
and has long drawn the attention of financial institutions vying to do busi-
ness in the lucrative San Diego market. Its acquisition was quite an accom-
plishment for Washington Mutual. Typically, the Southern California sav-
ings institutions are mortgage banks. They do not have assets compatible
with commercial banks and are not well positioned to do the business of
commercial banks. However, during 1996, Great Western reported non-
interest-bearing checking accounts in excess of 5% of assets to liabilities and
demonstrated it was well diversified in commercial real estate, consumer
loans, securities, and mortgages."'
In the fall of 1996, San Diego waited to see how the potential rival bid-
ders for Great Western Financial Corporation, the target of a $6.34 billion
hostile bid from H. F. Ahmanson would fair. The financial analyst commu-
nity surmised that Wells Fargo & Company and BankAmerica Corporation,
both growth-hungry California-based market contenders, would not be in the
mix because of antitrust concerns. NationsBank, Golden West Corporation,
Washington Mutual Inc., and First Nationwide Holding Inc. were all possi-
ble suitors for Great Western. Great Western did business mostly in Califor-
nia, with 46 branches in San Diego, and had at that time approximately $43
609. Southern California First National Bank, California First Bank, The Bank of Cali-
fornia, and Union Bank were combined in 1975, 1988, and 1996 through mergers and acqui-
sitions by The Mitsubishi Bank and The Bank of Tokyo, Ltd., to form what is now Union
Bank of California.
610. See WASINGTON MtTUAL, INC., 1997 SECOND QTR. EARNINGS STATEMENT (1997).
611. See WASHINGToN MUTUAL, INC., 1997 10-KREPORT 27, 30 (1998).
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billion in assets."' Washington Mutual planned to consolidate only 2
branches by May 1998, leaving 44 Washington Mutual branches intact in
San Diego."3 Analysts predicted that if the hostile bid by Ahmanson was un-
successful, Washington Mutual was the best poised of the rival bidders.
Washington Mutual had a record of proving its ability to convert sav-
ings institutions from deposit-centered institutions to successful retail bank-
ing operations. 4 As early as 1987, Washington Mutual had begun to move
into the acquisition and merger scenario with their initial acquisition of three
branches of Shoreline Savings Bank."' Even though Washington Mutual,
based in Seattle, just completed its latest of 22 acquisitions in the last ten
years with the acquisition of American Savings during the summer of 1996,
it had a record of consistent earnings growth.6 In late 1996, its stock traded
in higher multiples as related to earning and book value than any other rival
bidders,6"7 As a result of its experience acquiring other banking organiza-
tions, the bank anticipated (and realized) the systems integration of Great
Western to be completed by the end of the second quarter of 1998.6"8 By
year-end 1997, Washington Mutual had assets of $96,981 million, deposits
of $50,986 million, and net interest income of $2,656 million."9
Washington Mutual is well capitalized after the Great Western merger,
reporting for December 31, 1997, stockholders' equity of $5.31 billion,
compared with $4.99 billion at year-end 1996.62° At the end of 1997, the ratio
of capital to total assets was 5.47% compared with 5.71% a year earlier.621
The company had 19,880 employees as of year-end 1997.622
The bank is regulated as a S&L holding company by the OTS, the Di-
rector of the Department of Financial Institutions of the State of Washington,
the FDIC as a state-chartered bank, FDICIA requirements, and the Federal
Reserve Board.6" The bank's deposit accounts are insured by the FDIC
through both the BIF and SAIF 24
612. See Interview with Libby Hutchinson, Vice President for Corporate Public Rela-
tions, Washington Mutual Bank (Apr. 24, 1998).
613. See id
614. See, e.g., FDIC Continues Grappling with Bank-Thift Transactions, 6 No. 9
BANKING EXPANSION REp., May 4, 1987, at 8.
615. See id.
616. See WASmNGTON MUTUAL, INc., 1997 10-K REPORT 12 (1998); Washington Mu-
tual, Inc., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1998).
617. See generally WASHINGToNMuTUAL, INc., 1997 10-K REPORT 23-26 (1998).
618. See WAsHNGroNMuruAL, INc., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT4 (1998).
619. See id at 1.
620. See id
621. See id
622. SeeWAsHINGTONMtTUAL, INC., 1997 10-KREPORT 12 (1998).
623. See id. at 14-20.
624. See id at 15. BIF denotes the Bank Insurance Fund, authorized under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817(b)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. 1996). SAIF denotes the Savings Association Insurance Fund,
authorized under 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(D) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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Washington Mutual faces significant competition in attracting and
retaining deposits and making loans in all of its market areas. Its most di-
rect competition for deposits has historically come from savings institu-
tions, credit unions and commercial banks doing business in its primary
market areas of California, Washington, Oregon, Florida and Utah. As
with all banking organizations, however, Washington Mutual has also ex-
perienced competition from nonbanking sources, including mutual funds,
corporate and governmental debt securities and other investment altema-
tives. Washington Mutual's competition for loans comes principally from
savings institutions, commercial banks, mortgage companies, credit un-
ions, insurance companies and other institutional lenders. Many of these
competitors have more significant financial resources, larger market
shares and greater name recognition than [Washington Mutual]. The ac-
tivities of such competitors may make it difficult for Washington Mutual
to achieve its financial goals. In addition to the normal competitive factors
described above, Washington Mutual management at the holding company
level has limited operating experience in California and Florida, each of
which has a much larger population with more large financial institution
competitors than the states in which Washington Mutual has historically
operated. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that [Washington Mu-
tual's] consumer banking strategy will prove successful in the California
and Florida markets.
Although consolidation has decreased the number of institutions
competing in [Washington Mutual's] market, both savings and commer-
cial banks have reemphasized their focus on the consumer, making com-
petition for retail deposits and loans extremely fierce. While the increased
competitive pressures make the banking environment more difficult, the
Company remains a strong market force. For 1997 (through October),
Washington Mutual's originations of single family residential loans
ranked first in both Washington, Oregon and California.6z
Now serving over four million customers in 10 states,626 there is every ex-
pectation Washington Mutual will retain its market share of Great Western
San Diego customers.'V
5. The Locally Based Financial Institutions-Grossmont Bank, Bank of
Commerce, Scripps Bank, Peninsula Bank, and North County Bank
These five local banking organizations are currently extremely likely
takeover targets for regional or national financial institutions looking to in-
crease their presence in the San Diego banking market.
a. San Diego National Bank
During 1997, San Diego National, a commercial organization, head-
quartered in downtown San Diego, emerged as one of the local small bank
leaders. In July 1997, the Bank received approval from the Comptroller of
625. Id. at 20.
626. See WAsHINGTON MuTuAL, INc., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1998).
627. See WAsHINGToNMUTUAL, INc., 1997 10-KREPORT 20 (1998).
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the Currency to purchase ten Regency Savings Bank branches in San Diego
County. Even though both Regency Savings and San Diego National are
owned by FBOP, a financial holding company based in Illinois, the acquisi-
tion gave San Diego National assets of about $930 million and 12 branch of-
fices in the county.628 This deal made the Bank the largest locally based fi-
nancial institution of either the commercial or savings banking
organizations.629
At the time of the acquisition, San Diego National immediately an-
nounced it would place a new emphasis on consumer banking products and
extend its lending limit for business customers from $2 million to $25 mil-
lion.63 As of December 31, 1997, San Diego National reported $201 million
in assets, and $171 million in deposits. 1 The majority of its business (60%)
is commercial loans, including loans to business and agriculture. 2 Thirty-
five percent of its business is real estate loans.633
[The Chief Executive Officer very publicly] emphasized [the bank's] local
ties and the human touch in describing the mission of the expanded...
Bank, [saying] personalized customer service and participation in the civic
and arts communities as well as direct interest and flexibility to meet the
financial needs of San Diego's business sector has been lost through
mega-national bank mergers .... [O]ur goal is to fill this void.634
He also insisted that no layoffs were expected, rather the bank actually an-
ticipated some hiring.635 Prior to the Regency purchase, the bank had 108
employees. 6 "San Diego National Bank reported year-to-date net earnings
at the end of the [third- quarter 1998] of $11.04 million, compared to $1.8
million for the same period in 1997. The privately owned bank had net third-
quarter earnings of $3.01 million, compared to $1.31 million for the third
quarter of 1997.""
It is institutions like San Diego National and Grossmont Bank that will
attempt to transform the void left in the San Diego financial market, by the
disappearance of Great American, Imperial Savings, Home Federal, and San
628. See Uri Berliner, San Diego National Bank Set to Expand, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE, May 6, 1997, at C2. See also Business Briefing, SAN DIEGo UNION TRmUNE, July
12, 1997, at C2.
629. See Largest Area Commercial Banks Headquartered in San Diego County, SAN
DIEGO Bus. J., May 25, 1998, at 18 [hereinafter Largest Banks].
630. See Berliner, supra note 628, at C2.
631. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO Bus. L.-THF LisTs, Dec. 1998, at
52.
632. See id
633. See id
634. UNioNBANKOFCAL. CORP., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (1997).
635. See Berliner, supra note 628, at C2.
636. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO Bus. J.-THE ISTS, Dec. 1998, at
52.
637. Arthur Grupe, Lenders Offer Differing News to Shareholders, SAN DIEGo Bus. J.,
Nov. 23, 1998, at 26.
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Diego Trust.
b. Grossmont Bank
Grossmont Bank is considered by industry analysts to be one of the
highest performing banks among the largest publicly traded banking compa-
nies in the nation. On December 31, 1986, Grossmont had nine branches,
236 employees, $265 million in assets, and deposits of $236 million. 8 Prior
to the Zions purchase in 1996,639 Grossmont earned $101.7 million in net in-
come, and had $7.7 billion in assets." As of Dec 31, 1996, the bank reported
total assets of $ 628 million and net income of $ 6.5 million." As of De-
cember 31, 1997, Grossmont had earned an $11.4 million net income, re-
ported total assets of $858 million, and deposits of $776 million."2 Organ-
ized in 1972 in San Diego County,"3 from its humble beginnings Grossmont
has grown to 13 local branches, with 281 employees.'"
c. Bank of Commerce
Bank of Commerce became the largest independent San Diego based
commercial bank when Zions completed the Grossmont acquisition in 1997.
Founded in 1975, by 1987 the Bank reported $92 million in assets, $85 mil-
lion in deposits, four local branches, and 95 employees."5 Today Bank of
638. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO BuSINESs JOURNAL BOOK OF
IsTS, Dec. 1987, at 29.
639. On July 9, 1997, Grossmont Bank (which had been the largest locally-based bank
prior to the San Diego National deal) accepted an out-of-state buyout offer worth $173 mil-
lion in stock from Zions Bancorp, a Utah holding company with banks in four states. Zions
appears to prefer, and is recognized for its expertise in, acquiring banking organizations in
select markets like San Diego and leaving the management of the acquired institution in the
hands of the local managers who are familiar with the corresponding local communities. Zi-
ons currently operates small community-oriented banking organizations in Utah, Arizona,
Nevada, and Colorado, and in 1997 entered into a deal to purchase 31 branch offices from
Wells Fargo in Idaho, Utah, Arizona and Nevada. See generally Michael Kinsman, Gross-
mont Bank Accepts Out-of-State Buyout Offer, SAN DIEGO UNION TRmUNE, July 12, 1997, at
Al.
640. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO Bus. J.-TIE LISTs, Dee. 1998, at
52.
641. See id.
642. See Largest Banks, supra note 629, at 18.
643. Bancomer, a Mexican bank, owned Grossmont Bank from 1982 to 1995. See Kins-
man, supra note 639, at Al. "Zions Bancorp announced that Sumitomo Bank of California,
Grossmont Bank and First Pacific National Bank will be consolidated and renamed Bank of
California. The combined bank will have 70 offices and assets of about $6 billion .... That
will make it the fifth largest commercial bank in the state... ." Arthur Grupe, Venture Capi-
talists Beginning to Bank on San Diego, SAN DIEGO Bus. J., June 8, 1998, at 14.
644. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO Bus. J.-TE LISTS, Dee. 1998, at
52. See also Largest Banks, supra note 629, at 18.
645. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LIsTs, Dec.
1987, at 29.
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Commerce has grown to assets of $375 million, deposits of $345 million,
five local branches, and 142 employees."6 Its business is almost exclusively
commercial lending, including business and agricultural loans. 7
On April 20, 1998, Bank of Commerce "reported first quarter net in-
come more than doubled due to the strong economic growth and a dynamic
business climate in the six western states where the bank operates." 48 Net in-
come increased 123% to $2.57 million for the first quarter ending March 31,
1998, compared to $1.15 million, in the first quarter of 1997." On Decem-
ber 31, 1997, Bank of Commerce reported 179 employees, 5 branches, an
outstanding CRA rating of 1.51%, $7 million in net income, $556 million in
total assets, and $512 million in deposits.65 "Bank of Commerce reported
third-quarter [1998] net income increased [54%] to $3.8 million, compared
to $2.45 million for third-quarter 1997." "65 These improved results helped
boost the bank's stock price 13.79% to $12.875 on October 21, 1998.652
During 1998 alone, the lender opened six new loan production offices.653
d. Scripps Bank
Scripps Bank had not been a significant force in the San Diego banking
market, having only three branch offices until 1997 when the bank expanded
to seven branch offices and began to concentrate on the trust business.6' In
1987, Scripps reported $59.3 million in assets and $54.6 million deposits.655
At that time there was one branch and 31 employees. 6 As of December 31,
1996, Scripps had $301 million in assets, $271 million deposits, and 170
employees. 7 About one-half of the banks lending is commercial loans, the
other half in real estate.658 By December 31, 1997, Scripps reported 189 em-
ployees, 7 branches, a CRA rating of 0.96%, a net income of $3.2 million,
646. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEo Bus. J.-T HE LSTS, Dec. 1998, at
52.
647. See id
648. Business Briefs Digest: Bank Doubles Income, SAN DIEGO Bus. J., Apr. 20, 1998, at
9.
649. See it
650. See Largest Banks, supra note 629, at 18.
651. Arthur S. Grupe, Local Banks Prosper In 3"'-Quarter Figures, SAN DIEGo Bus. J.,
Nov. 2, 1998, at 6.
652. See id
653. See Arthur S. Grupe, Four Local Banks Report Second-Quarter Losses, SAN DIEo
Bus. J., Sept. 28, 1998, at 15.
654. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO BUS. J.-THE LISTS, Dec. 1998, at
52.
655. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGo Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS, Dec.
1987, at 29.
656. See id
657. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGo Bus. .- TE LIsTs, Dec. 1998, at
52.
658. See id
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total assets of $387 million, and $353 million in deposits."
e. Peninsula Bank
Peninsula Bank was founded in 1975 in San Diego County." By year-
end 1986, Peninsula Bank had assets of $141 million, net loans of $78 mil-
lion and deposits of $132 million.66" ' It maintained only three branch offices
in San Diego and 120 employees.662 As of December 31, 1996, the Bank re-
ported 216 employees, $343 million in assets, $318 million in deposits, and
a CRA rating of outstanding.' The majority (63%) of its business is making
real estate loans.6' Peninsula Bank is now the fourth largest commercial
bank based in San Diego.665 It continues to report a CRA rating of 0.95%.6"
The bank has grown to 10 branch offices, 240 employees, reports $417 mil-
lion in total assets, $389 million in deposits, and a net income for December
31, 1997, of $3.6 million. "Peninsula Bank [reported] record operating re-
sults for the nine-month period ended [September 30, 1998.] Net profits
were up 46.4 percent for the third quarter, while net profit for the nine
months ended [September 30, 1998,] were up 37.8 percent .... Peninsula
Bank was one of the top dollar gainers on the San Diego Stock Exchange on
[October 20, 1998]. '' 668
The locally based banking organizations are tiny establishments com-
pared to the three conglomerates in San Diego. This is the choice San Diego
depositors have, either pay to speak to a customer service representative at
their big bank after their pre-determined number of allotted calls each
month, or call or walk up to their small local bank for personal attention.
This is not too difficult of a choice for most depositors.
At the same time, it appears "that the acquisitions of Security Pacific,
Crocker and First Interstate by BankAmerica and Wells Fargo have fore-
closed other meaningful large bank competition .... ,,69 Deposits, after all,
are supposedly one measure of a financial institution's competitive capacity;
Wells Fargo and BankAmerica lead California banking organizations in de-
posits."
659. See Largest Banks, supra note 629, at 18.
660. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LisTs, Dec.
1987, at 29.
661. See id
662. See id
663. See Largest Area Commercial Banks, SAN DIEGO BUS. J.-THE LisTs, Dec. 1998, at
52.
664. See id
665. See Largest Banks, supra note 629, at 18.
666. See id
667. See id
668. Grupe, supra note 651, at 6.
669. Danielson, supra note 7, at 8.
670. See Appendix A, infra.
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In California, however, banks are only part of the banking story be-
cause the state is home to most of the nation's largest [savings institu-
tions.] Ahmanson & Company's Home Savings subsidiary and Great
Western [, now Washington Mutual, had] combined [1996] deposits of
more than $20 billion, and a resuscitated American Savings, Golden West,
CalFed, GlenFed, Coast Savings, and First Nationwide also are important
players and are larger than all but three banks in the state.
... [T]he large S&Ls are rapidly becoming all that is left of savings
institutions that once held almost 50 percent of [California's] deposits.67'
In 1986 there were 16 thrifts doing business in San Diego. 12 They ranged
from Morris Plan Thrift and Loan with $383 million in assets to the San Di-
ego based Mission Thrift and Loan with $12 million in assets. 3 'Eleven
large thrifts hold about 29 percent of California's deposits, which is up from
the 24 percent they held in 1990. The rest have done less than 6 percent, or
less than one-third of what they had five years ago. ' -
It appears that savings institutions have finally stabilized. As a result, it
is no longer considered necessary to have a separate government agency to
supervise the bailout of the savings and loan industry; consequently, in De-
cember 1995 the Resolution Trust Corporation closed down, and the FDIC
assumed responsibility for the functions of the RTC."
As the economy improves, the problems of many banks and savings in-
stitutions are dissolving. Some perception of reluctance to invest remained in
California banking, at least until the announcement April 13, 1998, of the
pending merger between BankAmerica and NationsBank and the November
1998 announcement of the Wells Fargo/Norwest merger. California banking
is now on the threshold of yet another period of extended growth. Which in-
stitutions will participate is an open question, but whether amalgamation will
continue as the preferred manner of growth seems certain.
What is not an open question is who commands the top position in Cali-
fornia banking. BankAmerica has long been the leading California bank,
[its presence is a vital part of the city of San Diego.] [Tihe dark days of
the inid-[1980s, when BankAmerica's] survival was a concern and Secu-
rity Pacific, Wells Fargo, and First Interstate were challenging its suprem-
acy, are long past. Wells Fargo is now [the most] formidable competitor
[and other than Union Bank, all its other major competitors are gone.] 6
'Today California's banking can be summarized as two very large
banks competing statewide against a myriad of local banks that are a fraction
671. Danielson, supra note 7, at 7-8.
672. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DiEGo Bus. J. BOOK OF LisTs, Dec.
1987, at 29.
673. See id
674. Danielson, supra note 7, at 8.
675. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
676. Danielson, supra note 7, at 6.
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their size, a few Japanese-owned banks and some very large thrifts, the ma-
jority of which are in the Los Angeles area."'
IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"[The only certainty about the future is that BankAmerica and Wells
Fargo will be the market leaders,"" especially in San Diego. But, Union
Bank is the third largest commercial bank in California, reporting $31 billion
in assets and $23 billion in deposits. 9
In its July 1993 report to the President and the Congress of the United
States, the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement made several highly respected recommendations in the ar-
eas of regulation and supervision, abuses and fraud, and as guardians of the
public interest. The Commission proposed "all federally insured depository
institutions should be subject to federal rules, regulations, and examination
which would supercede state rules, regulations and examinations upon a
finding that state-sanctioned activities threaten the safety and soundness of
the insurance fund."6 '
The FDIC would encourage experimentation in the states concerning
new powers and other issues, provided they are consistent with safety and
soundness."' Citing the "poor record" of S&L regulation and the elimination
of the distinction between banks and thrifts, the Commission further pro-
posed "the FDIC be made the sole federal insurer of depository institutions
and the sole federal charterer and regulator of insured depositories.""2 The
FDIC would remain an independent agency but would be required to consult
regularly with the Federal Reserve and make available to it, on a timely ba-
sis, all pertinent information concerning the condition of insured depository
institutions.683 Certainly implementation of such a reform would eliminate
the inconsistencies between California financial corporation regulations and
the federal banking regulations, which led to some of the earlier loopholes
San Diego based savings institutions utilized to broaden their products and
services repertoire and amalgamation activities. To date, such basic and
practical reforms suggested by this 1993 report have still not been embraced.
With regard to abuse and fraud, the Commission first acknowledged that
"savings institutions were tempting vehicles for abuses and fraud, and there
were greatly increased risks of loss from those sources."684
The Commission acknowledged, "insured deposits combined with non-
677. Id
678. Id
679. See UNION BANK OF CAL. CORP., THIRD QTR. EARNINGS STATEMENT (1997).
680. See ORIGINs & CAUSEs, supra note 42, at 69.
681. See id
682. Id
683. See id
684. Id
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existent net worth requirements allowed massive growth to keep ponzi-
schemes going and to maintain access to additional sums to prevent collapse.
Cash could be easily withdrawn from an institution either directly through
salaries, bonuses, perks, and dividends, or indirectly through nominee loans
kickbacks and other devices."6 "Moreover savings institutions were cheap
to acquire. It was easy to get approval to control the entity and easy to domi-
nate it. The regulatory laxity introduced as a part of forbearance provided the
ideal fraud environment. It allowed the fraudulent to report financial strength
and disguise losses while savings institutions were being looted. It required
no financial risk from those engaged in the fraud, and offered little chance of
the fraud being discovered, proved and punished.""6 6 Because of the applica-
tion of FDICIA, BHCA and increased examination and regulation by the
FDIC, OTS, and state supervision, this is no longer true in 1998.
In fact, in past years FSLIC and the FHLBB regularly required healthy
savings institutions to take over and manage problem financial institutions as
a quid pro quo for regulatory approval of such an institution's request to
complete a highly sought after merger or acquisition. "FSLIC efforts to con-
serve cash by arranging takeovers of insolvent savings institutions, rather
than closing them and paying off depositors, also contributed to the prob-
lems. Given the ability of the acquirers to contribute real estate and/or bor-
row the minor capital infusion, it cost almost nothing, or less than nothing
(as where the S&L paid the acquirer cash for the excess value of the real es-
tate contributed) to buy a S&L."6 But the problems in the S&L industry
were not just deregulation, poor capitalization or deposit insurance.
During San Diego-based Great American First Savings Bank's March
1986 acquisition of Home Federal Savings and Loan Association of Tucson,
Arizona, in addition to paying "cash in the amount of $103.5 million to ac-
quire Home Federal," the FHLBB required and FSLIC assisted Great
American to acquire
two insolvent institutions operating under FSLIC-imposed conservator-
ships: Hacienda Federal Savings and Loan Association, Oxnard, Califor-
nia ("Hacienda Federal") and First Federal Savings and Loan Association
of Redding, Redding, California ("First Federal"). The total assets of Ha-
cienda Federal and First Federal at December 31, 1985 were $74.6 million
and each of them operated a single office.
... [These acquisitions were treated as part of the same transaction in
which Great American acquired Home Federal of Tucson. FSLIC first]
placed Hacienda Federal into receivership and liquidated it, selling sub-
stantially all of its assets and liabilities to First Federal. [Pursuant to an
Assistance Agreement among FSLIC, Great American and First Federal,]
FSLIC agreed to provide certain financial assistance to Great American.
685. Id
686. Id at 70.
687. Ide
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Under the Assistance Agreement, [FSLIC agreed to] contribute to
Great American the amount of the negative net worth of Hacienda and
First Federal over $24 million .... In addition, losses or profits realized
upon the disposition of certain assets of Hacienda Federal and First Fed-
eral at the acquisition date... [would be] shared equally by Great Ameri-
can and FSLIC. [Finally, FSLIC] agreed to indemnify Great American
against certain losses or claims that [arose] out of its acquisition of Haci-
enda and First Federal. 88
What banking organization interested in amalgamation would not be willing
to acquire troubled institutions pursuant to such an agreement?
Amalgamation in such an environment only increases the possibilities
and depth of such abuses to occur. Certainly federal and state political af-
filiations between both owner-controlled and manager-controlled banks and
savings institutions had a role in the latitude certain financial institutions
were given in regulatory compliance matters and merger and acquisitions
deals. The Bank Board still promotes some quid pro quo arrangements in
exchange for regulatory approval, but today the anti-competitive effects of a
merger managed through divestiture plans are more of a regulatory concern.
Given such acknowledgments, the Commission recommended the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, FDIC, SEC, Treasury and Justice departments, and the
legal and accounting professions take proactive roles in formulating spe-
cialized rules of professional responsibility for attorneys and accountants
representing institutions receiving federal insurance or guarantees to try to
keep criminals away from insured institutions, and aggressively prosecute
wrongdoers, for the deterrent effect. 89 It appears however, that the most con-
vincing deterrent has been the shareholder derivative suits which began in
response to the amalgamation of the 1980s and show no sign of retreating
today.
The Commission advocated creating anti-fraud units that would include
attorneys, investigators, and accountants within each federal agency to be re-
sponsible for regulating financial institutions and refer criminal matters to
individual U.S. Attorney's Offices or other such agencies.69 The Commis-
sion's idea was to make each federal agency responsible for regulating in-
stitutions which receive federal insurance or guarantees under its jurisdiction
accountable, even to the extent of "appointing an inspector general ('busi-
ness practices officer') periodically to review and report upon the practices
of the institution. [Such an] inspector general would be appointed for a fixed
term (e.g., five years) subject to the approval of the federal regulatory
authority. [This] inspector general could not be removed by the institution-
except upon approval of the regulatory authority." ' Still there has been no
attempt by the regulatory banking agencies to establish these "task forces" of
688. GREAT AMERIcAN FIRST SAVINGs BANK, 1986 10-K REPORT 2, 3 (1987).
689. See ORIGINS & CAUSES, supra note 42, at 71.
690. See id
691. Idt
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sorts to more closely scrutinize fraud within financial institutions.
Finally, the Commission made certain recommendations pertaining to
the federal government's role as guardians of the public interest with regard
to the financial services industry. The problem, according to the Commis-
sion, was conflict of interest and improper separation of powers. The Bank
Board's role was "protecting taxpayers by assuring the safety and soundness
of the S&L industry .... [But h]istorically the Bank Board served more as
the promoter of the S&L industry than as its stem regulator. ' 92 When eco-
nomic anomalies occurred in the financial market, FHLBB was ill-equipped
to deal with the long term ramifications and responded by "promoting long
term growth [in areas other than housing finance, and creating] strong in-
centives for [savings institutions] to pursue risky and abusive ventures."693
The Executive Branch was focused on reducing government cutting taxes
and increasing national defense, and election year politics, and Congress
delayed recapitalization of the FSLIC, limited the statutory authority to deal
with mounting problems, and took heed to the assertions of industry lobby-
ists and even regulators who insisted the problems were under control, fail-
ing to recognize news media reports, revelations, and criticisms. '94 The Na-
tional Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery an
Enforcement considered the news media "key guardians of the public inter-
est,""G9' and charged the media with "failing to sound an alert with respect to
the unfolding S&L crisis. 696
As this report suggests, the answer is to improve the performance of the
guardians, and "[make] the burden [of these guardians more].., manageable
by assuring that the perverse incentives-economic, political and bureau-
cratic-that created the S&L debacle are eliminated." ' But for banking or-
ganizations in 1998, some of these particular inspirations remain. The Com-
mission's answer is to have "Congress delegate to the Federal Reserve
Board authority to appoint a nonpartisan oversight board," an objective
group without rule-making authority, to oversee and comment on issues re-
lating to federal deposit insurance and regulation.98 This group would con-
sist of "members... [with] expertise in accounting, legal and economic is-
sues,"' 99 its charge being to "publish an annual report, testify at oversight
hearings... issue press statements on matters concerning deposit insurance
and regulation... [and] evaluate proposed new statutes, rules, regulations
and examination procedures that appear too lax or that industry representa-
692. Id at 72.
693. Id
694. See id at 73-74.
695. Id at 74.
696. Id
697. Id at 75.
698. Id
699. Id
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tives indicate represent an undue burden.""0 The idea was for this oversight
board to "evaluate federal deposit insurance programs... [with] particular
attention to the presence or absence of moral hazard... [and] evaluate both
estimates of exposure to loss by these federal insurance programs. 701 The
Commission advocated full "authority, budget, and qualified staff... [for
this board, in order to] build the board's standing in the public arena...
generate confidence and promote political action on long-term problems
which had been ignored" in the past. 
71
The Commission admits "[c]ongressional oversight was inadequate and
ineffective during the collapse of the S&L industry," and finds not only that
"congressional committees need better access to information without relying
only on regulators" but that the view of these committees could also be "en-
hanc[ed by] the expertise and perspectives available by establishing visiting
scholar programs for academic experts.0 3
This Commission concluded that "a more vigilant news media with re-
porters better trained in economic and financial affairs could contribute
much to keeping pressure on Congress and the Executive Branch to prevent
future debacles from occurring." ' The problem is that the news media
should not be charged with playing a role in discovering flaws in a system
that is the Federal Reserve Board's and the other regulatory banking agen-
cies' responsibility. True, the news media is, of course, the ultimate guardian
of the public interest; but for regulators to trust even financially astute re-
porters with the responsibility of evaluating federal deposit insurance pro-
grams and regulatory actions is not appropriate.
Big savings institutions with a high concentration in the San Diego mar-
ket have a rosy future there. Housing development in San Diego is experi-
encing a strong recovery which means mortgage lending is again in as much
demand as commercial banking services. Although savings institutions have
always been primary receptacles of insured deposits, it does not appear they
will continue to be as much of a factor in the San Diego market as commer-
cial banks.
The problem is that so few savings institutions remain in the San Diego
market, and credit unions are ill equipped to service large numbers of cus-
tomers on a large scale. Certainly credit unions have been and will increas-
ingly have a competitive impact on the locally based banking organizations
and the markets they service. In San Diego, credit unions account for an in-
creased percentage of bank and savings institution deposits, and aggressively
compete with traditional financial institutions in terms of products and serv-
ices. On December 31, 1996, there were over twenty-five large credit unions
700. Id
701. Id
702. Id at 75-76.
703. Id
704. Id
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doing business in San Diego. 5 Membership in credit unions is no longer re-
strictive, now opening up to nearly every individual or business in the mar-
ket. But the tide of amalgamation will not slow. Now that the industry has
moved away from government regulation toward a market in which each
banking organization is vulnerable only to market conditions and competi-
tion, there is no reason to turn back to the methodical days of banking. In
creating the future, banking organizations will have plenty of opportunity for
innovation and adaptation. Certainly these conglomerates, products of amal-
gamation, can keep the needs of customers and communities as a focus. This
should be a matter for the examination of the Subcommittee on Anti-Trust,
Business Rights and Competition of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the
House Banking Committee during the scheduled hearings on mergers in
April 1998.
Banking institutions fulfill vital roles in the United States' economy.
The public relies on them to fulfill essential depository and intermediary
functions. In their depository capacity, banks act as fiduciaries in the safe-
keeping and safe handling of public savings and fiduciary accounts. In
their intermediary capacity, banks serve as reinvestment vehicles, chan-
neling funds to meet consumer and business credit needs. In addition,
banking institutions serve as payments intermediaries, providing liquidity
to both consumer and business customers. These banking functions create
a public interest in the soundness of the banking system that arises from a
government's obligation to protect customer expectations of safekeeping
and from a government's desire to promote a viable and efficient eco-
nomic system.0
The requirements to maintain an account at larger banks become more
stringent with each super-regional mega-merger. Yet, there are fewer serv-
ices available, except for those depositors who can maintain accounts of
$10,000 or more.7" In addition, large multistate banks tend to use monopoly
power to charge higher fees.08
Over the last decade, the winners in financial services have been the
category killers. These include specialized companies like MBNA in
credit cards, Countrywide Credit in mortgages and GEICO in auto insur-
ance. These organizations used technology to lower their costs and they
improved their marketing, thereby taking customers from their more tra-
ditional counterparts in the staid banking world .... The financial services
companies that are pairin up in the latest round of mergers want to trump
the category killers by offering financial consumers the convenience of the
shopping mall. The trouble is that there is little evidence that big compa-
nies can sell myriad financial products to all their customers .... 'Typi-
cally families in the top half of the income structure deal with between
705. See Largest Area Credit Unions, SANDIEGo Bus. J.-TI-E LIsTs, 66, 68 (1998).
706. Vincent DiLorenzo, Public Confidence and the Bank System, 35 AM. U. L. REV.
647, 648 (1986).
707. See Steven A. Holmes, National Report: Huge Bank Mergers Worry Consumer
Groups: Costs and Services Are Seen atRisk, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1998, at Y16.
708. See id
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five and ten financial firms," [according, to] Scott Cook, chairman of In-
tuit, Inc., the maker of Quicken software. °
As it is with much in life, perhaps as it has always been in banking, in-
creasingly those with minimum accounts of $10,000 to $15,000 on deposit
get the best bank services.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce is testing an ATM that can dish out
stock certificates, money orders, insurance forms and savings bonds. The
machine, developed by Compaq Computer Corp.'s Tandem unit and NCR,
can tap into a data base to provide customized service, such as remem-
bering that Mr. Smith likes to make withdrawals in $50 dollar bills. The
new software is helping banks prioritize customers. These days 'relation-
ship managers' know exactly which big customers are profitable and
which aren't. The software, which links to the bank's databases, allows
Chase Manhattan Bank executives to negotiate higher fees on certain
services or put in a low bid for another piece of the customers business
because the customer is generating higher fees in other areas. The same
software prioritizes incoming customer phone calls, putting more-
profitable customers ahead of others.
710
Another problem is that when newly merged banks consolidate opera-
tions, the branch offices they close tend to be concentrated more heavily in
poorer neighborhoods.!" '"The number of banks and savings institutions have
declined as a result of deregulation, acquisitions and failures, to 10,922 in
1997 from 18,193 in 1981. But at the same time, the number of bank
branches has remained relatively stable, around 83,000, meaning consolida-
tion has not had an adverse effect on convenience.""
"From a community bank perspective, southern California is the land of
opportunity .... [It is a] market with $250 billion deposits, only two large
banks to compete against, a reduced savings institution presence, the largest
foreign banks in the process of merging, and no [outsiders. It] is a local
bank's dream."1 3 The small locals, Grossmont Bank, San Diego National
Bank, Peninsula Bank, Scripps Bank, and First National, will be called upon
by depositors to fill the vacancies left by the recent departures of First Inter-
state, San Diego Trust, and Security Pacific. The small locally based, com-
munity-oriented banking organizations are here to stay. Their strength will
always be depositor relationships, the provision of personalized customer
service.
Amalgamation has made it unlikely that banking organizations in a city
like San Diego, or even nationally, be sensitive to the needs of the commu-
709. Timothy L. O'Brien & Saul Hansell, How Big Banks See the World: They're
Counting on Herds of Customers, But Bargain Hunters May Graze Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1998, at BU1, BU10.
710. Murray & Narisetti, supra note 568, at B9.
711. See Holmes, supra note 707, at Y16.
712. Id
713. Danielson, supra note 7, at 10.
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nities in which they operate, or ultimately to the depositors they seek. The
question then becomes whether service to community or customers remains
any part of the goal of capitalist banking organizations. 'There are few, if
any, institutions that so profoundly affect the public interest, but are so uni-
versally misunderstood, as banks. In the FDIC's view, the public has a need
and right to make its own judgments with respect to banks."' 4 It is the goal
of government regulation to protect customers from monopoly power and
market concentration as banking organizations consolidate and move into
new lines of business. Arguably, antitrust constraints prevent abuses of mar-
ket power. Yet, current antitrust parameters and practices, at least as cur-
rently applied by the financial regulatory agencies, will not prevent the mar-
ket leaders in San Diego, like BankAmerica, Union Bank, and Wells Fargo,
from playing gatekeeper roles and controlling the essential bank networks or
technological products.
The argument can be made that "for all the hand-wringing about
megamergers, there will still be abundant choices for customers on the
prowl. The combination of NationsBank and BankAmerica will create an
enormous bank, but one that still will control only a little more than 8% of
the nation's bank deposits."715
714. Boro, supra note 240, at 481 n.220.
715. O'Brien & Hansell, supra note 709, at BU1, BU10.
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APPENDIX A
SAN DIEGO MERGER TIME LINE-1986 TO 1998
1986 WELLS FARGO BANK /CROCKER NATIONAL BANK
Wells Fargo Bank acquired Crocker National Bank. At the time of the
merger, Wells Fargo operated 187 branches in Southern California!"
Crocker operated 319 branches in the state of California, 7 of these
branches in San Diego County. Crocker had $19.2 billion in assets at the
time of Wells Fargo's acquisition.
1987 FIRST NATIONAL BANK / NATIONAL BANK, LA JOLLA!
NATIONAL BANK OF FAIRBANKS RANCH
First National Bank of San Diego acquired National Bank, La Jolla and
National Bank of Fairbanks Ranch.7
1988 WELLS FARGO BANK / BARCLAYS BANK OF CALIFORNIA
Wells Fargo acquired Barclays Bank of California. At the time of acqui-
sition Barclays had assets of $1.3 billion,7 8 but had no branch offices in
San Diego.
1988 UNION BANK / CALIFORNIA FIRST BANK
San Francisco based Union Bank completed the acquisition of California
First Bank in 1988. Shortly after the California First deal, true to its es-
tablished mode of dealing with bank failures, "the FDIC entered into a
purchase and assumption agreement with Union Bank which assumed all
the insured deposits of Bank of Newport, after the California Superinten-
dent of Banks closed and took possession on August 12, 1994 of Bank of
Newport in Newport Beach, ordered that it be liquidated, and appointed
the FDIC as receiver." 9
1990 WELLS FARGO BANK / GREAT AMERICAN FIRST SAVINGS
BANK
Wells Fargo began its purchase of the entire California retail branch net-
work of Great American December 1, 1990, completing the initial pur-
chase of 92 Southern California branches.7 11 The first-phase purchase
716. SeeWELLS FARGO &CO., 1986 10-KREPoRT3 (1987).
717. See California Department of Financial Institutions, Mergers in California Since
1980 (visited Dec. 3, 1998) <http://vrvw.dfi.ca.gov/mergers.htm.> [hereinafter Mergers in
California Since 1980].
718. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1991 10-K REPORT 3 (1992).
719. Brenot & D'Angelo, supra note 154, at 113.
720. SeeWELLS FARGO & Co., 1991 10-K REPoRT 3 (1992).
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price was approximately $365 million for which Wells Fargo acquired
assets with a Great American book value of $4.1 billion.!" In connection
with the branch purchase, Wells Fargo also purchased $6.2 billion of de-
posits from Great American.722 Included in this purchase price were $3.7
billion of loans and deposit liabilities of $4.4 billion that were assumed
by Wells Fargo."2 The purchase of the 38 remaining Great American
branches was completed August 1, 1991.24 In connection with the sec-
ond-phase purchase, Wells Fargo acquired assets with a Great American
book value of $1.7 billion, including cash of $1.6 billion, and assumed
deposit liabilities of $1.8 billion."z
1990 WELLS FARGO BANK / TORREY PINES BANK
Wells Fargo acquired Torrey Pines Group of Solana Beach and its sub-
sidiary, Torrey Pines Bank.126 At the time of the acquisition, Torrey Pines
Bank had assets of $443 million.72
1990 SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK / LA JOLLA BANK &
TRUST CO.
Security Pacific National Bank acquired La Jolla Bank & Trust Comp-
nay.72 8
1991 BANK OF SAN DIEGO / BANK OF LA COSTA
The Bank of San Diego acquired the Bank of La Costa!2"
1992 BANK OF SAN DIEGO / AMERICAN VALLEY BANK
The Bank of San Diego acquired American Valley Bank of El Cajon.7 31
1992 PENINSULA BANK / CITIZEN WESTERN BANK
Peninsula Bank acquired Citizen Western Bank of San Diego. 3
1992 BANKAMERICA / SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK
Security Pacific National Bank merged with Bank of America.
721. See iUL
722. See id
723. See id
724. See id
725. See id
726. See id
727. See id
728. See Mergers in California Since 1980, supra note 717.
729. See id
730. See id
731. See id
[Vol. 35
112
California Western Law Review, Vol. 35 [1998], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol35/iss1/3
1998] THE AMALGAMATION OF THE SO. CAL. BANKING INDUSTRY 153
1992 FIRST PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK / TEMECULA VALLEY
NATIONAL BANK AND SAN MARCOS NATIONAL BANK
Escondido National Bank, Escondido, CA, acquired Temecula Valley
National Bank and San Marcos National Bank, changing the name of the
new combination to First Pacific National Bank.732
1993 GROSSMONT BANK/BANK OF SANDIEGO
Grossmont Bank assumed the deposits of the San Diego County branches
of the Bank of San Diego on October 29, 1993, and the Bank of San Di-
ego was closed.
1993 FIRST INTERSTATE BANK / CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC BANK
California Republic Bank merged with and into First Interstate Bank of
California on December 10, 1993, and California Republic Bank was
closed.
1994 FIRST INTERSTATE BANK / SAN DIEGO TRUST AND SAVINGS
BANK
First Interstate Bank of California acquired San Diego Trust & Savings
Bank in 1994. * At the time of regulatory approval, First Interstate had
assets of $50.1 billion and San Diego Trust reported deposits of $1.8 bil-
lion."M
1995 FIRST PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK / OVERLAND BANK
First Pacific National Bank acquired Overland Bank, Temecula, CA. "
1996 FIRST NATIONAL BANK / BANK OF SOUTERN CALIFORNIA
First National Bank of San Diego merged with Bank of Southern Cali-
fornia, San Diego, CA.736
1996 UNION BANK / THE BANK OF CALIFORNIA
This combination made Union Bank the third largest commercial bank
in California with $30.3 billion in assets."
1996 WELLS FARGO BANK / FIRST INTERSTATE BANK
Wells Fargo & Co. completed its merger with First Interstate Bank dur-
ing 1996, increasing Wells Fargo's assets to $108.9 billion as of Decem-
732. See id.
733. See Mergers & Acquisitions: 12 First Quarter Actions Include Okay of Deal Once
Denied Under CRA, 13 No. 8 BANKING POL'Y REP. 14 (Apr. 18, 1994).
734. See id
735. See Mergers in California Since 1980, supra note 717.
736. See id.
737. See UNIONBANK OF CAL. CORP., HISTORY PROFILE: THIRD QrR. 1997 (1997).
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ber 1996, from $50.3 billion in January 1996.131 Wells Fargo acquired as-
sets with a First Interstate book value of approximately $55 billion, for a
purchase price of $11.3 billion.739 In order to secure approval of the
merger, the bank was required by regulatory agencies to divest itself of
61 branches to Home Savings of America and completed the divestiture
September 1996.74 o Wells Fargo was required to divest itself of 10 First
Interstate branches, closed 40 more First Interstate branches, continuing
to operate only 10 of the previous First Interstate branches in San Diego
County.
1996 RANCHO VISTA NATIONAL BANK AND PACIFIC COMMERCE
BANK OF CHULA VISTA / GB BANCORPORATION
Approval granted by the Federal Reserve Board December 18, 1996, un-
der section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act, for GB Bancorporation
of San Diego (assets $527 million at the time of the acquisition), to ac-
quire up to 24.9% of the voting shares of Rancho Vista National
Bank,(assets $93 million) of Vista (a suburb of San Diego) and Pacific
Commerce Bank, of Chula Vista (also a suburb of San Diego).
1996 FIRST PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK / BANK OF RANCHO
BERNARDO
First Pacific National Bank acquired the Bank of Rancho Bernardo.74
1997 GREAT WESTERN BANK / WASHINGTON MUTUAL
Great Western agreed to be acquired by Washington Mutual in 1997.
Washington Mutual now claims to be "the largest savings institution in
the United States, with combined assets of more than $94 billion" as of
August 1997 and "the [number one] mortgage lender on the West
Coast."742 Originally Great Western was a statewide savings institution,
having only a minor presence in the San Diego financial market. On June
30, 1987, with 19 retail branches in San Diego County, the bank's total
assets were reported as approximately $24 billion, with total deposits of
$17.7 billion.74 On July 1, 1997, the day the merger deal was closed,
Washington Mutual had $46.1 billion in assets, Great Western reported
assets of $42.9 billion.7"
738. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1996 10-K REPORT 2 (1997); WELLS FARGO & CO., 1996
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1997).
739. See WELLS FARGO & Co., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1997).
740. See id at 8.
741. See Mergers in California Since 1980, supra note 721.
742. Letter from Michael L. Amato, Senior Vice President of Great Western Bank to
Great Western Customer (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author).
743. See Top 25 Area Banking Companies, SAN DIEGO Bus. J. BOOK OF LISTS, December
1987, at 29.
744. See WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC., 1997 SECOND QTR. EARNINGS STATEMENT (1997).
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1998 BANKAMERICA / NATIONSBANK
On April 13, 1998, BankAmerica and NationsBank announced they will
seek regulatory approval to merge. The combined banks will have $570
billion in assets.' 5 The Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Justice De-
partment gave regulatory approval for this $57.7 billion merger in August
1998.746 The boards of both banks approved the merger September 23,
1998. NationsBank had been the nation's third largest bank, Bank-
America the fifth largest.
7
1
1998 BANK OF COMMERCE / RANCHO VISTA NATIONAL BANK
Bank of Commerce acquired the assets of Rancho Vista National Bank in
May 1998. As of April 30, 1998, the pro forma combined balance sheets
of the two banks included $703 million in assets, $635 million in depos-
its, and $487 million in loans7
1998 SUMITOMO BANK OF CALIFORNIA / GROSSMONT BANK OF
SAN DIEGO AND FIRST PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK
The combined banks will be renamed Bank of California, have assets of
about $6 billion and 70 branch offices, making it the fifth largest com-
mercial bank in the state." 9
1998 PENINSULA BANK OF SAN DIEGO / WESTERN BANCORP
July 24, 1998, Peninsula Bank and Western Bancorp announced they
would merge. However, in September 1998, Peninsula Bank exercised
their right to withdraw from the merger when the price of Western Ban-
corp common stock fell below $36.65 a share7 1
With the addition of Norwest, Wells Fargo is the seventh largest in assets
and the third largest in market value among U.S. bank holding compa-
nies:"
1998 GROSSMONT BANK / FIRST PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK
Grossmont Bank acquired First Pacific National Bank in June 1998.752
1998 GLENDALE FEDERAL BANK / CALIFORNIA FEDERAL BANK
Glendale merged with California Federal in September 1998."
745. See Bank Merger OK'd-BankAmerica, NationsBank Approved by Federal Reserve,
TRE DALLAS MoRNIGNEwvS, August 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13095820.
746. See id.
747. See id.
748. See Business Briefs: Merger Approved, SAN DIEGO Bus. J., May 25, 1998, at 9.
749. See Arthur Grupe, supra note 651, at 14.
750. See Peninsula Backs Out of Merger Deal, SANDIEGO Bus. J., Nov. 9, 1998, at 42.
751. See icL
752. See Mergers in California Since 1980, supra note 717.
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1998 SCRIPPS BANK / PACIFIC COMMERCE BANK
Scripps Bank acquired Pacific Commerce Bank in November 1998.:'
1998 WELLS FARGO BANK / NORWEST
In November 1998, Wells Fargo and Norwest announced the comple-
tion of a merger creating "the new Wells Fargo, a diversified financial serv-
ices company." '755 The merger had been agreed to in June, and won the sup-
port of both boards and the stockholders in October.7 56 This combination
raised Wells Fargo's total assets to $196 billion, with almost 102,000 em-
ployees servicing 15 million customers through 5,836 locations.7'
753. See id
754. See id
755. Merger of Wells Fargo and Norwest Completed, WELLS FARGO & Co., Press Re-
lease of 11/2/98 available at <http://wellsfargo.com/press/press981102>.
756. See id
757. See id
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